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Introduction
Fingerprints have provided a valuable method of personal identification in forensic science and
criminal investigations for more than 100 years.1 Fingerprints left at crime scenes generally are
latent prints—unintentional reproductions of the arrangement of ridges on the skin made by the
transfer of materials (such as amino acids, proteins, polypeptides, and salts) to a surface. Palms
and the soles of feet also have friction ridge skin that can leave latent prints. The examination of
a latent print consists of a series of steps involving a comparison of the latent print to a known
(or exemplar) print. Courts have accepted latent print evidence for the past century.2 However,
several high-profile cases in the United States and abroad have highlighted the fact that human
errors can occur,3 and litigation and expressions of concern over the evidentiary reliability of
latent print examinations and other forensic identification procedures has increased in the last
decade.4
“Human factors” issues can arise in any experience- and judgment-based analytical process such
as latent print examination. Inadequate training, extraneous knowledge about the suspects in the
case or other matters, poor judgment, health problems, limitations of vision, complex technology,
and stress are but a few factors that can contribute to errors. A lack of standards or quality
control, poor management, insufficient resources, and substandard working conditions constitute
other potentially contributing factors.
In addition to reaching correct conclusions in the matching process, latent print examiners
are expected to produce records of the examination and, in some cases, to present their
conclusions and the reasoning behind them in the courtroom. Human factors issues related to the
documentation and communication of an examiner’s work and findings therefore merit attention
as well.
The study of human factors focuses on the interaction between humans and products, decisions,
procedures, workspaces, and the overall environment encountered at work and in daily living.5
Human factors analysis can advance our understanding of the nature of errors in complex work
settings. Most preventable, adverse events are not just the result of isolated or idiosyncratic
behavior but are in part caused by systemic factors.6 The forensic science community can benefit
from the application of human factors research to enhance quality and productivity in friction
Barnes, J. “History.” In The Fingerprint Sourcebook. National Institute of Justice, 2011. Cole, S. Suspect Identities:
A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification. Harvard University Press, 2001.
2
Mnookin, J. “Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling.” Brooklyn Law Review, 67 (2001): 13.
3
E.g., R. v. Smith, 2011 EWCA Crim. 1296; Bertino, A. and P. Bertino. Forensic Science: Fundamentals and
Investigations. South-Western Educational Publishing, 2009 (Stephen Cowans case); U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (Unclassified and
Redacted). U.S. Department of Justice, March 2006; and Sweeney, C. “Lord Advocate to Appear Before Shirley
McKie Fingerprint Inquiry.” The Times, October 21, 2008.
4
E.g., Leveson, B. Expert Evidence in Criminal Courts—The Problem, Address to the Forensic Science Society,
Kings College, University of London, November 18, 2010. For discussion of specific cases, see Chapter 6.
5
Sanders, M. and E. McCormick. Human Factors in Engineering and Design, 7th ed. McGraw-Hill Companies,
1993.
6
National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality of Health Care in America. To Err Is
Human: Building A Safer Health System. National Academies Press, 1999.
1
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ridge examinations and to reduce the likelihood and consequences of human error at various
stages in the interpretation of evidence.
To further this effort, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Office of Investigative and
Forensic Sciences (OFIS) within the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s) Law Enforcement Standards Office (OLES) sponsored
the work of this expert panel to examine human factors in latent print analysis and to develop
recommendations to reduce the risk of error and improve the practice of latent print analysis.

1.

The Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis

The Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis was convened in
December 2008 and charged with conducting a scientific assessment of the effects of human
factors on forensic latent print analysis. A scientific assessment, as defined by the Office of
Management and Budget, “is an evaluation of a body of scientific or technical knowledge which
typically synthesizes multiple factual inputs, data, models, and assumptions, and/or applies best
professional judgment to bridge uncertainties in the available information.”7
The Working Group was charged with:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Developing an understanding of the role of human factors and their contributions to
errors in latent print analysis through an evidence-based review of literature, case studies,
and previous analyses;
Evaluating approaches to reducing errors in terms of their efficacy, appropriateness in
different settings and circumstances, cost, scientific basis, feasibility, institutional barriers
to implementation, associated risks, and the quality of evidence supporting the approach;
Providing guidance to the latent print analysis community on the practical, scientific,
and policy outcomes of its work through peer-reviewed publications, presentations at
conferences and meetings, and government-sponsored publications;
Providing guidance to policy-makers and government agencies in promoting a national
agenda for error reduction in latent print analysis;
Attempting to develop credible estimates of the incidence, severity, and costs of errors;
and
Making recommendations for future research.

Working Group members were selected because of their expertise in the forensic sciences or
another relevant field and the ability to balance scientific rigor with practical and regulatory
constraints. The Working Group consisted of experts from forensic disciplines, statisticians,
psychologists, engineers, other scientific experts, legal scholars, and representatives of
professional organizations.
The Working Group met 9 times over the course of 2 1/2 years and heard presentations from
experts in human factors, vision science, laboratory design, latent print identification, and
interpretation in forensic science. Each chapter in this report was developed by a subgroup of the
Office of Management and Budget. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review. Office of Management and
Budget, December 15, 2004.
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Working Group, reviewed by the entire Working Group, edited by a committee within the
group, and reviewed again by a set of independent experts. The report was developed through
a consensus process in which each Working Group member had an opportunity to influence the
recommendations and writing. Despite the diversity of backgrounds and views, the Working
Group was able to reach substantial agreement on many important issues, not limited to the
formal recommendations. On some matters, however, an irreducible range of opinions remained,
and particular chapters indicate those issues.

2.

About the Sponsors

NIJ is the research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice and
is dedicated to researching crime control and justice issues. NIJ provides objective, independent,
evidence-based knowledge and tools to meet the challenges of crime and justice. The Office of
Investigative and Forensic Sciences (OIFS) is the federal government’s lead agency for forensic
science research and development as well as for the administration of programs that provide
direct support to crime laboratories and law enforcement agencies to increase their capacity
to process high-volume cases, to provide needed training in new technologies, and to provide
support to reduce backlogs. Forensic science program areas include Research and Development
in Basic and Applied Forensic Sciences, Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants, DNA
Backlog Reduction, Solving Cold Cases with DNA, Postconviction DNA Testing Assistance,
National Missing and Unidentified Persons System (NamUs), and Forensic Science Training
Development and Delivery.
NIST’s mission is to advance measurement science, standards, and technology. It accomplishes
these actions for the forensic science community through the OLES Forensic Science Program.
The OLES Forensic Science Program directs research efforts to develop performance standards,
measurement tools, operating procedures, guidelines, and reports that will advance the field
of forensic science. OLES also serves the broader public safety community through the
promulgation of standards in the areas of protective systems; detection, enforcement, and
inspection technologies; public safety communication; and counterterrorism and response
technologies.

3.

Organization of This Report

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification
(ACE-V) process for the examination of latent prints. The chapter also explains certain
terminology used throughout the report.
Chapter 2 outlines the general ideas behind human factors and organizational theory. It also
addresses the nature of errors in latent print analysis, the reasons for identifying them or
measuring their prevalence, and possible ways to estimate accuracy and error rates.
Chapter 3 describes, defines, and clarifies the interpretative stages of latent print comparisons.
In addition, it describes the current state of knowledge, based upon published research, and
discusses what this research suggests about potential concerns and pitfalls in the interpretive
process.
viii
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Chapter 4 surveys new and forthcoming methods, technologies, and techniques. It examines
research needs and ways to improve existing technologies for recording and storing exemplars,
for utilizing automated searches to locate exemplars for further comparison, and for conducting
latent print examinations.
Chapter 5 addresses written reports that summarize and document the results of friction skin
impression examinations. Best practices in report writing and documentation increase the
likelihood that the evidence is scientifically accurate and will be used appropriately in the
administration of criminal justice. The chapter describes the purposes and value of reporting
and documenting examinations and makes suggestions regarding the content of these materials.
Appendices provide examples of sample reports.
Chapter 6 discusses trial and pretrial communications from the expert to lawyers, judges, and
juries. It reviews the more important legal rules and principles that apply to these activities and
surveys the types of testimony that might be provided at trial.
Chapter 7 focuses on the conditions under which latent print work is performed that can affect
quality in the latent print examination process. It considers issues such as scheduling, lighting,
workstations, interruptions, and workplace design.
Chapter 8 reviews the current status of education and training for latent print examiners,
requirements and evaluation criteria, and curricula. It makes recommendations for training and
educational programs to improve quality and accuracy in latent print analysis and reporting.
Chapter 9 focuses on the role of management in developing and maintaining the system for
producing high-quality results. It reviews the components of a quality organization focused
on latent print analysis. These include management, personnel, accreditation, certification,
proficiency testing, and a systems approach to error identification and mitigation. It recommends
actions that managers and the latent print community should take to create or maintain quality
latent print units.
Chapter 10 summarizes the most important parts of the preceding chapters. It draws the
recommendations from Chapters 3 through 9 into categories that may be helpful for latent print
examiners, managers, research funding agencies, researchers, policymakers, and jurists. An
appendix lists all formal recommendations in order of their appearance in this report.
Although this report explicitly addresses only the procedures for performing a latent
fingerprint examination and communicating the results, much of the analysis and many of
the recommendations are applicable to other forensic science disciplines. Issues of cognitive
bias, standardization of procedures, documentation of examinations, working conditions,
error detection and correction, and accuracy in testimony—among many others—cut across
the forensic sciences. By identifying and managing the human factors issues relevant to latent
print analysis, the latent print community not only can enhance the quality and accuracy of its
contributions to the justice system but also can set an example for other forensic disciplines. The
Working Group hopes that this report will assist in this effort.
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Chapter 1: The Latent Print Examination Process and Terminology
Introduction
The conventional procedure for associating impressions of friction ridge skin by a latent print
examiner involves four phases known as Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification
(ACE-V). This chapter describes the ACE-V process, notes some of its limitations, identifies
areas where human factors should be considered, and defines certain terms used throughout this
report.
Box 1.1: Terminology
ACE-V: An acronym for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification. The ACE-V process is
described in section 1.1.
Bias and error: Defined and discussed in section 1.2.
Exemplar or known prints: Prints deliberately collected from an individual, usually fingerprints.
Exemplar prints can be collected electronically or by using ink on paper cards. Exemplars may be
called ten-prints when impressions of all ten fingers are taken. Exemplar prints collected during
criminal arrests normally include one rolled (from one side of the nail to the other) print of each finger
pad and a plain or slap impression of each finger.
Focal point: A small region containing distinguishing features within a print.
Forensic service provider: A laboratory or unit that examines physical evidence in criminal matters
and provides testimony and reports about the examination findings. In this report, the term is used
interchangeably with agency.
Latent print: Unintentional reproduction of the arrangement of ridges on the skin on the underside of
the hands or feet made by the transfer of materials from the skin to a surface. This report uses the term
print or latent print to denote impressions from all regions of friction ridge skin unless a more specific
term such as “fingerprint” or “palm print” is used.
Latent print examination: The study of latent and exemplar prints to help determine the source of the
latent print. Because prints come from the friction ridge area of the skin on the hands or feet, latent
print analysis is sometimes referred to as friction ridge analysis. As discussed below, “Analysis” and
“Comparison” also have specialized meanings in “ACE-V;” therefore, this report generally uses the
term “examination” rather than “analysis” or “comparison” when referring to the totality of work of
latent print examiners.
Latent print examiner: The individual who conducts the latent print examination, also called latent
print analyst.
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Minutiae: Events along a ridge path, including bifurcations (points at which one friction ridge
divides into two friction ridges), dots (isolated friction ridge units that have lengths similar
their widths), and ridge endings (the abrupt end of ridges), as illustrated in Table 1.1.
Bifurcation

Dot

Ridge Ending

Table 1.1: Illustrations of some friction ridge minutiae8

1.1

The ACE-V Process

In broad strokes, a latent print examination using the ACE-V process proceeds as follows:
Analysis refers to an initial information-gathering phase in which the examiner studies the
unknown print to assess the quality and quantity of discriminating detail present. The examiner
considers information such as substrate, development method, various levels of ridge detail,
and pressure distortions. A separate analysis then occurs with the exemplar print. Comparison
is the side-by-side observation of the friction ridge detail in the two prints to determine the
agreement or disagreement in the details. In the Evaluation phase, the examiner assesses the
agreement or disagreement of the information observed during Analysis and Comparison and
forms a conclusion. Verification in some agencies is a review of an examiner’s conclusions with
knowledge of those conclusions; in other agencies, it is an independent re-examination by a
second examiner who does not know the outcome of the first examination.
Figure 1.1, developed by members of the Working Group, describes the steps of the ACE-V
process as currently practiced by the latent print examination community. The Latent Print
Examination Process Map’s purpose is to facilitate discussion about key decision points in the
ACE-V process. This chapter briefly describes each step in ACE-V, although the sequence of
some of the steps may vary in practice.

Images adapted from Champod, C. Reconnaissance Automatique et Analyse Statistique des Minuties sur les
Empreintes Digitales. PhD Thesis. Institut de Police Scientifique et de Criminologie, Université de Lausanne,
Lausanne, Suisse, 1996.

8

Chapter 1: The Latent Print Examination Process and Terminology

2

Figure 1.1: The Latent Print Examination Process Map
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1.1.1

Analysis

Analysis refers to the initial examination of a friction ridge impression. By inspecting the latent
print, the examiner gathers information needed to decide whether it is useful for comparison.

Figure 1.2: Analysis phase of ACE-V

To determine the print’s value, the examiner considers three levels of detail in the impression.
Level 1 Detail (L1D) is defined as “ridge flow.”9 Ridge flow often translates to a pattern type in
a finger or palm, such as a loop, whorl, or arch formation (see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3); ridge
flow also includes other information such as relative curvature. Pattern types are class
characteristics shared by many individuals. Level 2 Detail (L2D) is defined as “ridge path.”10
L2D includes, but is not limited to, minutiae, such as ridge endings, bifurcations, or dots. Even
the absence of minutiae in an area (called an “open field”) can be significant and highly
discriminating. Level 3 Detail (L3D) is defined as “ridge shapes.” Ridge shapes include the
edges of ridges (which may appear indented or protruded) and pores (the location of the center of

Ashbaugh, D. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced
Ridgeology. CRC Press, 1999.
10
Ibid.
9
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the pore, not the size or shape, which can be highly variable within a source).11 Chapter 3, which
discusses interpreting information in latent prints, provides additional information on the three
levels of detail and their use in the Analysis phase.
After considering the details and the distortion, the examiner judges whether the impression is
suitable for a comparison. If the examiner concludes that the print lacks sufficient detail for a
comparison, then the examination ends with the determination that the latent print is not suitable
for a comparison. Otherwise, the examination moves into the Comparison phase.
1.1.2

Comparison

In the Comparison phase, the examiner compares the latent print to one or more exemplar prints.
Information gathered in the earlier analysis of the latent print provides a starting point. A
comparison of L1D might take only a split second, as when a whorl is present in the latent, but
an arch is apparent in the exemplar. If there is no exclusion based upon L1D, then the examiner
continues the comparison. If the examiner finds disagreement with respect to the target group
that is too extensive to be the result of the distortion noted in the Analysis phase, the examiner
will exclude the source of the exemplar as the source of the latent.

Figure 1.3: Comparison phase of ACE-V

Roddy, A. and J. Stosz. “Fingerprint Features—Statistical Analysis and System Performance Estimates,”
Proceedings of the IEEE, 85, no. 9 (1997): 1390 – 1421; Richmond, S. Do Fingerprint Ridges and Characteristics
Within Ridges Change with Pressure?. Australian Federal Police, Forensic Services, 2004.
11
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If the initial target group is not found, alternative target groups may be selected. If the examiner
locates a comparable set of L1D features in the known exemplar, the examiner proceeds to a
detailed, side-by-side comparison of L2D and possibly L3D. If the examiner concludes that
the extent of agreement between the two prints satisfies his or her threshold, then the examiner
proceeds to the Evaluation phase.
Figure 1.4 displays a latent print (in the middle) and two very similar exemplar prints from
monozygotic (identical) twins. One twin is the source of the latent print. These images were used
in an unusually difficult inter-laboratory comparison in 1995.

Figure 1.4: A latent print and exemplar prints12

12

Images reproduced and adapted with permission of Collaborative Testing Services.
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1.1.3

Evaluation

Figure 1.5: Evaluation phase of ACE-V

In the Evaluation phase, the examiner makes the ultimate decision regarding source attribution.
Traditionally, three possible findings have been available. First, the examiner can make an
“individualization” or “identification.” Section 1.2 defines these terms and describes another
type of source attribution. Second, the examiner can categorically exclude the latent print by
determining that the exemplar print and the latent do not match and cannot share a common
source. Finally, the examiner can determine that the information available is inadequate to
warrant a conclusion. In that event, the examiner would state that the comparison was
“inconclusive” and would provide no additional information about the chances that the two
prints share a common source.
The thresholds for these decisions can vary among examiners and among forensic service
providers. Some examiners state that they report identification if they find a particular number of
relatively rare concurring features, for instance, eight or twelve. Others do not use any fixed
numerical standard. Some examiners discount seemingly different details as long as there are
enough similarities between the two prints. Other examiners practice the one-dissimilarity rule,
excluding a print if a single dissimilarity not attributable to perceptible distortion exists. If the
examiner decides that the degree of similarity falls short of satisfying the standard, the examiner
can report an inconclusive outcome. If the conclusion is that the degree of similarity satisfies the
standard, the examiner reports an identification.
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1.1.4

Verification

Figure 1.6: Verification phase of ACE-V

In the ACE-V acronym, V stands for Verification. Verification procedures vary among forensic
service providers. At one extreme, the verifier, presented with the first examiner’s work, assesses
the original conclusion. At the other extreme, the verifier, blinded to the initial examination,
performs an independent examination.
1.1.5

Limitations and Concerns about ACE-V

At every step in the ACE-V process, human factors can affect the outcome. Latent print
examiners rely heavily on their training and experience to make the required judgments.
Subjectivity is an inextricable part of the process. In the Analysis phase, for example, accurate
identification of the characteristics that make prints of value depends on the examiner’s
knowledge, training, and experience. Likewise, in the Comparison phase, variable factors, such
as the elasticity of skin and uneven pressure, mean that there will never be perfect congruence
between two prints, even if they originate from the same source. The examiner must resolve the
question of whether there is sufficient agreement “within tolerance.” As Chapter 3 points out, the
examiner at least implicitly relies on a sufficiency threshold to resolve that question, and in
setting this threshold, the examiner draws on professional knowledge and experience. There is
little research at present that provides objective metrics for determining these tolerances.
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Of course, the mere existence of subjective elements does not make the process unreliable
or invalid. Humans can perform many tasks involving subjective judgments quite accurately
and consistently. For example, by holding a heavy book and a much lighter one in each hand,
most people can subjectively—but correctly—tell which is heavier. Thus, the mere presence of
subjectivity is not a valid criticism of the technique, but it does mean that issues related to human
factors can be especially salient to the outcome.
Although ACE-V is a systematic process, meaning that the examination proceeds in an
orderly and logical fashion, this does not, by itself, demonstrate that the results are accurate
and reproducible. In 2009, a committee of the National Research Council (NRC) stated that
ACE-V is “a broadly stated framework for conducting friction ridge analyses. However, this
framework is not specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this type of analysis.
… Merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is proceeding in a scientific
manner or producing reliable results.”13 Additional study is required to ascertain precisely how
well examiners using the process perform under either controlled conditions or in casework, and
Chapter 2 describes several possible approaches to developing such information.
Although many in the latent print community describe the ACE-V process as a scientific
method (see Chapter 6), the issue is not the label that can or should be attached to the process
with respect to human factors. ACE-V is a systematic, skill-based, and widely used process
for determining whether two impressions have a common origin. ACE-V designates a logical
sequence for a complex process of judgment, but ACE-V itself does not provide substantive
guidance about standards to be applied within this sequence. Therefore, even though two
examiners might both assert (correctly) that they are using ACE-V, they may be employing
different cognitive processes. Those differences create opportunities for human factors to come
into play.

1.2

The Meanings of “Bias” and “Error”

The issues of bias and error are critical to assessing the role of human factors in latent print
analysis. Those terms are described in detail here, and they are referred to throughout this report.
1.2.1

Bias

The term “bias” has many meanings. This report discusses the term as it is used in three
disciplines. In law, “bias” refers to a witness’s partiality toward one party (or against another)
as a result of financial, emotional, or other interests or attitudes. The law of evidence does not
expect all witnesses to be unbiased. Rather, it relies on the disclosure of the biasing interests or
attitudes through cross-examination, a procedure that is effective primarily in exposing gross
motivational biases (see Chapter 6).
In statistics, “bias” refers to the extent to which an average statistic departs from the parameter
it is estimating or to the extent to which measurements on individual units systematically depart
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. National Academies
Press, 2009, p. 142.
13
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from the true values. Errors from chance will cancel each other out in the long run; those from
bias will not (see Chapter 2).
In psychology, “cognitive bias,” which is addressed throughout this report, is a general term
for “many observer effects in the human mind, some of which can lead to perceptual distortion,
inaccurate judgment, or illogical interpretation.”14 Social and cognitive psychologists have
identified many sources of cognitive bias, including “information-processing shortcuts
(heuristics), motivational factors, and social influence.”15
One type of cognitive bias, called confirmation bias, “is perhaps the best known and most
widely accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning.”16
Confirmation bias “connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial
to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”17 It is “a proclivity to search for or
interpret additional information to confirm beliefs and to steer clear of information that may
disagree with those prior beliefs.”18 “One may be selective in seeking or interpreting evidence
that pertains to a belief without being deliberately so, or even necessarily being aware of the
selectivity.”19
Observers’ expectations have been shown to influence judgment in a broad range of tasks.20
Especially when confronted with ambiguous stimuli, people tend to see what they hope or
expect to see. Thus, in a clinical trial of an experimental drug, the failure to blind the clinicians
evaluating the health of the patients as to whether each patient received the experimental drug or
the placebo would be regarded as a serious methodological flaw. This knowledge would create
a bias toward a finding of efficacy. Recognition of this cognitive bias in no way impeaches the
researcher’s integrity and dedication to learning the truth. It simply means that, on average, the
measurements the researcher makes could well be shifted systematically from the true values,
creating a statistical bias.
As explained in Chapter 3, some information about the origin of a latent print can facilitate
accurate results, but other contextual information can produce confirmation bias.21 Extraneous
information can influence people acting in good faith and attempting to be fair interpreters of the
evidence. For example, radiographers may read X-rays differently if they know the patient’s
14
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. “Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness.” Cognitive
Psychology, 3 (July 1972): 430.
15
Ibid.
16
Evans, J. Bias in Human Reasoning: Causes and Consequences. Psychology Press, 1989, p. 41.
17
Nickerson, R. “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises.” Review of General Psychology, 2
(1998): 175.
18
Budowle, B., M. Bottrell, S. Bunch, et al. “A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic
Sciences and Direction for Continuing Advancement.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 54 (July 2009): 803.
19
Nickerson, op. cit., p. 176.
20
See Miller, L. “Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human Hair.” Law and Human Behavior,
11, no. 2 (June 1987): 157; Nickerson, op cit.; and Risinger, D., M. Saks, W. Thompson, et al. “The Daubert/Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion.” California
Law Review, 90, no. 1 (January 2002).
21
See, e.g., Saks, M., D. Risinger, R. Rosenthal, et al. “Context Effects in Forensic Science: A Review and
Application of the Science of Science to Crime Laboratory Practice in the United States.” Science and Justice, 43,
no. 2 (April – June 2003): 77.
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clinical history;27 doctors may
assess a patient differently in a
drug trial if they know whether
the patient is receiving the
experimental drug or a placebo;28
and a consumer may express
different taste preferences
in response to food labels or
knowledge of the ingredients
included.29 “Contextual bias”
occurs when “the forensic
scientist uses other evidence to
believe that the specific evidence
being analyzed is related to a
particular reference sample(s)”30
and when the contextual
information prompts a biased
selection or weighting of the
features in the samples.
In short, “bias” can be a loaded
term, as when people speak of
personal bias, racial bias, gender

Box 1.2: Misconceptions about “Bias” in Science
Cognitive scientists and psychologists have observed
cognitive bias in hundreds of scientific studies across dozens
of domains.22 Research has also demonstrated its existence in
latent print examination such as when one examiner, presented
with consistent evidence in different biasing contexts, has
been shown to reach different conclusions.23 Much of the
work in latent print examination depends on judgment and
decision-making. In many scientific fields, such judgments are
recognized as subjective and vulnerable to contextual biases.
Within the forensic science community, some people still lack
an understanding of what bias is and how best to address it.24
Often, cognitive bias is treated as an ethical issue or as an
issue that will resolve once someone is aware of the problem.
However, the cognitive process used when gaining experience
(e.g., using schemas, chunking information, automaticity, and
more reliance on top-down information) in itself opens the
practitioner to vulnerabilities, including bias, tunnel vision, lack
of flexibility, and selective attention.25 Cognitive bias results
from computational trade-offs carried out in the brain and is not
a conscious act or an act that can be avoided at will.26

E.g., Nickerson, op cit.
For a review, see Dror, I. and R. Rosenthal. “Meta-Analytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of
Forensic Experts.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 53 (July 2008): 900. See also Dror, I. and S. Cole. “The Vision in
‘Blind’ Justice: Expert Perception, Judgment, and Visual Cognition in Forensic Pattern Recognition.” Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 17 (2010): 161.
24
Pronin, E. “Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment.” Trends in Cognitive Science, 11 (January
2007): 37.
25
Dror, I. “The Paradox of Human Expertise: Why Experts Can Get It Wrong.” In The Paradoxical Brain, edited
by N. Kapur. Cambridge University Press, 2011; and Busey, T. and I. Dror. “Special Abilities and Vulnerabilities in
Forensic Expertise.” In The Fingerprint Sourcebook. National Institute of Justice, 2011.
26
E.g., McClelland, J. and D. Rumelhart. “An Interactive Activation Model of Context Effects in Letter Perception:
Part 1, An Account of Basic Findings.” Psychological Review, 88 (September 1981): 375; and Wilson, T. and N.
Brekke. “Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations.”
Psychological Bulletin, 116 (July 1994): 117.
27
See, e.g., Tape, T. and R. Panzer. “Echocardiography, Endocarditis, and Clinical Information Bias.” Journal of
General Internal Medicine, 1, no.3 (1986): 300; Schreiber, M. “The Clinical History as a Factor in Roentgenogram
Interpretation.” The Journal of the American Medical Association, 185 (1963): 137; Doubilet, P. and P. Herman.
“Interpretation of Radiographs: Effect of Clinical History.” American Journal of Roentgenology, 137, no. 5 (1981):
1055; and Potchen, E., J. Gard, P. Lazar, et al. “The Effect of Clinical History Data on Chest Film Interpretation:
Direction or Distraction?” Investigative Radiology, 14 (1979): 404.
28
Levine, R. Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research. 2nd ed. Yale University Press, 1986; and Shultz, K. and D.
Grimes. “Blinding in Randomized Trials: Hiding Who Got What.” Lancet, 359 (February 2002): 696.
29
Allison, R. and K. Uhl. “Influence of Beer Brand Identification on Taste Perception.” Journal of Marketing
Research, 1 (1964): 36; Nevid, J. “Effects of Brand Labeling on Ratings of Product Quality. Perceptual and Motor
Skills, 53 (1981): 407; Palmer, S. “The Effects of Contextual Scenes on the Identification of Objects.” Memory
and Cognition, 3 (1975): 519; and Lee, L., S. Frederick, and D. Ariely. “Try It, You’ll Like It: The Influence of
Expectation, Consumption, and Revelation on Preferences for Beer.” Psychological Science, 17 (2006): 1054.
30
Budowle, Bottrell, Bunch, et al., op. cit., p. 803.
22
23
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bias, cultural bias, media bias, political bias, and so on. However, this is not the type of bias with
which this report is concerned. Although there have been occasional cases of conscious bias—
indeed, outright fraud—in forensic science31 (as in all sciences and professions), cognitive bias is
far more subtle and usually unknown to the observer. Just how often such bias produces incorrect
findings is difficult to say,32 but “the possibility of biases influencing the decision-making process
of examiners” cannot be dismissed.33
The issue of cognitive bias is therefore one important topic in the study of human factors
in friction ridge impression examination. Research on expectancy effects in latent print
identification is limited.34 However, being consistent with widely accepted psychological
phenomena, this research has prompted proposals for blinding forensic examiners to the origin
of samples being compared with each other35 and for using multiple exemplars in comparisons.36
Likewise, blind verification shields the verifying examiner from contextual bias that might
otherwise affect the outcome in difficult cases. The Noblis-FBI experiment, discussed in Chapter
2, indicated “that blind verification of exclusions could greatly reduce false negative errors.”37
Taking the human factors perspective, an agency might wish to adopt one or more of these
systemic changes rather than simply warning examiners to do their best not to be influenced by
potentially biasing information.38
1.2.2

Error

Like “bias,” the word “error” has a multitude of possible meanings. This report addresses the
relationship between human factors and the two concepts of error outlined in Chapter 2—
procedural error and outcome error. Procedural error refers to departures from a prescribed
procedure. The failure of a technician to calibrate an instrument for measuring breath alcohol
concentration as frequently as regulations prescribe, for example, is a procedural error. It
E.g., Giannelli, P. “Independent Crime Laboratories: The Problem of Motivational and Cognitive Bias.” Utah Law
Review, 247 (2010): 251.
32
Langenburg, G., C. Champod, and P. Wertheim. “Testing for Potential Contextual Bias Effects During the
Verification Stage of the ACE-V Methodology When Conducting Fingerprint Comparisons.” Journal of Forensic
Sciences, 54 (May 2009): 571 – 82 (concluding that blind verification may be most useful for exclusions).
33
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Strengthening Forensic Science
in the United States: A Path Forward, Position Statement. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis,
Study and Technology, 2009; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI’s
Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (Unclassified and Redacted). U.S. Department of Justice, 2006; Stacey, R.
“A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case.” Journal of Forensic
Identification, 54, no. 6 (2004): 706; and Moses, K. “Anatomy of Error.” Presented at International Association for
Identification 89th International Educational Conference, St. Louis, Missouri. August 2004.
34
Dror and Cole, op. cit., p. 161; Dror, I., D. Charlton, and A. Peron. “Contextual Information Renders Experts
Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications.” Forensic Science International, 156, no. 1 (2006): 74 – 78; Dror,
I. and D. Charlton. “Why Experts Make Errors.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 56, no. 4 (2006): 600 – 16; Dror
and Rosenthal, op. cit.; and Langenburg, Champod, and Wertheim, op. cit.
35
Krane, D., S. Ford, J. Gilder, et al. “Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic
DNA Interpretation.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 53 (2008): 1006.
36
NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 123.
37
Ulery, B., A. Hicklin, J. Buscaglia, et al. “Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions.”
Proceedings of the NAS. 2011.
38
Following the misidentification of Brandon Mayfield as a Madrid train bomber, for instance, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) implemented blind verification in some cases. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the
Inspector General, op. cit.; Stacey, op. cit.; and Moses, op. cit.
31
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increases the risk of an error in the actual measurements,39 but this risk might not be realized; the
instrument could remain correctly calibrated during the period in question and thus be no more
likely to err than it would have if the technician had followed the proper calibration schedule.
Whether or not the measuring instrument is calibrated in the prescribed manner, it is unlikely to
give perfectly accurate results. Some measurements will be above the true value, some below it.
For nominal variables (involving categories, such as the ABO types of blood), measurement error
usually is called misclassification or classification error.40
When human beings make comparisons, they also engage in a form of measurement. Visually
determining that one source of light is bright and another dim, or that one object is large and
another small, are examples of classifications by a human system for sensory measurement.
Likewise, the human examiner following the ACE-V process acts as a measuring instrument, and
the examination of two friction ridge skin impressions is a form of categorical measurement or
decision-making. An examiner who reaches a conclusion that two impressions of friction ridge
skin do or do not match is making a binary classification, and it might be a misclassification or
outcome error. If the exclusion or inclusion corresponds to the true state of affairs, there is no
such outcome error. A judgment of an exclusion when the two impressions come from the same
individual’s skin is a false exclusion (a false negative). A declaration of a match when the two
impressions come from different individuals is a false inclusion (a false positive). Chapter 3
develops these ideas further.
1.2.3

Identification: Inclusions and Exclusions

Forensic scientists are sensitive to the breadth of the word “identification.” It can mean placing
an item in a large class, as in “I identified this automobile as a red Buick.”41 It also can mean
associating a trace with a single possible source, as when a latent print examiner reports, “I
identified the latent print as having been made by the right ring finger of the defendant.”42
Examinations of features for the purpose of identification can lead to inclusions (for example,
the suspect’s red Buick is included in the set of automobiles that might have been used by the
robbers) or exclusions (for example, the suspect’s green Lincoln is excluded as the one used
in the robbery). As these examples indicate, an inclusion increases the probability that a trace
originated from a particular source within that set, and an exclusion decreases this probability to
essentially zero. In short, in forensic science and law generally, identifying information makes
an association between a source and a trace either more probable or less probable. If the shifted
probability is large enough, it can justify a source attribution.

See Flaherty, M. “400 Drunken-Driving Convictions In D.C. Based On Flawed Test, Official Says.” The
Washington Post, June 10, 2010.
40
Rothman, K., S. Greenland, and T. Lash. Modern Epidemiology. 3d ed. Lippincott, Williams, & Wilkins, 2008,
p. 138.
41
Thornton, J. and J. Peterson. “The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification.” Modern
Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony. West Publishing Company, 1997.
42
Ibid.
39
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Latent print examiners often use the word “identification” more narrowly, to denote the finding
of an association at the conclusion of the process known as ACE-V.43 In this more specialized
vocabulary, an identification is sometimes also referred to as an individualization.44 In general,
however, forensic “identification” encompasses observations that could narrow the set of
possible sources of a trace and thus change the probability that the trace originated from a
particular source within that set, even when there is more than one remaining possible source.
Whether and when it is appropriate to conclude that the identification procedure establishes
that the set of possible sources consists of one and only one individual is discussed below in
connection with the term “individualization.”
1.2.4

Individualization

As the discriminating power of the latent print features used to make an identification increases,
so does the probability that the matching individual is the source. When every possible source
has different features, and when these differences are detectable, a match in the feature set can
establish that a specific individual is the source. In this limiting case, when the features in the
samples have been accurately ascertained, compared, and found to match, the probability that the
individual in question is the source is one. The identification then has such specificity that it has
become an “individualization.”
The classical theory of latent print identification is that individualization is possible regardless
of how many people could be considered as possible sources. This theory holds that in the
population of the entire world (both in the distant past and the far future): (1) every finger has
a unique pattern of ridges and other features that is maintained throughout a person’s lifetime,45
and (2) a well-trained examiner can ascertain when any impression from a finger displays
enough features to distinguish it from every sufficiently complete and clear impression of every
other finger. This is a theory of “universal individualization” based on a premise of “general
uniqueness.”46
In practice, a universal individualization means that the examiner is confident that if impressions
from everyone else who ever lived and ever will live could be compared with the latent print,
then not one would match.47 The individualizing examiner effectively sets the size of the
43
E.g., Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standards for Conclusions.
Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, September 2003.
44
E.g., Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standard Terminology
of Friction Ridge Examination (To Replace: Glossary, Version 2.0). Version 3. Scientific Working Group on
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, February 11, 2011. This terminology defines “identification”
as “individualization” and notes that in other forensic disciplines “this term denotes the similarity of class
characteristics.”
45
E.g., Peterson, P., C. Dreyfus, M. Gische, et al. “Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State of the Science.”
Forensic Science Communications, 11, no. 4 (October 2009); Stoney, D. “Measurement of Fingerprint
Individuality.” In Advances in Fingerprint Technology, edited by Henry C. Lee and R.E. Gaensslen, 327–87. 2nd ed.
CRC Press, 2001.
46
Kaye, D., D. Bernstein, and J. Mnookin. The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence. 2nd ed.
Aspen Publishers, 2011. “General uniqueness” means that every element of a set is distinguishable from every other
element. “Special uniqueness” means that a particular element is distinguishable from all others even if not all of the
remaining elements are each distinguishable. Kaye, D. “Identification, Individualization and Uniqueness: What’s the
Difference?” Law, Probability & Risk, 8 (2009): 85.
47
Stoney, 2001, op. cit., p. 332.
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population of possible sources to its maximum (the entire population of the earth) regardless of
the specific circumstances of the case. The individualization process moves from this maximum
initial population to a decision.48 At the end of the examination process, the quantity of features
observed in agreement between two objects (without significant discrepancies) is perceived as
so impressive that the examiner has ruled out the possibility of a coincidental match, whatever
initial population of sources was involved. This has been described as a “leap of faith.”49
It means that the identification of the source is to the exclusion of all other sources.
In recent years, the classical theory of universal individualization has come under attack in court
and in the academic literature (see Chapter 6). Some critics of individualization dismiss the first
premise of global, general uniqueness as unscientific and metaphysical.50 In principle, however,
belief in uniqueness is compatible with scientific and statistical reasoning.51 Nonetheless, the
fact that the surfaces of every individual’s fingers are unique (at a sufficient level of detail) is
not, in itself, a persuasive argument for universal individualization.52 In a sense, the uniqueness
argument proves too much, for just as every three-dimensional surface of every finger
presumably is unique, so is every latent print left on two-dimensional surfaces, even those from
the same skin.53 Consequently,
uniqueness does not guarantee that prints from two different people are always
sufficiently different that they cannot be confused, or that two impressions made
by the same finger will also be sufficiently similar to be discerned as coming
from the same source. The impression left by a given finger will differ every time,
because of inevitable variations in pressure, which change the degree of contact
between each part of the ridge structure and the impression medium.54
This takes us to the second proposition underlying the claim of universal individualization. How
can we know that a skilled examiner can consistently discriminate between pairs of prints that
come from the same source and pairs that come from different sources when there is substantial
variation in both types of pairs? The question of the variability of multiple impressions from
the same source versus inter-source variability is not special to latent print analysis. It is
fundamental to the recognition of individual sources across the forensic sciences and to signaldetection problems in engineering and psychology. In 1979, it prompted an NRC committee to
Biedermann, A., S. Bozza, and F. Taroni. “Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification: Underlying
Logic and Argumentative Implications.” Forensic Science International, 177 (2008): 120.
49
Stoney, D. “What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using Statistics?” Journal of the Forensic Science
Society, 31 (1991): 197.
50
Saks, M. and J. Koehler. “The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence.” Vanderbilt Law Review,
61 (2008): 199.
51
Kaye, D. “Probability, Individualization, and Uniqueness in Forensic Science Evidence: Listening to the
Academies.” Brooklyn Law Review, 75 (Summer 2010): 1163; National Academy of Sciences, National Research
Council, Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An Update. The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence. National
Academies Press, 1996, p. 161.
52
Stoney, 1991, op. cit., p. 331.
53
Vanderkolk, J. Forensic Comparative Science: Qualitative Quantitative Source Determination of Unique
Impressions, Images, and Objects. Academic Press, 2009, p. 195; and Kaye, D. “Questioning a Courtroom Proof of
the Uniqueness of Fingerprints.” International Statistical Review, 71 (2003): 521. Compare Cole, S., M. Welling, R.
Dioso-Villa, et al. “Beyond the Individuality of Fingerprints: A Measure of Simulated Computer Latent Print Source
Attribution Accuracy.” Law, Probability & Risk, 7 (2008): 165.
54
NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit. p. 144.
48
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question the ability of spectrographic analysis to provide voiceprints that can be associated with
one and only one individual.55 Similarly, the 2009 NRC report asks for “studies [that] would
accumulate data about the intra-individual variability (e.g., how much one finger’s impressions
vary from impression to impression, or how much one toolmark or signature varies from
instance to instance) and the inter-individual variability (e.g., how much the impressions of many
fingerprints vary across a population and in what ways)” to validate the ACE-V process and “to
attach confidence limits to individualization determinations.”56 To be sure, “examiners are trained
to recognize the factors that may affect the translation of information [from three dimensions to
two];”57 yet the fact remains that “none of these variabilities—of features across a population of
fingers or of repeated impressions left by the same finger—has been characterized, quantified, or
compared.”58
Despite such misgivings, many fingerprint experts believe that every latent print (of sufficient
quality, as judged by a human examiner with no predefined, articulable standard for ascertaining
sufficiency) from a single finger has a degree of similarity to a rolled or plain print that is
measurably greater than its similarity to every other finger on Earth. To appreciate just how
ambitious this claim is, suppose that the chance of two latent fingerprints (from two different
individuals) appearing so similar as to be declared a match is a mere one in one trillion. Because
the Earth’s population is approximately seven billion people, it might seem that no pair of fingers
from different individuals now living would match. After all, one in one trillion is two orders
of magnitude smaller than one in seven billion. However, seven billion individuals give rise to
immensely more pairs of prints that, by coincidence, could match. All told, there are nearly 25
× 1018 distinct pairs of individuals to be considered. Individual 1 can be paired with Individuals
2 through 7,000,000,000 (for seven billion comparisons). Individual 2 can be paired not only
with Individual 1 but also with Individuals 3 through 7,000,000,000 (for another seven billion
comparisons).Statistically, the expected number of indistinguishable pairs from different sources
is the number of possible comparisons times the probability of a match for each comparison.
This expected number of matching pairs is 25 × 1018 × 10–12 = 25 million.
Of course, this particular number is hypothetical. Perhaps some prints are so distinctive that the
probability of confusing them with any print from any other finger is less than one in one trillion.
The computation could be refined to handle heterogeneity in random-match probabilities, but
the purpose here is not to estimate any particular number of matching pairs that might exist.

National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectrograms.
On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identification. National Academies Press, 1979, p. 4.
56
NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 184.
57
Peterson, Dreyfus, Gische, et al., op. cit. Compare NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the
Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 145.
58
NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 144.
SWGFAST, 2009, op. cit. complains that “a significant body of constructive scientific research ... has not been
adequately reported by the NAS committee.” Yet, the statement cites no such “significant body” of research that fills
the specific gap in the proof of the individualization hypothesis noted by the NRC report. Peterson, Dreyfus, Gische,
et al., op. cit. refer to an “FBI Laboratory manuscript in preparation” that finds that “controlled recordings from the
friction ridge skin have shown that the information contained in friction ridge impressions does translate reliably as
a true and accurate representation of what appears on the friction ridge skin.”
55
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It is merely to underscore the nearly inconceivable number of pairs of prints that have to be
considered to establish the premise of universal individualization.59
Given these difficulties, there has been some movement toward using the term
“individualization” to mean any definitive identification of a single individual as the source of a
latent print, even one that falls short of universality. The Scientific Working Group on Friction
Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology has eliminated the global “exclusion of all others”
language in its glossary60 and plans to do the same in its standards.61 A draft guideline defines
individualization as “the decision by an examiner that there are sufficient features in agreement
to conclude that two areas of friction ridge impressions originated from the same source.”62 As
to how this decision is made, the next sentence adds, “Individualization of an impression to one
source is the decision that the likelihood the impression was made by another (different) source
is so remote that it is considered as a practical impossibility.”63
To some extent, however, the new definition begs the question of how the examiner knows
that the probability that the “impression was made by another (different) source” is practically
zero. Is the rationale that individualization is still universal, applying as a “practical” matter to
astronomical numbers of possible pairs? If the “practical” judgment remains based upon the
classical theory of universal individualization, then an individualization is still a statement that
the examiner has excluded everyone else in the world as the source of the latent print.
Perhaps the new form of “individualization” is simply a source attribution based upon an
examiner’s training and experience with two sets of paired latent and exemplars in which
the origin of the prints is known. One set consists of all pairs of latent and exemplar prints
known to the examiner to have come from the same fingers (mates). The other set consists of
all pairs known to the examiner to have come from different fingers (nonmates). An examiner
might conclude that the prints being compared are more similar than any pair of nonmates
ever encountered, and that they are comparable in similarity to the known mates previously
experienced. If so, this examiner would regard the pair as originating from the same individual.
We can designate this approach as the mate-nonmate theory of source attribution.64 It assumes
that the difficulty of classifications in the previously experienced sets of mated and nonmated
prints are comparable to all those that ever will be encountered in casework.65
For other discussions of this classic “Birthday Problem” in probability theory and forensic science, see, for
example, NAS, NRC, Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An Update, op. cit., pp. 137, 161, 165; Page, M., J.
Taylor, and M. Blenkin. “Uniqueness in the Forensic Identification Sciences—Fact or Fiction?” Forensic Science
International, 206 (2011): 12, 1415.
60
SWGFAST, 2011, op. cit.
61
Butt, L. Letter from the Chairman, Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology.
In Regards to: Position Clarification. June 29, 2010. Accessed June 3, 2011. http://www.swgfast.org/CommentsPositions/SWGFAST_NAS_Position_Clarification.doc.
62
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Draft for Comment: Standards
for Examining Friction Ridge Impressions and Resulting Conclusions (To Replace: Friction Ridge Examination
Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, Version 1.01, and Standards for Conclusions, Version 1.0). Version 1.0.
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, August 2010, p. 4.
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Ibid., p. 5.
64
Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners. Theory of Identification as it Relates to Toolmarks. 5th ed., ver.
5.070207. 2007.
65
Although thinking about the features of mated versus nonmated prints might describe how the examiner thinks (at
some level), it does not respond to the criticism that it is difficult to say how much confidence one can place on
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Another possible route to identification that also does not rest on the theory of universal
individualization has been called “local individualization” because it only claims that the source
is very probably unique within a particular population that is much smaller than the entire human
race.66 Local individualization is the assertion that a particular individual within a set of
plausible suspects is the source of a latent print. This set might be enumerated (a “closed” list of
suspects); alternatively, it might not be subject to explicit enumeration (the list is “open” even
though it might be limited by geography or other factors). For example, the relevant population
might be every resident of a dormitory who was in the dormitory on a given night (“closed”), or
it might be everyone in a city (“open”). In a local individualization, the examiner concludes that
the latent print came from one source even if he has not examined the prints of everyone else in
this local population.
In Chapter 3, the Working Group recommends against presenting a latent print identification
as meaning that the source of the exemplar is the source of the latent print to the exclusion of
all other individuals in the world. However, the members of the Working Group have varying
opinions as to whether the practice of making source attributions based on the mate-nonmate
theory or the local-individualization theory is appropriate. Chapter 6 therefore describes
alternatives to source-attribution testimony without endorsing any of them.
In sum, the term “identification” is not necessarily synonymous with “individualization.” As a
general matter, “identification” refers to the association, to some degree of probability, of a trace
to a source. (The operation of probability theory in this context is explained in the next section.)
One type of identification is the attribution of a trace to a single source (a source attribution).
In latent print work, source attributions have traditionally rested on a theory of universal
individualization. In this framework, an individualization is a statement that a single individual
must be the source of the trace because no other individual in the world could have produced
such a trace. Source attributions also can rest on less extreme theories of why the identified
individual is, very probably, the source, and evidence that does not warrant a source attribution
also can be useful in investigations and prosecutions.

1.3

Probability

In describing the nature of error (Chapter 2), the interpretive process of ACE-V (Chapter 3),
emerging technologies (Chapter 4), and courtroom testimony (Chapter 6), this report uses terms
and concepts from the theory of probability. Indeed, the previous section describes a source
attribution as a statement that a particular object or individual is “very probably” the source of a
trace. This section provides definitions of several of the terms used in theory of probability and
indicates more fully how source attribution relates to probabilities.67
judgments made in this fashion if “[n]one of these variabilities—of features across a population of fingers or of
repeated impressions left by the same finger—has been characterized, quantified, or compared.” NAS, NRC,
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit.
66
The logic of “local individualization” and “specific uniqueness” is described more fully in Chapter 6, in Kaye,
Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit., and in Kaye, 2009, op. cit.
67
For more extensive discussions, see, for example, Aitken, C. and F. Taroni. Statistics and the Evaluation of
Evidence for Forensic Scientists. 2nd ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2004; Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit.; and
Robertson, B. and G. Vignaux. Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom. John Wiley &
Sons, 1995.
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Probability is a number between zero and one. A probability of zero means that a proposition is
definitely false. A probability of one means that a proposition is certainly true. In the empirical
sciences, absolute certainty in unattainable, although some propositions, such as the claim that
the Earth orbits the Sun, have probabilities very close to one.
Probability often is expressed as a percentage. Thus, a 60% probability and a 0.6 probability
are the same thing. Another way to describe uncertainty is with odds. If the probability that a
particular baseball team will win the World Series is 60%, the odds are 60 to 40 (or, equivalently,
1.5 to 1).
To place the findings and inferences of forensic scientists in a probabilistic framework, it is
necessary to distinguish between data or observations on the one hand, and hypotheses on the
other. That a specific finger is the source of an impression is a hypothesis. The observed features
in a pair of fingerprints are data. The data can make the hypothesis more probable or less
probable than it otherwise would be. The probability before obtaining particular data is known
as the prior probability. The probability after considering the data is known as the posterior
probability.
The precise relationship between the prior and posterior probability is given by a formula known
as Bayes’s rule. The rule tells us how to update the prior probability in light of the data. When
there are only two possible hypotheses to consider—such as the hypothesis that two impressions
come from the same fingers and the competing hypothesis that they come from different
fingers—the increase or decrease in the probability depends on a single factor, called the
likelihood ratio. Specifically, the posterior odds are the prior odds multiplied by the likelihood
ratio (see Box 1.3 for examples). The likelihood ratio thus measures the strength of the evidence.
A large likelihood ratio means that the evidence is powerful: it raises the odds by a large factor.
The likelihood ratio is just the probability of the data when one hypothesis is true compared to
(divided by) the probability of the data when the competing hypothesis is true. For example,
when the features in a latent print and an exemplar are ten thousand times more probable for
mates than nonmates, the likelihood ratio is ten thousand. Observing these features boosts
the prior odds for identity (whatever they may be) by a factor of ten thousand. In principle, at
least, an examiner could estimate the likelihood ratio subjectively or could compute it using a
statistical model (see Chapters 3, 4, and 6).
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Box 1.3: Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Individualization
The term “individualization” can be given various probabilistic interpretations. The traditional notion
of universal individualization means that the probability of finding another matching exemplar (if
exemplars existed for everyone in the world) is essentially zero. However, probability theory shows
how evidence that is not individualizing in this traditional sense still can be extremely powerful.
As indicated in the text, probabilities can be assigned to two different hypotheses: (1) that two
impressions come from the same finger (s), and (2) that they come from different fingers (d). If Pe|s
denotes the probability of the observations (the evidence from the latent print examination) when
the prints are from the same source, and Pe|d represents the probability when they are from different
sources, then a simple measure of the extent to which the observations support the former hypothesis
over the latter is the likelihood ratio, LR = Pe|s / Pe|d.
According to Bayes’s rule, posterior odds = LR × prior odds. Suppose the likelihood ratio is one
million, meaning that an apparent match is one million times more probable if the prints come from the
same source than if they come from different sources. Although this likelihood ratio seems extremely
high, if we assume for the sake of argument that all residents of New York City were equally likely to
have made an impression, then the odds of s to d change from one to eight million (before considering
the evidence) to one to eight (after considering the evidence).
For suspect populations of various sizes, the posterior odds of identity for evidence with this likelihood
ratio are as follows:
Population
Posterior odds of probability
size
(LR = 1,000,000)
The world (~7,000,000,000)
1:7,000
United States (~300,000,000)
1:300
New York City (~8,000,000)
1:8
Colorado Springs (~400,000)
2.5:1
Walla Walla (~30,000)
33:1
A college dormitory (~200)
5,025:1
Table 1.2: Posterior odds of identity for evidence with a likelihood ratio of 1,000,000 in populations
in which everyone has the same prior odds on being the source of a latent print
An examiner who makes a source attribution is giving an opinion that the posterior probability is
practically 1 (100%).

1.4 Summary
This chapter defines various terms and concepts that are central to the assessment of latent
print evidence. In particular, it describes the steps of the ACE-V process as currently practiced
and understood by the latent print examination community and discusses how exclusions and
identifications are fundamentally statements of probabilities. Because humans conduct the
process, human factors can influence the outcome of an examination. Bias and error can occur
in any process for making comparisons and drawing inferences. In the context of latent print
examination, they can play a role in the final decision made by an examiner. Many other human
factors are at play in the latent print work environment, as addressed in the chapters that follow.
Chapter 1: The Latent Print Examination Process and Terminology
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Chapter 2: Human Factors and Errors
Human beings, in all lines of work, make errors. Errors can be prevented by
designing systems that make it hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy
for people to do the right thing. Cars are designed so that drivers cannot start
them while in reverse because that prevents accidents. Work schedules for pilots
are designed so they don’t fly too many consecutive hours without rest because
alertness and performance are compromised.
—To Err Is Human: Building A Safer Health System68
Introduction and Scope
One goal of this chapter on human factors and errors in latent print examination is to explain
the systems view of human factors. What is true of drivers and pilots—not to mention judges,
police officers, lawyers, soldiers, and scholars—is also true of forensic scientists and technicians.
All of us make errors. This report makes no effort to hide this fact. To the contrary, the Working
Group agrees that the “culture of blame must be broken down, [and] we must systematically
design safety into processes.”69 Later chapters apply these ideas to matters such as the training
and working environment of examiners as well as their performance in interpreting evidence and
reporting and testifying about their findings.
The other major goal of this chapter is to describe methods for quantifying the risk of errors
in latent print examinations. Measuring the incidence of errors serves three functions. First,
studying error is an integral part of science. A basic tenet of experimental science is that “errors
and uncertainties exist that must be reduced by improved experimental techniques and repeated
measurements, and those errors remaining must always be estimated to establish the validity of
our results.”70 What applies to physics and chemistry applies to all of forensic science: “A key
task … for the analyst applying a scientific method is to conduct a particular analysis to identify
as many sources of error as possible, to control or eliminate as many as possible, and to estimate
the magnitude of remaining errors so that the conclusions drawn from the study are valid.”71 In
other words, errors should, to the extent possible, be identified and quantified.
Second, measuring and tracking error rates is part of a comprehensive quality control and
assurance system. This idea is not new. In the field of medicine, it has been called the “error
movement,” and it has firm roots in industrial psychology.72 Although it is difficult to
National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality of Health Care in America. To Err Is
Human: Building A Safer Health System. National Academies Press, 1999, p. ix.
69
Ibid.
70
Bevington, P. and D. Robinson. Data Reduction and Error Analysis for the Physical Sciences. 3rd ed. McGrawHill, 2002, p. 1.
71
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. National Academies
Press, 2009, p. 111.
72
See, e.g., NAS, Institute of Medicine, op. cit.; and Hofer, T., E. Kerr, and R. Hayward. “What Is an Error?”
Effective Clinical Practice, 3 (2000): 261.
68
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demonstrate that the medical error movement has improved hospital patient safety in general,73
quantitative analysis can identify factors associated with errors—including preventable ones—
and thus suggest strategies for error reduction.74 Chapter 9 discusses the importance of
implementing effective systems to detect deviations from desired practices and incorrect
judgments in latent print casework.
Finally, in the legal system, quantified “error
rates” have long been a consideration in
judging the admissibility of findings or the
weight that should be given to them.
Quantification not only can lead to
improvements in the reliability and validity of
current practices, but it also could assist in
more appropriate use of the evidence by
fact-finders. The objective, in other words, is
improving the “back end” of the system—
the use of the evidence in investigations and
legal proceedings. Many court opinions have
discussed error rates of scientific tests such as
polygraphy, speaker identification, and latent
print identification as a consideration affecting
the admissibility of these tests. To ascertain the
prospects for useful quantification, however,
there must be clarity about the meaning of
the surprisingly ambiguous term “error” as it
applies to the task of latent print identification.
It is necessary to consider various ways to
measure a suitably defined “error rate” that can
be used to assess the validity of the method and
conclusions.

2.1

Box 2.1: Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and “Error Rates”
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,75 the Supreme Court wrote that federal courts
should determine whether contested scientific
evidence is “scientifically valid.” It listed four
non‑exhaustive factors that trial judges could
consider in making these determinations. One of
these factors came from a federal court of appeals
opinion on spectrographic voice identification
that relied on laboratory experiments measuring
the rate of false positives and false negatives.
Citing this case, the Supreme Court stated, “In the
case of a particular scientific technique, the court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential
rate of error.”76
The rules of evidence in many states treat “general
acceptance” in the scientific community rather
than “scientific validity” as the touchstone for
admitting scientific evidence. Courts in these
jurisdictions have treated error rates from
controlled experiments as a factor that can help
show whether a technique is generally accepted.

The Systems View of Errors and Human Factors

The systems view of human error regards errors and adverse events as a function of a system of
interacting parts, any or all of which could present opportunities for preventing and correcting
errors. Forensic science evidence results from a complex productive system. A single examiner
conducts latent print examinations using various technological tools, but more than one
individual participates in the production process. A detective may provide candidate suspect
prints, and an examiner may run a search of an automated fingerprint identification system
(AFIS) that produces both viable matches and nonmatches that initially appear similar. Finally,
Landrigan, C., G. Parry, C. Bones, et al. “Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from Medical
Care.” New England Journal of Medicine, 363 (2010): 2124.
74
Macklis, R., T. Meier, and M. Weinhous. “Error Rates in Clinical Radiotherapy.” Journal of Clinical Oncology,
16 (1998): 551.; and Weingart, S., R. Wilson, R. Gibberd, et al. “Epidemiology of Medical Error.” British Medical
Journal, 320 (2000): 774.
75
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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additional individuals may verify work. Thus, the etiology of errors requires a characterization
of not only the contributions of each state of the process to potential errors, but also their
interactions, since interactions among parts of the system can serve to reduce errors or contribute
to them. Simply blaming errors on individuals is simplistic and unproductive. One must
appreciate how human actors function in and interact with other components of a more complex
system.
The “Swiss cheese” model of errors (see Figure 9.2 in Chapter 9),77 which allows classifications
of various human factors that contribute to errors, provides a framework for identifying
weaknesses in the examination process. Briefly, this framework involves factors that are specific
to an individual examiner, those that are features or products of the work environment, and those
that are the result of failures of supervision and the structure of the organization. This model is
explained in more detail in Chapter 9. A seminal example of the effects of interactions between
humans and technology comes from Hutchins,78 who characterized the tools, procedures,
training, and checklists that allow a cockpit crew, working with tools such as airspeed indicators,
to ensure that an airplane does not stall on landing approach. The indicators and control surface
settings provide valuable safety margins and checks, but they can also can lead to crashes if set
incorrectly.
Similarly, latent print examination may well benefit from procedures such as verification, but if
such procedures are implemented improperly, they can lead to a mere illusion of error reduction.
Not knowing when an examiner has erred makes error reduction difficult. Numerous studies have
found that without quick and accurate feedback on correct and incorrect judgments, experience
does not enhance expertise79 and that experts routinely overestimate their skills.80 Weather
forecasters are particularly well calibrated; when they report that the chance of rain is 60%, it
rains about 60% of the time. Lawyers and doctors are not so well calibrated; their predictions of
the outcomes of cases tend to be optimistic.81 The explanation for the difference, at least in part,
is that meteorologists get frequent, immediate feedback and rewards for correct predictions.82
In forensic handwriting analysis, latent print identification, toolmark identification, and other
pattern and impression evidence comparisons, examiners do not routinely receive such prompt
and frequent feedback.83 Under what circumstances would examiners realize that they are
working with prints that are beyond their current capabilities? If an examiner feels that his
This model is presented in Reason, J. Human Error. Cambridge University Press, 1990. It is refined in Wiegmann,
D. and S. Shappell. A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident Analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System. Ashgate Publishing, 2003.
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Kahneman. “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.” Journal of Business, 59 (1986): 251.
80
Hoffrage, U. “Overconfidence.” In Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking,
Judgment, and Memory. Psychology Press, 2004; and Lichtenstein, S., B. Fischhoff, and L. Phillips. “Calibration
of Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980.” Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge
University Press, 1982.
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abilities far outstrip his colleagues’ and is willing to make identifications that they would not,
how would such a situation be identified and resolved? Procedures to reconcile differences of
opinion might only reduce the independence of each examiner without moving the decision
criterion toward an optimum.
Thus, procedural changes aimed at error reduction must be devised and examined at a systemwide level. These changes must emphasize data collection and feedback to allow both the agency
and the examiners to adjust their decision criteria and methods. Well-designed proficiency
tests, employed to enhance skills, are one way to supply feedback. Excluding unnecessary
contextual information that might affect the outcome of an examination is another strategy best
implemented with an appreciation of how the system works, since such information may need to
be integrated at later stages without affecting the initial examination.
Detecting, analyzing, quantifying, and reducing error is difficult, but these efforts are important
quality assurance steps. To take these steps, however, it is necessary to define terms such as
“error” precisely. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, analyzes the meaning of “error,”
elucidates some possible types and sources of error in the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V) process, and compares methods for estimating the risk of error in latent
friction ridge identification as performed by examiners following ACE-V.

2.2

Errors in Executing a Procedure

When an individual is expected to follow well-defined steps in a procedure, a departure from
the protocol or a mistake in one of the steps might be designated an error. For example, suppose
that a forensic service provider requires its examiners to mark the useful features in a latent print
before making a side-by-side comparison to an exemplar. A particular examiner neglects to do
so, but correctly determines that the differences between the latent images and the exemplar
are so extensive and clear that the prints could not have originated from the same source. The
examiner then correctly excludes the suspect from whom the exemplar came.
This examiner has not erred in the sense of reaching a false conclusion, but the examiner has
erred in deviating from the prescribed procedure. Identifying such procedural errors (also called
“process errors” in medicine),84 perhaps through audits of casework, could be valuable even
when the errors did not lead to a false conclusion. If the procedural step serves a useful function
in general, then discovering that examiners are not performing the step may warrant corrective
action. For example, the system might be redesigned so that examiners must sign a checklist as
they go along to remind them to complete each step in order.85
If an agency has a policy demanding blind verification of identifications, another example of
procedural error would be providing the verifying examiner with the knowledge that an earlier
examination conducted by a highly respected colleague resulted in an identification. Such
policies serve to prevent any “expectancy effect” from influencing the verification (see Chapters
Hickner, J., D. Graham, N. Elder, et al. “Testing Process Errors and Their Harms and Consequences Reported
From Family Medicine Practices: A Study of the American Academy of Family Physicians National Research
Network.” Quality and Safety in Health Care, 17 (2008): 194.
85
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1 and 3). In a laboratory that requires blind verification, a nonblind verification would be a
procedural error. Discovering a large rate of such departures from the established protocol should
produce an inquiry into what should be done to correct the situation.

2.3

Errors in Outcomes

Another type of error, an outcome error, contrasts with procedural error. It is closer, but not
identical, to an “adverse event” in fields such as aviation and medicine86 and relates to reporting
the wrong conclusions in latent print examination. Bias does not always produce an incorrect
outcome. For instance, a radar gun that gives readings that are always 2 miles per hour too low is
biased, but a reading of 45 mph is a good indication that a driver is exceeding the speed limit of
35 mph (at least when the random error also is small relative to the measured excess of 10 mph).
In this example, the performance of the measuring device can be compared to the true state of
affairs—what sometimes is called “ground truth” in biometrics87 or “states of nature” in decision
theory.88 However, in real-world latent print casework, this true state of affairs is rarely available.
Human decision making also can be poorly calibrated or well calibrated in terms of its accuracy
in ascertaining the true state of affairs. If a latent print and an exemplar come from two different
individuals, will an examiner (or an initial examiner and a verifier)89 report that the two prints
match? If the two prints come from the same individual, will the examiner report that they do not
match? Of the positive identifications made by examiners, what percentage is mistaken? Of the
exclusions, what percentage is incorrect? Each of these questions leads to a different statistic—
there is no single “error rate” and no single number that gives the “accuracy” of judgments
about the origin of pairs of prints.90 Moreover, as discussed below, further questions arise when
one considers an examiner’s determination that a latent print is insufficient to warrant further
examination or that the further examination is inconclusive.
The simplest measures of accuracy (or, conversely, error) in categorization arise when
there are only two categories. Putting aside, for the moment, judgments of “insufficient” or
“inconclusive,” the examiner reports either that the prints match or that they do not. The same
kind of binary categorization task is central to many other disciplines.91 Clinical diagnosis,
predictions of future violence, and signal detection are a few examples. A radar operator may
E.g., Hofer, Kerr, and Hayward, op. cit.
E.g., Ratha, N., S. Chen, and A. Jain. “Adaptive Flow Orientation-Based Feature Extraction in Fingerprint
Images.” Pattern Recognition, 28 (1995): 1657.
88
Berger, J. Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. 2nd ed. Springer, 1984, p. 3.
89
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need to distinguish between a missile launch, on the one hand, and a flock of birds or anything
else on the other. Signal-detection theory provides a well-developed analytical framework
involving the probabilities of false alarms (false positives) and missed signals (false negatives).92
The definition of error in this analytical framework is simple. The outcome is judged against a
true state of the world. An error is a reported categorization that does not report the true state.
If the radar operator misses the signal of the missile launch (a false negative), or if the operator
declares an alarm when no missile is in the air (a false positive), then the error will become
apparent all too soon.93 Table 2.1 summarizes the same two kinds of errors that can arise in
determining whether a latent print is from the known source of an exemplar. The first column
lists the examiner’s possible decisions: declare that the prints are so different that the source
of the exemplar is excluded (abbreviated as –) or declare that the prints are so similar that the
source of the exemplar is included (an identification, abbreviated as +). The first row lists the
true states of the world: different source (d) or same source (s). In casework, these states would
not generally be known. In an experiment or a proficiency test, however, they would be. This
knowledge makes no difference to the definition of an outcome error, although it affects our
ability to estimate the conditional error probabilities. In the table, “P( )” stands for “probability
of.” The vertical bar “|” stands for “given that” or “on the condition that.”
Different source (d)

Same source (s)

Exclusion (–)

True negative
Specificity = P(–|d)

False negative (a miss, type II
error)
1 – sensitivity = P(–|s)

Identification
(+)

False positive (false alarm, type I
error)
1 – specificity = P(+|d)

True positive (a hit)
Sensitivity = P(+|s)

Table 2.1: Types of errors and correct conclusions in a binary classification task

In latent print comparisons that lead to only the two outcomes shown in Table 2.1—exclusions
and identifications—a false negative error is an exclusion when the pair actually originated from
the same friction ridge skin. Its probability, marked in the upper right-hand corner of the table, is
P(–|s). In contrast, a false positive probability P(+|d), in the lower left-hand corner of the table,
measures the chance of an identification when the pair actually did not originate from the same
source.
Instead of referring to these two conditional error probabilities, one can refer to two related
quantities that define the accuracy of the judgment. Sensitivity is the probability of identification
Melsa, J. and D. Cohn. Decision and Estimation Theory. McGraw-Hill, 1978; Swets, J. and R. Pickett. Evaluation
of Diagnostic Systems: Methods from Signal Detection Theory. Academic Press, 1982; and Wickens, T. Elementary
Signal Detection Theory. Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.
93
When the categorization system maps quantitative scores into binary categories, its performance can be depicted
as a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. This is a plot of the true positive rate (sensitivity) vs. false
positive rate (1 – specificity) for a binary classifier system as its discrimination threshold is varied. National
Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectrograms. On the Theory
and Practice of Voice Identification. National Academies Press, 1979, p. 4.
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given that the prints actually come from the same source. These correct outcomes lie in the
bottom right-hand corner of the table. Specificity is the probability of exclusion given that the
prints actually came from different sources (upper left-hand corner).
Sensitivity and specificity are commonly used to appraise the diagnostic value of a test in clinical
medicine. A pregnancy test that almost always gives a positive result in cases of pregnancy has
a high sensitivity. On the other hand, a pregnancy test that identifies many women as pregnant
when they are not has low specificity. That pregnancy test is sensitive to the condition but
its positive results are not very specific to pregnancy. An ideal diagnostic test is both highly
sensitive and highly specific, and so is the ideal fingerprint examiner. Encountering a latent
and an exemplar from the same source, this examiner almost always makes an identification.
Presented with a latent and an exemplar from different sources, this examiner almost always
makes an exclusion.
The important points to be gleaned from Table 2.1 are that (1) each type of error has a probability
of occurring given the true state of the world (whether known or unknown), and (2) the falsepositive probability is not generally equal to the probability that the prints are from different
individuals when an examiner declares a match. The latter is a posterior probability (Chapter 1).
To make this more concrete, suppose that an experimenter gives an examiner 200 pairs of prints
to examine. A latent and an exemplar comprise each pair. For 100 of the pairs, the latent and
the exemplar come from different individuals (d); and for the other 100 pairs, the latent and the
exemplar come from the same individuals (s). The examiner compares the prints in each and
every pair, and correctly classifies 99 of the former group and 98 of the latter. This situation
is shown in Table 2.2. Again, these numbers are hypothetical and merely intended to illustrate
how various measures of accuracy and error are computed. Results from a recent experiment are
described later in this chapter.
Different source (d)

Same source (s)

Exclusion (–)

True negatives = 99
Specificity = P(–|d) = 99%

False negatives = 2
1 – sensitivity = P(–|s) = 2%

Identification
(+)

False positives = 1
1 – specificity = P(+|d) = 1%

True positives = 98
Sensitivity = P(+|s) = 98%

Table 2.2: Outcomes of a hypothetical experiment that estimates an examiner’s sensitivity and
specificity

The examiner in this example has performed with a sensitivity of 98% (correct identifications)
and a specificity of 99% (correct exclusions). Equivalently, the examiner’s false negative and
false positive rates were 2% and 1%, respectively.
It is important to understand that these numbers do not translate directly into a probability that an
identification or an exclusion is correct. The probabilities of a correct identification or exclusion
are influenced by the proportion of cases in which the pairs of prints actually come from the
same individuals. Box 2.2 presents a numerical example of how changing the mix of true and
false pairs changes the probability of a true positive identification.
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Box 2.2: How Prevalence, Sensitivity, and Specificity Affect the Posterior Probability of a
Correct Positive Identification
The probability that the examination has correctly classified a pair of prints as identifying the individual
is the proportion of all those cases in which the examiner has made a positive identification that involve
true pairs. For example, consider a set of 1,000 pairs of prints that includes only 800 true pairs for an
80‑20 mix. An examiner with a sensitivity of 98% would classify approximately 98% of these 800, or
784, as identifications. But there also are 200 false pairs to consider. The examiner with a specificity
of 99% would classify approximately 1% of these 200, or 2, as identifications. The total number of
identifications therefore would be 784 + 2 = 786. Thus, the examiner would make correct identifications
for approximately 784 out of 786 identifications: P(s|+) = 784/786 = 99.7%. The following table
summarizes these calculations:

True pairs (s)
False pairs (d)
Total

Number
800
200
1,000

Number +
784
2
786

Pr(s|+)

784/786 = 99.7%

Table 2.3: Hypothetical data to show probability of correct identifications in an 80-20 mix
Now suppose that the examiner’s casework consisted of a 10-90 mix of true and false pairs. Of the
1,000 cases, 100 are true pairs, and 900 are false pairs. This depresses the value of P(s|+) to (100 × 98%) /
[(100 × 98%) + (900 × 1%)] = 98 / (98 + 9) = 92%. The examiner’s ability to discriminate between a true
pair and a false pair has not changed. The sensitivity is still 98%, and the specificity is still 99%. However,
the expected number of each type of error in the sample of casework is different, lowering the probability
that a positive identification is correct, as shown in the following table:94

True pairs (s)
False pairs (d)
Total

Number
100
900
1,000

Number +
98
9
107

P(s|+)

98/107 = 92%

Table 2.4: Hypothetical data to show probability of correct identifications in a 10-90 mix

Thus far, we have assumed that the identification process always reaches a conclusion of
exclusion or identification, and we have described how an experiment could measure the
sensitivity and specificity of examiners using the ACE-V (or any other) process to reach these
conclusions. However, examiners have other options. They can declare the latent print (or
exemplar) to be insufficient for a comparison, or they can make a comparison but designate it as
These computations are examples of Bayes’s rule, where the proportion of true pairs in casework is the prior
probability that a random pair comes from the same source. Compare Parmigiani, G. Modeling in Medical Decision
Making: A Bayesian Approach. Wiley, 2002, p. 9. In a fully Bayesian analysis, however, the prior probability is
subjective and need not equal the past frequency. But even if there is no known value, the existence of a prior
probability that a random pair comes from the same source has to be borne in mind. In that way, examiners are more
likely to remember that the probabilities of exclusion or identification given a pair of impressions from the same
source are not the probabilities that a source exclusion or attribution is correct.
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“inconclusive.” Table 2.1 can be expanded with an additional row to account for those possible
outcomes (Table 2.5).

Exclusion (–)
Identification (+)
Insufficient or
inconclusive

Different source (d)
True negative
Specificity = P(–|d)
False positive
1 – specificity = P(+|d)
Missed an exclusion

Same source (s)
False negative
1 – sensitivity = P(–|s)
True positive (a hit)
Sensitivity = P(+|s)
Missed an identification

Table 2.5: Types of errors and correct conclusions in a binary classification task
with the option of not deciding

The additional row complicates the computation of error and accuracy rates.95 Should sensitivity
and specificity be calculated relative to ground truth for all cases presented, or just for those
in which an examiner reaches a definitive conclusion (an exclusion or an identification)? The
argument for tossing out inconclusives is as follows:
When an examiner offers an “inconclusive” opinion about whether two prints
match, there is a sense in which he has erred. After all, he did not get the
answer right, and the consequences of this failure may be serious (e.g., missed
opportunity to exonerate a suspect). However, in the more usual sense of the
meaning of error, an inconclusive is not an error. It is a pass. An inconclusive
means that the examiner offers no judgment about whether two prints do or do not
share a common source.96
Suppose, then, that one agrees that an inconclusive cannot be considered an outcome error (not
even an outcome error that is less serious than a false identification or a false exclusion). It is still
not clear whether the inconclusives should be included in the denominators of the proportions for
true and false positives and true and false negatives.
The answer may turn on the setting in which the error and accuracy rates will be used. The view
that inconclusives should not count is appropriate from the perspective of a judge or juror who
might consider error rates or probabilities to assess the probative value of an identification or an
exclusion. For that purpose, it does not matter how often the examiner refrains from reaching
a categorical conclusion. What matters is accuracy in those cases in which the examiner does
offer an opinion on identification or exclusion. These are the only cases in which an examiner’s
testimony might lead the jury astray. Testimony that the latent print contained inadequate
information to reach any conclusion as to the origin of the print occurs less often and should not
See Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Draft for Comment: Standard
for the Definition and Measurement of Rates of Errors and Inappropriate Decisions in Friction Ridge Examination.
Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, February 2011.
96
Koehler, J. “Fingerprint Error Rates And Proficiency Tests: What They Are And Why They Matter.” Hastings Law
Journal, 59 (2008): 1077.
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propel the jury in any particular direction. Therefore, any calculated error rate presented in a trial
involving an identification or an exclusion should be based upon the subset of cases in which
examiners actually make an identification or an exclusion.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the police, what matters is all the cases that an examiner
considers rather than just those in which the examiner ultimately might testify. In terms of
improving the contribution of the examiner to the investigative process, it is appropriate to
regard the failure to identify or exclude when the latent print contains adequate information as a
potentially correctable error. Likewise, deciding that the latent print is of sufficient quality, but
concluding that the comparison is inconclusive when, in fact, the similarities (or differences)
are distinct and extensive, also is an error. Whether one regards such errors as outcome or
process errors (or both), they are important because they might warrant a change in training or
operational procedures to take fuller advantage of the latent friction ridge data.97
To help identify undesirable inconclusives, reliability and reproducibility studies could compare
the performance of examiners in making judgments of sufficiency and conclusiveness. When the
same examiner reaches the same conclusions (whether right or wrong) in repeated examinations
of the same set of prints with no recollection of the earlier results, “intra-examiner reliability”
is high. When different examiners independently studying the same set of prints reach the same
conclusions, “inter-examiner reproducibility” is high. Table 2.6 uses four categories for the
outcomes of latent print examinations: identification, exclusion, inconclusive, and insufficient
(not suitable for comparison). A high number of discrepant judgments signals a need to
understand what is causing the discordance and perhaps to correct it.
Examiner 2

Examiner 1

Identification Exclusion
Identification
Exclusion
Inconclusive

Inconclusive

Insufficient

AGREE
AGREE
AGREE

Insufficient

AGREE

Table 2.6: Concordancy in judgments of two examiners

A related method of spotting problematic judgments uses pairs of prints that are relatively
complex to examine but that the agency is convinced should result in specific judgments in each
category. In this situation, there are correct answers (in the judgment of the best experts), and
the objective is to ensure that all examiners reach these desired outcomes. Table 2.7 shows the
correct and incorrect outcomes relative to the desired outcomes rather than to ground truth.

Because of the differing possible uses of error and accuracy rates, in discussing studies of these rates, this chapter
gives the results of calculations both with and without inconclusives.
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Desired Outcomes as Determined by Experts

Examiner

Identification
Exclusion
Inconclusive
Insufficient

Identification

Exclusion

Inconclusive

Insufficient

CORRECT

False positive

False positive

False positive

False negative

CORRECT

False negative

False negative

Missed an
identification
Missed an
identification

Missed an
exclusion
Missed an
exclusion

CORRECT

Missed
insufficient

Missed an
inconclusive

CORRECT

Table 2.7: Concordancy with desired outcomes as determined by experts

The discordant outcomes in Table 2.7 are of varying importance. Many of them would not affect
the usefulness of the examiner’s findings. For example, if an examiner concludes that the prints
are insufficient for comparison when the “correct” opinion is that they are worth further study but
are nonetheless inconclusive, then the examiner did not produce a result that could have affected
the outcome of that case. Nonetheless, an examiner who is too prone to dismiss samples as
unsuitable when they are sufficient for comparison but ultimately inconclusive also might be too
inclined to regard them as insufficient when they would permit an identification or an exclusion.
These discordant outcomes may not produce outcome errors, and they are not amenable to
inclusion in “error rates” for ascertaining probative value. But following up on them could be
important to making the best use of the data and to reducing the risk of actual outcome errors.

2.4

Measuring the Prevalence of Error: Prospects and Pitfalls

On occasion, the lures and pressures of the adversarial system, combined with the natural
tendency of scientists and technicians to be confident in the power of the technology at their
command and their decision-making abilities, can lead to excessive claims of accuracy. Two
examples unrelated to friction ridge identification illustrate the phenomenon. First, claims
that “everyone’s voiceprint is as unique as his fingerprints, and that any skilled technician can
identify a voiceprint with more than 99% accuracy,”98 prompted the National Research Council
(NRC) to caution that “the assumption that intra-speaker variability is less than … inter-speaker
variability … is not adequately supported by scientific theory and data.”99 Second, in the initial
years of DNA testing, expert witnesses claimed that false positive matches were impossible.100
In response, a separate NRC committee reminded them that “laboratory errors happen, even in
the best laboratories and even when the analyst is certain that every precaution against error was
taken.”101

Kersta, L. As summarized in “The Law: Speak, Voiceprint.” Time. January 10, 1972.
NAS, NRC, Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectrograms, op.cit.
100
For examples, see Kaye, D. “Probability, Individualization, and Uniqueness in Forensic Science Evidence:
Listening to the Academies.” Brooklyn Law Review, 75 (Summer 2010): 1163.
101
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science.
DNA Technology in Forensic Science. National Academies Press, 1992, p. 82.
98
99
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Expert witnesses on latent print identification have heeded these admonitions. To be sure, many
experts once assured courts that the examination process was so rigorous that no competent
examiner meticulously following the prescribed steps could reach a mistaken conclusion.102
Today, however, many experts understand that insistence on “perfect accuracy,” “no errors,” and
“a zero error rate”103 for the ACE-V “method itself, if followed correctly … does not lead to a
process of method improvement”104 and that these claims “have no scientific basis”105 and “are
not scientifically plausible.”106 Commentary from the latent print community “acknowledges
that errors do occur and furthermore that claims of zero error rate in the discipline are not
scientifically plausible.”107
But if the rates of various kinds of errors are not zero, how can we know what they are, and what
use can courts make of the possible estimates? The frequency with which different types of errors
occur—and even whether meaningful data exist or can be produced to estimate this frequency—
are subject to differing opinions. In a lengthy review, Cole concluded that “the existing data
are inadequate to calculate a meaningful error rate for forensic fingerprint identification.”108
Pointing to “known cases of fingerprint misattribution” and a 0.8% rate of false positives on
external proficiency tests, however, he proposed that “the error rate may not be trivial.”109 The
NRC committee was more circumspect when it wrote that “there is limited information about the
accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses.”110 In response, the Scientific Working Group
on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology insisted that
history demonstrates that the actual error rate in practice is very low. ... Billions
of comparisons worldwide have occurred over the course of a century with an
extremely low number of errors. … Recent studies published in peer-reviewed
journals, although limited, also tend to suggest that the error rate of friction ridge
examination, when conducted by competent examiners, is very low.111
Likewise, in United States v. Baines,112 a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) supervisor
testified that the FBI had “made, on average, about one erroneous identification every 11 years.”
Estimating the total number of comparisons made at about 1 million per year, he assured the
court that the known actual error rate was about one per eleven million comparisons.
For examples, see United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 997-98 (10th Cir. 2009); Government’s Combined
Report to the Court and Motions in Limine Concerning Fingerprint Evidence, at 22, United States v. Mitchell, 199 F.
Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002), aff’d, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Llera Plaza, Crim. No. 98-362-10,
11, 12, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 344 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
103
NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 47.
104
Ibid., p. 143.
105
Zabell, S. “Fingerprint Evidence.” Journal of Law and Policy, 13 (2005): 177.
106
NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 143.
107
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Strengthening Forensic Science
in the United States: A Path Forward, Position Statement. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis,
Study and Technology, 2009. See also Champod, C. “Fingerprint Examination: Towards More Transparency.” Law,
Probability & Risk, 7 (2008): 111.
108
Cole, S. “More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification.” Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 95 (2005): 1033.
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SWGFAST, 2009, op. cit.
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But the reliance on denominators of millions and “billions of comparisons” has been challenged
on the grounds that
the chances of uncovering an erroneous identification are remote. Most fingerprint
identifications are not challenged in court either because the defendant pled
to some other charge or because the defense did not obtain a second opinion.
Further, after conviction, the opportunities for innocent persons to obtain new
evidence and have their convictions reviewed and overturned are still extremely
rare.113
Historical inquiry is simply not a viable way to estimate how low the false positive rate has been,
let alone to estimate the size of the false negative rate.
Instead, one might consider using data from five possible sources: non-blind proficiency tests
currently in use; realistic, blind proficiency tests; verifications; random audits of case reports;
and controlled experiments. These kinds of data vary in their suitability for estimating error
rates, and all of them have significant limitations. To begin with, proficiency tests designed
and administered for certification and quality improvement purposes bear little resemblance to
actual casework. The employees or trainees taking them are not blind to the fact that they are
being tested, and the samples prepared for certification and quality improvement purposes can
be different from casework samples. For such reasons, one large proficiency test provider has
cautioned against using its proficiency test data for calculating error rates. 114
Second, recognizing that normal proficiency tests are neither designed for nor particularly
suitable for estimating error rates, some commentators have proposed more realistic, blind
proficiency testing to produce estimates of error rates for individuals, organizations, or the entire
profession.115 Truly blind proficiency testing is possible, but implementation on a large scale
may not be feasible given the logistics and costs.116 For the entire laboratory to be blinded, law
enforcement authorities must disguise the test so that it appears as a routine case to the target
laboratory. European DNA laboratories undergo two “blind trials” a year with many samples,
but these are really “a ‘graded’ interpretation test.”117 The commission that designed the trials
“seriously considered” but rejected “the setting up of a ‘fake’ or simulated casework situation
to be distributed among the participants … [because] this was deemed to be extremely difficult
to implement from a practical point of view and also to offer no great advantage to the testing
procedure.”118 Thus, if actual error rates are quite small, an impractical number of realistic
proficiency tests (in which the entire laboratory is blind to the testing) would be required to
Haber, L. and R. Haber. “Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert.” Law, Probability &
Risk, 7 (2008): 87. See also S. Cole, op. cit.; Saks, M. “Merlin and Solomon: Lessons From the Law’s Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science.” Hastings Law Journal, 49 (1998): 1102, note 169.
114
Collaborative Testing Services, Inc. CTS Statement on the Use of Proficiency Testing Data for Error Rate
Determination. Collaborative Testing Services, Inc, March 30, 2010.
115
E.g., Koehler, op. cit.
116
Peterson, J., G. Lin, M. Ho, et al. “The Feasibility of External Blind DNA Proficiency Testing.” Journal of
Forensic Sciences, 48 (2003): 21.
117
Butler, J. Fundamentals of Forensic DNA Typing. Academic Press, 2010, p. 299.
118
Rand, S., M. Schürenkamp, and B. Brinkmann. “The GEDNAP (German DNA Profiling Group) Blind Trial
Concept.” International Journal of Legal Medicine, 116, no. 4 (2002): 199.
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produce accurate estimates.119 Using the upper bound of a confidence interval based upon a small
sample could grossly overstate the likelihood of an error in a particular case (see Box 2.3).120
Third, forensic service providers that
routinely use verifications could compile
statistics on the outcomes. Because
verifications are less costly than blind
proficiency tests, a much larger number
of observations would be available,
leading to a more precise estimate.
However, at best, statistics on the
outcomes of verifications estimate
reproducibility rather than validity. That
two examiners agree does not prove that
both are correct; that they disagree does
not tell us which one is correct.
Consequently, statistics on verifications
would not estimate false positive or false
negative probabilities.

Box 2.3: The Zero Numerator Problem
Suppose that a group of latent print examiners is not
known to have made any false identifications over a
long period. One cannot be sure that there have been
no false positives, because there has been no intensive
effort to detect any. Over the next decade, therefore,
the examiners undergo a series of 100 blind proficiency
tests on prints representative of casework. This situation
gives rise to the question in the title of a well-known
article, If Nothing Goes Wrong, Is Everything All Right?
Interpreting Zero Numerators.121 A quick answer,
according to classical statistical theory, is the “Rule of
Three,” which states that 3/n is a good approximation
for an upper 95% confidence bound for the probability
P of an outcome of an event when the proportion of the
outcomes in a large number n of independent trials is
0/n.122 Therefore, 3/100 is a conservative estimate of the
probability of a false positive for these examiners who
passed the 100 realistic, representative, blind proficiency
tests involving true positives.

This is not to say that verification
statistics have no relevance to error
probabilities. If examiners usually reach
conflicting results, one can infer that the
However, it is a very conservative estimate. It
ability to make correct classifications of
corresponds to starting with the belief that P is equally
pairs of prints is limited. Establishing
likely to be anywhere in the interval between zero and
reproducibility, therefore, is a part of the
one.123 Prior to the proficiency tests, it was plainly
process of validating measurements, but
unrealistic to think that it was just as likely that the
concordance between the two examiners examiners’ probability of a false positive was greater
is a flawed measure even of
than one-half as it was to have been less than one-half.124
reproducibility if the verifying
examiner’s judgments are influenced by
knowledge of the first examiner’s
opinion. Forensic service providers that conduct a large number of blind verifications, however,
could contribute to a more complete base of knowledge about the examination process by
compiling statistics on these verifications. That verifying examiners, proceeding with no
knowledge of the outcome of the initial examination, almost always reach the same conclusions
Champod, op. cit., p. 112; National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on DNA
Forensic Science: An Update. The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence. National Academies Press, 1996.
120
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as initial examiners would indicate that the judgments of different examiners are at least
reproducible. Moreover, whether or not the verifications are blind, the data on initial
discrepancies could be helpful in identifying individual examiners or situations that merit
constructive, corrective action.
Fourth, the outcomes of random audits of completed casework might be used to estimate false
positive or false negative probabilities. For quality assurance, random technical case audits
test the entire scope of evidence examination and reporting. Such audits can be conducted
internally (by the same agency that did the examination) or externally (by an outside entity).
These technical case audits include a re-analysis of the evidence and an associated evaluation. As
with proficiency tests, the purpose of conducting technical case audits is to improve laboratory
performance and to increase reliability and reproducibility. There is an inherent value of a
program including these audits (regardless of any particular case audit outcomes) that results
simply from each examiner knowing that some of his work will be re-examined. This knowledge
may make people more conscientious in their documentation and performance.
Case audits are designed to detect deviations from ideal, normative, or intended practices.
Finding these alone makes the audit process useful. The findings can identify specific corrective
actions (as they relate to the case), or they can identify more general issues, resulting in
recommendations for improvements (for example, changes in processes or in training methods).
Audits generally do result in such findings, since all processes can be improved; arguably, if an
agency performs audits, it should make them rigorous enough for the agency to acquire data on
areas for improvement. Thus, compilations of technical case audit findings are a potential source
of valuable information. They provide quantitative data regarding the occurrence of different
types of deviations from ideal or intended practices. The data can suggest which deviations may
be occurring systematically, leading to modifications in technical audit procedures or to more
specific investigations or research.
Technical case audit compilations, however, are not a reasonable way to measure overall
latent print process performance or to estimate the error rate of a specific latent print process.
Individual technical audits differ in their criteria, rigor, and areas of concern (as is appropriate
and consistent with their purpose). Compilations of findings will represent combinations of cases
with different examiners, different levels of difficulty, and different examination processes. The
actual causes of problems detected in technical case audits usually cannot be determined. And,
once again, ground truth, which would be necessary for establishing errors in identifications and
exclusions, is unknown for audited casework.
Rather than auditing casework, an expert panel of latent print examiners could conduct its own
evaluations of a large sample of previous casework (blinded to the earlier outcomes).125 The
results would test the conclusions reached in actual casework. However, the true source of the
latent prints in these cases would not be known with certainty. The panel’s conclusions would
have to be accepted as correct if they are to serve as the measure of accuracy in casework.
Without proof of the panel’s accuracy, the experiment would be subject to the criticism that
it seeks to prove one unknown by means of another. Although the absence of ground truth
technically makes this experiment a reproducibility study, the expert panel experiment could be
125
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revealing. Studies of the predictive power of screening tests in medicine rely on this
experimental design when they use a more precise (but still imperfect) test to measure the
accuracy of the first result. A large number of discordant evaluations would reveal the need
for further research targeted to ascertaining the sources of the discrepancies. Conversely, high
concordance rates would support the perception that latent print analysis is a reliable and
reproducible process as currently practiced.
Finally, controlled experiments with simulated materials are possible. These could illuminate the
conditions under which possible errors might occur, could help provide a scientific foundation
for the validity of the ACE-V process (as practiced by the subjects in the experiment), and could
supply the kind of error rate information mentioned in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.126 To determine error rates of a specific type, or for a specific process, one can design an
experiment that has a consistent process and for which the correct outcomes are known. In this
way, an error can be detected conclusively (as distinct from a process divergence examined in
case audits).
This is the logic that underlies the European collaborative exercises in the DNA field.127 The
researchers conducting these exercises have found that the overall error rate dropped sharply
with the introduction of standardized, commercially available DNA testing kits in 1999; that
“human carelessness is the predominant source of error regardless of the technology used;” that
these errors take the form of “the transposition of samples, … albeit never [twice] by the same
laboratory” and “writing a correct result incorrectly in the summary sheet supplied” but not
normally used in the laboratory;128 and that the total error rate has stabilized in the range of 0.4%
to 0.7%.129 The researchers’ conclusions indicate the value of experiments like these: “During
the development of the trials over the last decade since the introduction of STRs [short tandem
repeats], many lessons have been learnt which have led to improvements not only in the trials
themselves, but also have achieved the goal of improved quality of results within the forensic
community as a whole.”130
Results from the first large-scale, controlled experiment on the accuracy of fingerprint examiners
appeared in 2011.131 Sacrificing the realism of casework for known ground truth, experimenters
from the Noblis Corporation and the FBI presented latent print examiners with pairs of prints
consisting of one latent print and one exemplar, each from known sources. Some of the pairs
(520) were mates that came from the same finger. The rest (224) were nonmates that came from
different fingers. These nonmated pairs were designed to yield difficult comparisons. Unusually
similar exemplars in the nonmates came from searches of the prints of the 58 million persons
then in FBI’s Integrated AFIS database. Moreover, an abnormally large proportion of the latent
prints were of poor quality.
509 U.S. 594 (1993).
Rand, Schürenkamp, and Brinkman, 2002, op. cit.
128
Ibid.
129
Rand, S., M. Schürenkamp, and B. Brinkmann. “The GEDNAP (German DNA Profiling Group) Blind Trial
Concept Part II: Trends and Developments.” International Journal of Legal Medicine, 118, no.2 (2004): 83.
130
Ibid., p. 88.
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Ulery, B., A. Hicklin, J. Buscaglia, et al. “Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions.”
Proceedings of the NAS. 2011.
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After a double-blind presentation of the mated and nonmated pairs to the latent print examiners,
the experimenters measured the proportions of identifications132 for the mates (sensitivity) and
nonmates (false positives), as well as the proportions of exclusions for the nonmates (specificity)
and mates (false negatives). For the particular mix of mates and nonmates in the test set,
they also determined the proportion of correct judgments among the identifications (positive
predictive value) and exclusions (negative predictive value). Box 2.4 provides a small part of the
data obtained and the resulting statistics on errors and accuracy.
Of course, the experimental results may not lead to reasonable estimates of the rates at which
errors occur in practice. To the extent that the experimental conditions and the examiners who
are tested in the experiment do not mirror the conditions and examiners encountered in actual
casework, the measured error probabilities will not apply directly to the field as a whole. They
may, however, answer such questions as “How well do skilled examiners, working under ideal
conditions on a difficult case, perform?” As noted, the legal system values the answers to such
questions. Chapter 6 considers the admissibility of various statistics on error rates and offers
recommendations on how an expert witness might approach the issue of error in a particular
case.
Box 2.4: Selected Results of the Noblis-FBI Experiment
This experiment presented 169 relatively experienced and proficient latent fingerprint examiners, who
knew they were being tested, with pairs of latent and exemplar prints selected to be challenging and
judged by the examiners in the study to be representative of casework. The examiners worked through a
total of 17,121 presentations of 744 image pairs (roughly 100 pairs per examiner). Table 2.8 summarizes
the results of the examiners’ efforts for those pairs of prints that they initially deemed “of value for
individualization.”133

Exclusion
Identification
Inconclusive
All

Nonmate
3,622
6
455
4,083

Mate
450
3,663
1,856
5,969

All
4,072
3,669
2,311
10,052

Table 2.8: Outcomes for pairs judged to be “of value for individualization”
Of the presentations deemed of value for individualization (59%, or 10,052), five examiners
(5/169 = 3%) made false identifications. One of the five examiners made two false
identifications. Looking just to the outcomes likely to be seen in court—the identifications and
exclusions—the false positive rate is 6/3,628 = 0.2%.134 (For brevity, the discussion here is
During the study, examiners were asked to provide one of four decisions: “the analysis decision of no value
(unsuitable for comparison); or the comparison/evaluation decisions of individualizations (from the same source),
exclusion (from different sources), or inconclusive.” Ibid.
133
There were an additional 3,122 comparisons based on latent fingerprints deemed of value only for exclusion.
Because standard operating procedures typically include only value-for-individualization comparisons, these other
outcomes are not presented here.
134
In no case did two examiners make the same false positive error. The errors occurred on image pairs where a
large majority of examiners made correct exclusions; one occurred on a pair where the majority of examiners judged
the comparisons to be inconclusive. Thus, the six erroneous identifications probably would have been detected if an
independent, blind verification were performed as part of the operational examination process.
132
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confined to this set of cases in which the examiners were able to make an identification or an
exclusion.135)
As discussed earlier, “sensitivity” is the proportion of cases in which an examiner confronted with a mated
pair makes a positive identification. Thus, in this experiment, the sensitivity was 3,663/4,113 = 89.1%.136
Whereas the false positive rate was only 0.2%, the false negative rate was 450/4,113 = 10.9%.137 Defining
specificity as the proportion of exclusions for nonmates judged to be of value for inclusion, the specificity
was 3,622/3,628 = 99.8%.138 Table 2.9 summarizes these error and accuracy rates.
Nonmate
Exclusion Specificity: 99.8%
Identification False positive rate: 0.2%

Mate
False negative rate: 10.9%
Sensitivity: 89.1%

Table 2.9: Accuracy and error rates for exclusions and identifications in pairs judged to be
“of value for individualization” and leading to exclusions or identifications

2.5

Summary

This chapter discussed types of error and the differences between process errors and outcome
errors. It also reviewed how the system in which the examiner works can contribute to such
errors. Finally, the chapter outlined the challenges and benefits of trying to calculate the
prevalence of error in latent print examinations.

Adding inconclusives lowers the false positive rate to 6/4,083 = 0.1%.
Again, the text deals only with the pairs deemed of value for identification and resulting in a definitive conclusion.
The sensitivity was 3,663/5,969 = 61.4%, including inconclusives.
137
Adding inconclusives lowers the false negative rate to 450/5,969 = 7.5%.
138
Adding inconclusives lowers the specificity to 3,622/4,083 = 88.7%.
135
136
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Chapter 3: Interpreting Latent Prints
Introduction and Scope
Latent print examination requires the careful interpretation and comparison of friction ridge
impressions. From the first examination of the features contained in a latent print to a final
conclusion regarding an identification or exclusion, an examiner engages in many acts of
interpretation. Current methods of interpretation are based upon professional knowledge and
experience rather than formal decision thresholds or statistical models.
This chapter describes the critical interpretative stages that are part of every latent print
comparison. It surveys the current state of knowledge, based upon published research, regarding
the interpretive stages and the implications for pitfalls that may arise during the interpretive
process. It also identifies the most important questions in this area that require further study.
Finally, this chapter provides recommendations and best practices relating to the interpretive
stages.

3.1

Preliminary Observations and Caveats

Several preliminary observations are important. To begin with, the chapter focuses almost
exclusively on latent fingerprint examinations using the ACE-V process (Analysis, Comparison,
Evaluation, and Verification), drawing on the Latent Print Examination Process Map of Chapter
1 (Figure 1.1). This chapter maps the interpretive stages onto the relevant sections of that Process
Map. The focus on ACE-V is not intended as an endorsement of ACE-V as a “methodology.” As
explained in Chapter 1, ACE-V maps the steps of a process, but it does not provide specific
functional guidance on how to implement that process, nor does it detail the substantive content
of the various steps.139 Although ACE-V provides a useful framework for describing the steps
taken for interpreting prints, it does not offer specific criteria to guide those interpretations.
A second preliminary observation concerns the analysis of the subjective elements in human
interpretation. To recognize such subjectivity is not to disparage the process. The act of
interpreting inevitably requires human judgment and necessarily implies at least some
subjectivity. If one simply follows a clear, bright-line rule with no discretion or independent
judgment, one is not actually interpreting. Interpretation goes beyond merely executing a set of
rules; thus, the exercise of judgment and expertise inevitably makes the interpretive process
partly subjective.
Third, with the subjectivity of interpretation comes the possibility of reduced performance
because of human factors issues. As explained in Chapter 1, cognitive bias is one aspect of
human interpretation that has received significant attention. Writing about sorting fingerprints
according to Purkenje’s standards, Francis Galton recognized the difficulty of accurate
interpretations of fingerprints and the possible dangers of cognitive bias:

See also Mnookin, J. “The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science.” Brooklyn Law Review, 75, no.
4 (2010): 1209.
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On considering the causes of these doubts and blunders, different influences were
found to produce them, any one of which was sufficient by itself to give rise to
serious uncertainty. A complex pattern is capable of suggesting various readings,
as the figuring on a wallpaper may suggest a variety of forms and faces to those
who have such fancies.140
All human interpretation is potentially subject to biasing effects, as the enormous research
literature across a wide variety of domains establishes (as noted in Chapter 2). To recognize that
latent print examiners are potentially subject to bias is not to single them out but rather to suggest
that they are not exempt from those cognitive biases that all interpreters of data and information
face. Indeed, many psychologists claim that susceptibility to bias is part of the architecture of the
human brain. The same processes that help us make sound judgments in many circumstances
also create the possibility for bias. In some instances, cognitive biases lead to improved
performance, whereas in other circumstances they degrade performance.141
Bias is only one of the many factors that can affect examiner performance. It receives particular
attention in this chapter because of the extensive research on cognitive bias in other fields and
the emerging research in this field that reveals the possible effects of bias on interpretive
performance. Other chapters focus on other factors—from lighting, to technology access, to
work culture—that also affect interpretation. Recognizing that a variety of human factors affect
the interpretive process, this chapter examines the process with an eye toward identifying the
facets that raise research and operational issues because of the possibility of cognitive bias.
Fourth, although this chapter attempts to highlight those locations within the interpretive process
of latent print examination where subjectivity and error due to human factors might be especially
salient, it makes no effort to quantify the potential risk of error in latent print interpretation. The
discussion is primarily theoretical. For the most part, the empirical basis for clearly establishing
the extent of these risks does not yet exist. Further research is needed to establish whether, in
what circumstances, and to what extent these theoretical issues of interpretation create an
elevated risk for error.
Many of the interpretive issues discussed in this chapter are well known to latent print
examiners. However, some of the interpretive inflection points in the latent print identification
process traditionally have not had precise names associated with them and are not clearly
articulated in day-to-day practice. Enormous variability exists in how various forensic service
providers approach these interpretive issues. This chapter offers a framework for thinking about
interpretation, and it presents a vocabulary for considering the interpretive inflection points, but
it does not attempt to detail the variations in approaches to interpretive questions across
laboratories or jurisdictions. The major interpretive stages involved in latent print examination
discussed in this chapter are as follows:
•

Feature selection: The examiner selects specific friction ridge details within a latent print
on which to focus subsequent inquiry.

Galton, F. Finger Prints. 1892. Reprint, William S. Hein & Co., 2003, p. 66.
Potchen, E., J. Gard, P. Lazar, et al. “The Effect of Clinical History Data on Chest Film Interpretation: Direction
or Distraction?” Investigative Radiology, 14 (1979): 404
140
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•

Utility assessment: At various points in the latent print identification process, an examiner
decides whether the print is of value for numerous purposes. Examples include assessing
whether the latent is suitable for comparison, whether it is suitable for an automated
fingerprint identification system (AFIS) search, and whether the potential source print
is suitable for comparison. Because these interpretive determinations are all forms of
sufficiency analysis, they are considered under a common rubric.

•

Feature weighting: An examiner assigns weight and significance to individual features
and their configuration and assesses the overall strength of their synthesis.

•

Discrepancy interpretation: An examiner interprets the significance of observed
divergences between a latent print and an exemplar and determines whether the
differences establish that the two impressions arose from different sources or are
consistent with a common origin.

•

Source attribution: An examiner decides whether two prints share a common source, or
determines that the information presented does not permit a categorical conclusion.142

In addition to discussing these interpretive stages individually, this chapter addresses a number
of issues common to several interpretative stages, including the need to establish adequate
documentation and the desirability of procedures to help avoid bias. The next section discusses
these crosscutting issues and presents recommendations regarding them. The remainder of the
chapter (1) describes the interpretive stages and explicitly connects them to the Latent Print
Examination Process Map set out in Chapter 1, (2) describes and discusses any key published
research findings that relate to the particular interpretive stage, (3) provides recommendations
and best practices relating to the interpretive stage, and (4) highlights important research
questions connected to each interpretive stage.

3.2

Issues Relevant to Multiple Interpretative Stages

3.2.1

Documentation

One crosscutting issue is the need for adequate documentation of an examiner’s reasoning and
conclusions. Documentation is not itself an interpretive practice, but rather a practice for
capturing an examiner’s interpretive judgments in a form that would permit the examiner, or
another examiner, to make sense of a decision at a later time. Documentation serves to maximize
the transparency of the interpretative process and to provide a record that can be useful for many
purposes, including reports and testimony, future research and evaluation, and quality assurance.
Documentation requirements also may affect the interpretive process itself by requiring
judgments to be explicit and thus potentially subject to greater reflection on the part of the
examiner.

There are other interpretive stages beyond the five described here. For example, it can be argued that a major step
is classifying an impression as emanating from a finger or palm and determining what orientation to use to search
the latent print. These decisions, if incorrect, can lead to a missed opportunity for an identification or to an erroneous
exclusion. However, the focus here is on the steps that can present some of the more complex issues in
comprehending the associated human factors concerns.
142
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Questions regarding how much documentation should be required clearly are relevant to feature
selection, utility assessment, and discrepancy interpretation. How much documentation to
provide is difficult to legislate because the degree and detail of documentation can vary
depending on the complexity of the comparison. The more complex the cognitive and
interpretive assessment, the more there is to be gained from detailed and explicit documentation.
However, assessing the complexity of a comparison requires additional research. Without clear
guidelines on complexity, the examiner’s subjective assessment of complexity can be used, but
this assessment too should be part of the record. For both legal and scientific purposes (see
Chapter 5), the documentation should supply detail sufficient for another expert to understand
the basis for the examiner’s conclusions and to replicate the steps the examiner followed.
Such documentation should be contemporaneous with the analysis or as nearly so as is
practicable.143 Because the purpose of documentation is to capture an examiner’s interpretive
process, both to assist that examiner in recalling what occurred and to make these processes as
transparent as possible to others, documentation will be most helpful and accurate when
conducted at the same time as the interpretation itself.144 The closer in time the documentation is
conducted to the mental processes it details, the more complete and accurate the documentation
is likely to be.
Recommendation 3.1: A report and contemporaneous supporting notes or materials
should document the examination to make the interpretive process as transparent as
possible. Although the degree of detail may vary depending on the perceived complexity
of the comparison, documentation should, at a minimum, be sufficient to permit
another examiner to assess the accuracy and validity of the initial examiner’s
assessment of the evidence.
Another question that arises in more than one interpretative stage is the extent to which it is
legitimate to reassess a latent print or other exemplar after looking at a potential source print.
Norms and laboratory practices vary in this regard. At one extreme, some forensic service
providers permit examiners to undertake comparisons without any prior explicit feature
assessment in the questioned print. At another extreme, some providers discourage any “new”
features from being noted in the latent print after comparison has begun. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many laboratories routinely reassess the features within the latent print after
undertaking a comparison to a known exemplar. This recursive practice should not be ruled out,
because the exemplar may draw attention to a genuine feature in the latent print that was not
previously observed or that was interpreted as likely to be an artifact until the same feature was
apparent in the comparison print. 145
However, recursion raises the possibility that an examiner will be unduly influenced by the
exemplar when reassessing the latent print. In other words, although the comparison process may
reveal true similarities regarding features that had not previously been noted, it also can lead to
See American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board. ASCLD/LAB Guiding
Principles of Professional Responsibility for Crime Laboratories and Forensic Scientists. Principle 15, Version 1.1.
144
See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. The FBI DNA Laboratory: A Review of Protocol
and Practice Vulnerabilities. U.S. Department of Justice, May 2004.
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Vanderkolk, J. Forensic Comparative Science: Qualitative Quantitative Source Determination of Unique
Impressions, Images, and Objects. Academic Press, 2009, p. 23, 92 – 94.
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the perception of a similarity that does not exist. In some instances, the comparison print may
help the examiner accurately clarify ambiguous minutiae in the latent image, whereas in other
instances, an examiner may, in all good faith, be misled by what cognitive psychologists call
expectation effects. Given this complex interaction between the interpretation of a latent and
known print, this report can offer no hard rules about the appropriateness of making use of this
interpretive practice. However, procedural steps can make the use of this interpretive procedure
more transparent and reflective. At a minimum, there should be an explicit determination of
features in the latent before the comparison process. This initial determination need not limit the
features that can be used in subsequent analysis; identifying this initial set ensures that the
analyst’s approach remains transparent. But because of the danger of bias emerging in going
back and forth between latent and exemplar prints—and to maintain the transparency of the
process—any features that are noted after comparison has begun or as the result of the
comparison process (rather than before comparison begins) should be indicated and explicitly
included in the documentation.
Recommendation 3.2: Modifications to the results of any stage of latent print analysis
(e.g., feature selection, utility assessment, discrepancy interpretation) after seeing a
known exemplar should be viewed with caution. Such modifications should be
specifically documented as having occurred after comparison had begun.
3.2.2

Cognitive Biases

Another crosscutting issue is cognitive bias. Chapter 1 notes the substantial body of
psychological research illustrating the tendency for human beings to engage in motivated
reasoning or to be affected by contextual knowledge. Even people attempting to be fair
interpreters of the evidence may be influenced by information outside the formally relevant
decision criteria. Such biases may be present in the work of latent print examiners.146 However,
the extent to which cognitive bias creates the danger of erroneous interpretations in real-world
circumstances has not yet received significant research attention. Continued research about the
presence or absence of such biases in the latent print domain and the extent of any impact on
accuracy and reliability is needed. However, given the decades-long research into the significant
effects of cognitive bias in other domains, it seems wise to minimize the potential for such biases
in latent print interpretation, even in the absence of definitive research results for latent print
analysis.
An obvious way to minimize the effect of contextual information is to keep the interpreter from
having access to that contextual information in the first place. For example, the double-blind
study is the gold standard for clinical drug testing because it ensures that the clinicians
administering a drug and evaluating the patient’s response do not know whether the patient is
receiving the drug or the placebo. Treating physicians still have all the information they need to
provide quality care, but those participating in the testing process are shielded from the
information that could bias them.

Dror, I., D. Charlton, and A. Peron. “Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous
Identifications.” Forensic Science International, 156, no. 1 (2006): 74–78. See also authorities cited, Chapter 2.
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Currently, there is no systematic effort to blind forensic examiners from contextual information
that is clearly not domain relevant—information that is not related to or necessary for their
analysis. For example, the suspect’s prior convictions, gang membership, or confession does not
assist in the print analysis. Such extraneous information could create bias. It is therefore good
practice to avoid disclosing extraneous, domain-irrelevant information.147 To be sure,
someinformation may be necessary at a later point in the forensic analysis and should be
provided at that point. The goal here is not to define what information is necessary at each point
in the analysis but simply to suggest that procedures should be designed to eliminate access to
potentially biasing, domain-irrelevant information.
Recommendation 3.3: Procedures should be implemented to protect examiners from
exposure to extraneous (domain-irrelevant) information in a case.
This recommendation is not suggesting that examiners should be denied access to information
that is legitimately relevant to their substantive analysis. Examiners must have the information
that is necessary to do their jobs effectively. Some information will be both potentially biasing
and domain relevant—for example, information about the substrate from which a print was
lifted, or the fact that the source print is the result of an AFIS search. Unless further research
points to particularized dangers of bias, examiners should have access to whatever information is
legitimately relevant to the exercise of their expertise, notwithstanding some theoretical but
unproven danger of bias.
However, given the genuine dangers of cognitive bias, the better practice is to protect examiners
from inadvertent bias by shielding them from information that is clearly unnecessary and not
relevant to their assessment. It might not always be feasible to implement such procedures, and it
may well be infeasible to implement them perfectly. Forensic scientists strive to reach
conclusions “based on the evidence and reference material relevant to the evidence, not on
extraneous information, political pressure, or other outside influences.”148 If examiners routinely
receive extraneous, domain-irrelevant information, forensic service providers should examine
whether they can modify their procedures to shield examiners from this unnecessary and
potentially biasing information.
The three recommendations above apply to multiple interpretative stages. The sections that
follow focus on the stages of the latent print analysis, with reference to the research that is
relevant to each stage and recommendations (beyond those given above) that are specific to each
stage of interpretation.

3.3

Feature Selection

The first major interpretative stage in a latent print analysis occurs during the initial examination
of the latent print. In this stage, the examiner identifies features in the latent print (e.g., ridge
Others have made similar suggestions. E.g., Risinger, D., M. Saks, W. Thompson, et al. “The Daubert/Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion.” California
Law Review, 90, no. 1 (January 2002); Krane, D., S. Ford, J. Gilder, et al. “Sequential Unmasking: A Means of
Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 53, no. 4 (2008):
1006–7.
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flow type or ridge path minutiae) that allow a determination of whether the latent print has
sufficient detail to form the basis for subsequent comparisons. Section 3.5 provides figures and
more explanation about minutiae and the levels of detail in print images.
3.3.1

Corresponding Phase in the Latent Print Examination Process Map

One of the primary tasks of the Analysis phase of the ACE-V process is the selection of reliable
friction ridge features in a latent print for comparison against features in exemplar prints. This
corresponds to steps 210 and 320 in the Latent Print Examination Process Map (Figure 1.1). The
process of feature selection may occur simultaneously with the other interpretative processes
such as analysis of distortion and suitability determination (see the discussion of these topics
below and steps 210 through 240 in the Process Map). These interpretative processes, in fact,
may all color and influence each other because they have direct impact on the determination of
the quantity, quality, and reliability of the features selected for analysis.
3.3.2

Findings from Existing Research

Feature selection begins with an analysis of the latent print by itself. This generally occurs—and
should generally occur—before viewing the exemplar print. The features that will be selected
usually include those that are the most clearly visible and distinctive, and they will serve as the
basis for the comparison against exemplar prints.
In studying a latent print, an examiner will likely note some minutiae that he is certain exist and
other that he is less sure about. The former should be the primary focus. Confidence about a
feature refers to two things: (1) the examiner is confident that the feature genuinely exists in the
latent print, and (2) the examiner strongly expects to observe that feature in a corresponding
exemplar print from the same source. The degree of expectation relates to the level of tolerance
that the examiner is willing to accept when observing differences during the subsequent
Comparison phase. In other words, if an examiner believes a feature exists in the latent print and
strongly expects to see it in any print from the same source, then the absence of the feature could
significantly affect the examiner’s source attribution. The effect of this feature’s absence
increases with the examiner’s confidence that the feature existed in the original latent print (and
could not be interpreted as anything else).
Typically, high-confidence features will have the highest reliability (accuracy and precision in
selection).149 Because these features will form the basis for the decision, the manner in which
they are selected, how they are documented, and what level of confidence is assigned to them
become critical in understanding the examiner’s decision-making process. Feature selection
becomes crucial in the examination because criteria for the decision-making processes are
neither clearly defined a priori nor made using an objective, validated metric.
Defining the Features
Examiners are not limited to the “points” or “minutiae” when selecting features during the
Analysis phase (although commonly these may be the only formal features documented).
Langenburg, G. and C. Champod. “The GYRO System—A Recommended Approach to More Transparent
Documentation.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 61, issue 4 (July/August 2011): 373 – 384.
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Examiners will utilize several classes of features, often referred to as “levels of detail.” There are
also occasional features not associated with any of the traditional levels of detail that appear,
such as creases and wrinkles, permanent scars, temporary skin damage, or skin disease, that
examiners might use.150
Level 1 Detail (L1D) is defined as “ridge flow.”151 Ridge flow often translates to a pattern type
in a finger or palm, such as a loop, whorl, or arch formation; ridge flow also includes other
information such as relative curvature. Pattern types are class characteristics shared by many
individuals. Furthermore, L1D can be easily distorted as a result of the flexibility of skin.152
Therefore, although L1D might be selected, this level of detail is not always reliable, especially
if signs of distortion appear in the image. Figure 3.1 provides illustrations of some L1D.
Level 2 Detail (L2D) is defined as “ridge path.”153 L2D includes minutiae, such as ridge endings,
bifurcations, or dots. Even the absence of minutiae in an area (called an “open field”) can be
significant and highly discriminating. Ridge path features are also some of the most robust
features, and they will be present even under extreme conditions of distortion.154 They also tend
to be highly discriminating155 and thus are ideal features for comparisons.
Level 3 Detail (L3D) refers to the edges of ridges (which may appear indented or protruded) and
pores (the location of the center of the pore, not the size or shape, which can be highly variable
within a source).156 Although the reproducibility of pores in latent prints (or low-resolution
capture systems for exemplars) can be problematic in low-clarity images, these features can be
highly discriminating when visible.157

150
This will vary significantly among jurisdictions. For example, in countries that require a minimum number of
minutiae to declare an identification, scars and creases may not be used to reach the minimum. Other agencies may
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Occasional features such as scars and creases can be selected. These features vary in their
reproducibility. For example, creases may not always reproduce consistently158 but can be fairly
discriminating,159 whereas scars reproduce very consistently and are also believed to be highly
discriminating.160 In some instances, such as temporary skin damage, there is a low expectation
of reproducibility in exemplar prints, but the presence of such a feature can be highly significant.
How examiners select and document features can vary significantly among jurisdictions. In some
instances, the examiner observes and notes features to use for comparison without producing any
formal documentation; this examiner might change his mind about the features selected without
documenting the change. On the other end of the spectrum, some examiners formally select
features a priori and annotate the features during the Analysis phase. In some agencies,
examiners must justify in writing any modifications made to their initial feature selections during
the Comparison phase.161
Whether features are selected formally or informally, there are two major decision components
involved: determining the existence of a feature and identifying the type or shape of the feature.
These decisions are distinct, and each decision can have its own assigned level of confidence. In
other words, deciding if a feature is present is different from determining precisely what the
feature is. Both decisions may be limited by the quality and clarity of the image.
The determination that a feature exists is akin to the concept of signal-to-noise ratio
determination. Typically, a targeted feature produces a stimulus signal to the observer greater
than the background noise. In some instances, additional information near the suspected signal is
relevant to ascertaining the existence of a feature. An example would be the observation that
adjacent ridges next to a suspected feature react to account for the presence of the suspected
feature. Another example would be three ridges entering a small smudged area from which only
two ridges exit. These indicators allow an examiner to infer the existence of a feature that cannot
be observed directly.
The identification of the type of feature observed is, as a logical matter, a separate inquiry made
after determining the existence of a feature. For this decision, the examiner will attempt to
classify and identify the type of feature with as much specificity as possible. For example, after
noting L1D that includes a recurve and a single delta formation, the examiner might classify this
ridge flow as a loop pattern. Similarly, an examiner observing a ridge path event may conclude
that the feature is an ending ridge or a bifurcation (illustrations of these minutiae are available in
Table 3.4 and Figure 4.3). Or perhaps the examiner cannot tell and will simply refer to the
minutiae as a “ridge event.” In this last scenario, the examiner has no doubt that a minutia exists
in the latent print, but the examiner cannot, on the basis of what is observable in the latent image,
Richmond, op. cit.
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determine the specific type of minutia. The examiner, in this instance, has great certainty about
the minutia’s existence, but great uncertainty about its specific nature.
For each of these decisions—determining the existence of the feature and determining the type of
feature—the examiner has some internal level of confidence. This level of confidence may be
documented formally, or it may simply be an informal or even implicit judgment by the
examiner, depending on local practices. The levels of confidence can also be very different for
the two decisions. For example, the examiner might be highly confident that a feature exists
when three ridges enter a smudged area but only two exit; yet the examiner might have no
confidence regarding whether the event is a bifurcation or ridge ending (although the examiner
might have high confidence about what the feature is not—for example, a dot).
3.3.3

Issues and Recommendations

Confidence Levels and Documentation
During feature selection, there may be a wholly implicit or a more explicit assignment of weight
to the features, mostly as a function of their specificity (discriminating strength). This chapter
covers weighting of features in section 3.5; here the focus is on the role of an examiner’s
confidence in such weighting and the importance of documenting the degree of confidence. An
examiner’s confidence in the existence of the feature and confidence in its classification will
undoubtedly affect the weight applied to the feature, independent of specificity. Generally
speaking, examiners would give more weight to a rare feature, such as a trifurcation, when it is
clear and distinct and when the examiner is confident in selecting it than when it is part of an
indistinct, distorted, or low-quality area that may possibly include a trifurcation or something
else (or may not even exist). Weight is a function of both confidence about the feature’s
existence and the perceived rarity of the feature. Because not enough is known about rarity, and
even that which is known is not necessarily part of an examiner’s formal training, this aspect of
interpretation is often an implicit judgment based on the examiner’s experience.162
The examiner’s decisions in the Analysis phase and the associated levels of confidence will only
be captured by documenting these aspects contemporaneously. An examiner may choose to
document the features and levels of confidence using a narrative, although this can be somewhat
time-consuming and burdensome. Another way to record this information is to annotate the
features with dots, tracings, and other markings on a photograph of the latent print. Numerous
software packages can facilitate this process. Some software has been designed for fingerprint
case annotation and includes tools for marking various friction ridge features, classifying these
features, and assigning levels of confidence to the decisions.163 Newly developed algorithms,
such as used in an automated quality mapping assessment,164 may be able to extract features
automatically and to assign a level of confidence in the existence of the feature. While waiting
162
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for this software to be further tested and more readily available, however, some examiners have
developed annotation schemes for indicating their personal assessments of confidence in the
existence of a feature. For example, one scheme uses colors to represent an examiner’s level of
confidence.165 Similar to a traffic light, green features represent high confidence, yellow features
represent medium confidence, red features represent low confidence, and orange features are
those observed during the Comparison phase. This report does not offer specific prescriptions
regarding which approaches or technologies should be used; however, tools that make explicit
documentation both more routine and less time-consuming for examiners offer significant
benefits to the interpretive process.
If time were no limitation, elaborate, formal documentation of all discriminative features in
advance of a comparison would be ideal. The examiner would document all relevant and
significant features observed and would record the confidence regarding these features before
engaging in comparison. This annotation in advance would make explicit whether any significant
features were noted only after the comparison had begun, whether the examiner’s confidence in
the existence of minutiae changed as a result of the comparison process, and whether these
changes were justified. It would make the examiner’s internal thought process more transparent
to later observers and more transparent to the examiner himself.
However, not every comparison is complex, and time and resources are limited. Heavy caseloads
are the norm for many forensic service providers. Therefore, the benefits of detailed and
formalized documentation requirements must be balanced against the time and resources they
require. Recommendation 3.1, regarding the importance of documentation to maintain
transparency, which is highly relevant to feature selection, attempts to provide this balance by
requiring some degree of contemporaneous documentation in all cases while also recognizing
that the degree and detail of documentation may vary with the complexity of the print and the
comparison.
Variation
Intra-examiner reliability refers to reproducibility on the part of the same examiner. Intraexaminer reliability would be present during feature selection when an examiner selects certain
features in a questioned latent print at one time and selects different features from the same print
at a later time (without recollection of the initial features selected). Inter-examiner
reproducibility refers to the variation that exists across different examiners—variation that
occurs when different examiners are presented with the same latent print and independently
select different features. Studies of intra-examiner and inter-examiner variation reveal significant
differences.166 Methods to reduce variation in feature selection are currently being explored and
tested.167 In the meantime, because inter-examiner variation can be extensive, an examiner
cannot assume that another examiner will see the same features (or place the same level of
Langenburg and Champod, 2011, op.cit.
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confidence in the existence of any given feature).168 Documentation of the feature selection
process is critical to understanding the differences among examiners and their decisions.
Examination Complexity
Not all print comparison tasks are equal in difficulty. Some comparisons are simple; others are
far more complex. Although there is no formal method or metric for assessing complexity,
experience and common sense point to some of the relevant factors. Examples of factors that
lead to complexity include significant elements of distortion, reduced image quality (clarity), few
reliable features available for comparison, or unusual, rare features to consider.
As described in Recommendation 3.1, the amount of documentation needed may vary depending
on the complexity of the particular examination. In fairly simple, unambiguous cases, examiners
appear to be fairly resistant to certain bias effects.169 Furthermore, although extensive
interexaminer variation in feature selection appears to exist, some research suggests that this
variation does not have significant effects on the ultimate decisions in noncomplex cases, but it is
more significant in complex cases.170
These findings comport with intuition. When information is clear and plentiful, different
examiners may elect to focus on different minutiae and yet reach consistent results. For the sake
of efficiency, in these simple cases with significant quantity and quality of features present,
minimal documentation may be sufficient because the risk of error due to bias or other human
factors is also fairly minimal. Conversely, in complex cases, with limited quantity and quality of
features, research shows that a variety of factors can influence interpretation and decisions.171
In these more difficult interpretations, documenting all available and reliable features and
following stricter protocols regarding the analysis of the latent print before exposure to an
exemplar can be critical in reducing the potential for error.
However, if documentation is permitted to vary with the complexity of the examination,
examiners need to be able to determine complexity. It then becomes very important during the
Analysis phase that the examiner both assesses and documents the complexity of the case.
Current research is attempting to develop tools and metrics for quantitatively assessing the
difficulty or complexity of a latent print comparison. In the meantime, an examiner’s subjective
assessment of case complexity can, by necessity, substitute, but this judgment must be
documented in the case record. Some agencies may elect to institute a quality assurance policy or
minimum minutiae threshold to assist in deciding how to document a case. For example, a
An illustration can be found in the responses of the dozens of examiners in the public judicial inquiry set up by
Scottish Ministers to verify the fingerprints associated with the case of H.M Advocate v. McKie in 1999, and related
matters. Many chartings of the disputed latent print Y7 were submitted into evidence. Experts in the case disagreed
about which features were reliable. Transcripts and court exhibits can be viewed at
www.thefingerprintinquiryscotland.org.uk, accessed June 2, 2011.
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forensic service provider might require examiners to document all features during the Analysis
phase when a latent print has fewer than 12 minutiae.
Recursive Practice
Once the examiner enters the Comparison phase and compares the latent print against an
exemplar print (beginning with step 500 on the Latent Print Examination Process Map), looking
at the exemplar may cause the examiner to re-evaluate aspects of the latent print. The examiner
might use features in the exemplar print to find new features or to reassess previously noted
features in the latent print. This practice, which has been referred to as “teasing the points”172
when used to attain a required minimum number of minutiae, poses possible concerns about bias.
Some have criticized it as a form of circular reasoning because it uses the exemplar to infer
meaning from the source print and vice versa.173 However, there are occasions when the exemplar
may legitimately draw clearer attention to an important feature or reveal that some
detail in the latent print previously thought to be “noise” is actually “signal.”
Some sources, describing the advantages of a more cyclical process, defend examinations that
move back and forth between latent and exemplar prints,174 whereas other sources discourage it
in favor of a more linear approach.175 The difficulty is that the comparison print may lead both to
accurate and inaccurate judgments about previously unnoticed features of the latent print, and
there is no foolproof way to tell the two apart. Eliminating recursion would protect against
picking or trimming the data to fit the conclusion, but it would also prevent the examiner from
using valuable information. Moreover, recursive examinations may be especially important for
reaching the conclusion to exclude. If the examiner sees several similarities between a latent and
exemplar, notices another feature in the potential source print, returns to the latent, and does not
see the corresponding feature, then the examiner is engaging in a form of recursion; yet even
those who criticize recursive examinations would likely not wish to prevent such an analysis.
Recently, Dror et al.176 and Langenburg et al.177 proposed using features in the latent print that
were selected after observing the exemplar only if the nonlinearity of the process is documented.
These sources recommend that if these features are used, they must be formally documented as
features observed during, rather than prior to, the Comparison phase, and typically they should
be assigned less weight than if the feature had been observed initially in the Analysis phase. This
documentation-focused compromise has significant merit. This approach is captured in
Recommendation 3.2, which states that any modification to an analysis after examining the
exemplar (both in feature selection and in other interpretive phases) should be formally
documented.
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Cognitive Bias
Various studies have shown that context information or other external factors can influence
feature selection.178 However, some of this research has shown that not all bias effects are
necessarily negative. At times, the biases can create more conservative decisions by examiners,
even during feature selection. Whether greater conservatism is a plus or a minus depends on
factors not yet fully understood (such as error rates in a variety of circumstances as well as
policy decisions regarding tradeoffs between Type 1 and Type 2 errors). More study of the
risks—and any benefits—of these bias effects and how to minimize them is warranted. One
advisable countermeasure for bias in feature selection is simply to select features in the latent
print separately from the exemplar. More generally, sequential unmasking, which excludes
irrelevant contextual information, is a valuable strategy.
3.3.4

Research Needs in Feature Selection

Assessing Variation in Feature Selection
A handful of studies have assessed variation in the feature selection process. Generally, they find
a wide variation among examiners during the task of feature selection. At this stage, what may be
of more interest to the community are methods to reduce the variation of feature selection and
tools and technologies to help identify the most reliable features. These tools are likely to be
especially important for complex comparisons, and they may have benefits more broadly.
Link between Feature Selection and Source Attribution
The link between variations in feature selection and the examiner’s ultimate decision is not well
understood. Emerging research suggests that there is a relationship,179 but the effect may be
competing with other major interpretative steps, such as interpreting discrepancy, feature
weighting, and thresholds for reaching identification decisions. A better understanding of the link
between feature selection and the ultimate decision would permit best practices to be formulated
and would allow technology to select the most reliable and useful features on which to base
decisions later in the ACE-V process.
What is clear from the research is that in complex cases, examiners who perceive and compare a
greater number of features are more likely to reach a conclusion about source attribution (rather
than determining the print to be inconclusive). Therefore, in complex cases, there is a strong
need for tools or methods to standardize the selection of features. More generally, standardized
methods for feature selection should result in less variation in the features that are selected and
compared, which in turn should lead to more consistency in the decisions. However, even if
decisions were more consistent, they would not necessarily be more accurate. It is possible, for
example, that the best interpreters of prints would be more accurate using their own methods
instead of following a standard protocol. This too, deserves attention and research.
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3.4

Utility Assessment

Several points in the latent print analysis process require a determination of latent print utility or
sufficiency. The examiner must determine whether the print has enough clarity and quantity of
information for some specified purpose. This happens both early in the process (e.g.,
determinations of whether the latent is suitable for analysis or suitable for an AFIS search) and
later in the process (e.g., determinations of sufficient information to compare the latent and
exemplar). For convenience, the common points are discussed here, since the recurring question
is whether there is sufficient information for making the next inquiry.
3.4.1

Corresponding Steps in the Latent Print Examination Process Map

Key points at which utility determinations are relevant are discussed here with the numbers in
parentheses referring to steps in the Latent Print Examination Process Map. Upon acquiring a
latent print, an examiner must determine whether it is suitable for comparison (step 240). This
typically involves examining the details and any relevant distortion in the latent print to
determine whether there is enough usable information to make a comparison viable. Assuming
the latent print is suitable and that known prints are available, the examiner next determines if
the known prints are suitable for comparison (step 350) and if the two prints combined are
sufficient to see the comparison through to a decision (step 370). If no known prints are
available, the examiner may be called on to determine if the latent print is suitable for an AFIS
search (step 270).
3.4.2

Findings from Existing Research

The Working Group found no research that effectively addresses utility or sufficiency in the
context of fingerprint analysis. This is unsurprising, for a critical piece for any such research—
the definition and validation of a metric for assessing utility—is still missing. Research has been
carried out related to the examiner decision process that implicitly involves judgments of utility
and sufficiency, but these studies tend to focus only on the accuracy or repeatability of the
ultimate decision and thus are reviewed in the relevant sections below.
3.4.3

Recommendations and Best Practices

The absence of research findings specific to the determination of utility precludes evidence-based
recommendations to guide practitioners. Instead, the primary findings with regard to utility
determination concern practices to encourage consistent decision-making and to allow for
ongoing evaluation of quality both within and across forensic service providers. This involves
Recommendation 3.1, regarding the importance of documentation, and Recommendation 3.2,
regarding the special importance of documenting any utility determinations that are altered after
examining the exemplar. Such documentation is critical in utility determinations because it
allows for internal quality control and quality assurance. It also is of great importance for any
potential future external evaluations of quality.
Agencies and forensic service providers can enhance the transparency of their analyses and
conclusions by determining clear guidelines that assist examiners in making determinations of
utility. This refers to guidelines for deciding whether a print warrants further assessment and not
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to guidelines for making ultimate source attribution. For example, an agency might require at
least five minutiae to conduct an AFIS search.
This chapter does not propose particular guidelines for determining utility but suggests that each
forensic service provider try to make this step as explicit as possible. Until a substantial research
basis exists from which best practices can be generated, it is inappropriate to require field-wide
shared standards. Nevertheless, forensic service providers can draw on experience to establish
clear guidelines. Information that could be incorporated in an agency’s guidelines includes
number of minutiae and visibility of ridge flow, pores, ridge edges, and details of incipient
ridges, creases, and scars. The guidelines for determining whether a latent print is suitable for
comparison are necessarily different from the guidelines for comparing a pair of prints.
Recommendation 3.4: Each agency or forensic service provider should define “suitable”
or “sufficient” in its standard operations procedures. These guidelines should be as
explicit as possible about what is expected for sufficiency determinations at different
stages of the latent print examination process.
The Working Group takes no position on whether agencies should couch guidelines as
recommendations or as requirements.
3.4.4

Research Needs in Utility Assessment

Existing research has not resolved the questions of utility, sufficiency, and value determination in
latent print analysis. The Working Group strongly endorses further research in this area to enable
the development of evidence-based guidelines and recommendations for utility determination.
Although a general discussion of the need for research and a recommendation regarding research
is provided near the end of the chapter, some preliminary thoughts regarding research questions
relevant to utility or value determinations are provided here.
Important areas for study include the following:
•

Reproducibility and accuracy: It is of great interest to understand the degree to which
utility determinations are reliable. For each utility determination, researchers could
present the same print at different times to a single examiner, present the same print to
different examiners, or both. These studies could provide significant information about
consistency, though they would not tell the researcher anything directly about accuracy.
Assessing the accuracy of utility determinations is more problematic because there is no
objective basis for ascertaining when a determination is correct.

•

Factors affecting utility determinations: A wide range of factors can affect utility
determinations. One possible topic for consideration is context effects: does the type of
case (e.g., violent crime versus property crime) have an effect on the determination of
utility, or does background knowledge about the case affect utility judgments? Another
possible topic is comparator effects: are different utility determinations obtained for
comparing latent prints with suspect prints as opposed to comparing latent prints with
AFIS-generated targets? Other factors that should be studied include forensic service
provider culture norms and other human factors.
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•

The effect of laboratory culture: The relationship between the culture and expectations in
an agency and examiner performance has not been studied. For example, do laboratories
that frown on inconclusive determinations eliminate more prints at an earlier utility stage?

•

Utility effects with relation to manual, as opposed to AFIS, search strategies: Research
could investigate, for example, whether certain pattern types create different utility
strategies in relation to searching manually or on AFIS.

3.5

Feature Weighting

Practitioners recognize that assigning weights to latent print features and their configuration is a
fundamental decision-making or interpretive step, either as an output of the Analysis phase or as
part of the Evaluation phase. Pioneers such as Locard indicated that fingerprint features should
be assessed as a function of their relative rarity (and clarity).180
3.5.1

Frequencies of Friction Ridge Details

As discussed in section 3.1, the weighting of individual features currently reflects subjective,
experience-based judgments of the probability associated with their occurrence. Whether done
subjectively or in a more data-oriented fashion, weighting is a probabilistic assignment of the
selectivity of the features being considered. The process of weighting among practitioners today,
however, remains essentially holistic, and the subjective probabilities are rarely made explicit.181
In addition, no clear consensus exists among practitioners as to the reproducibility and perceived
contribution of L3D features appearing in both latent and exemplar prints.182
Although individual experience may provide some insight into probabilities, carefully collected
data should be used to provide more accurate assessments that can inform the weighting of
features in the interpretive process. To demonstrate the nature and value of such data, this
section summarizes the major sources of data available on the classification and prevalence
of L1D features (general flow of the ridges) and L2D features (here restricted to minutiae) for
fingerprints.183 Limited statistical data are available for L3D features of fingerprints. Other types
of friction ridge impressions (palms, toes, etc.) do not yet have comparable data available for
even L1D features.
L1D Features
The prevalence of different types of L1D features in the population is well documented.
Dermatoglyphic data from studies in anthropology, population genetics, and early detection of
180
Locard, E. “La Preuve Judiciaire par les Empreintes Digitales.” Archives d’Anthropologie Criminelle, de
Médecine Légale et de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, 29 (1914): 321–48.
181
In fact, in one early study, latent print examiners did not provide consistent rankings of how frequently fingerprint
features occur. Osterburg, op. cit.
182
Anthonioz, A., N. Egli, C. Champod, et al. “Level 3 Details and Their Role in Fingerprint Identification: A Survey
Among Practitioners.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 58, no. 5 (2008): 562–89.
183
Part of this section is based upon a report of C. Champod, provided on September 28, 2009, to the Scottish
Ministers’ Fingerprint Inquiry, available at www.thefingerprintinquiryscotland.org.uk/inquiry/2090.html, accessed
April 22, 2011.

55

Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis

disease, are one source.184 These data can be used in forensic science, but the classifications often
do not match those used by forensic experts. Other data come from collections of ten-print cards.
The majority of large collections were classified according to the Galton-Henry scheme,185 as
illustrated in Figure 3.1:

Figure 3.1: Level 1 Detail features186
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Data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center permits
estimates of the prevalence of each class of L1D in the U.S. population.
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Arches

3.6%

2.9%

Tented Arches

3.1%

2.7%

Right Loops

3.9%

58.0%

Le ft Loops

63.7%

4.4%

Pla in W horls

17.3%

24.4%

Central Pocket Loops

3.8%

4.1%

Double Loops

4.1%

3.2%

Accidental W horls

0.1%

0.083%

Miss ing or Amputated

0.2%

0.2%

Scarred or Mutilated

0.09%

0.094%

Table 3.1: Distribution for the general patterns on fingerprints from the left and right hands of males
(89,755,960 fingers)187

The relative frequencies of L1D can vary depending on the finger considered and, to some
degree, the sex and ethnic background of the population. For example, comparing right thumbs
to the little fingers of males produces the distributions in Table 3.2.
Male Right Thumb P atterns

Male Right Little Finger P atterns

Arches

2.5%

0.7%

Tented Arches

0.4%

0.6%

Right Loops

50.8%

82.3%

Le ft Loops

0.4%

0.3%

Pla in W horls

34.8%

11.8%

Central Pocket Loops

1.1%

3.6%

Double Loops

9.9%

0.4%

Accidental W horls

0.021%

0.009%

Miss ing or Amputated

0.088%

0.1%

Scarred or Mutilated

0.025%

0.059%

Table 3.2: Distribution for the general patterns on fingerprints from the right thumb and little fingers
of males (17,951,192 fingers)188

Some classes of L1D can be subdivided according to ridge counts (number of ridges between the
core of the pattern to the delta) and ridge tracing (relative positioning of the deltas). Statistics in
relation to these subclassifications are available. Table 3.3 presents two examples.

187
188
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Champod, C., C. Lennard, P. Margot, et al. Fingerprints and Other Ridge Skin Impressions. CRC Press, 2004.
Ibid.
Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis

Table 3.3: Examples of statistics on subclassifications189

These data can assist fingerprint examiners in several ways. Because the frequencies of general
patterns vary across the different fingers, the patterns offer information on which finger the latent
print came from. In addition, during the Evaluation phase, a rare general pattern, such as a tented
arch, can be weighted more than a common general pattern, such as a loop with a ridge count of
between 11 and 20.
L2D Features
The following two tables list frequencies, reported in studies prior to 1985, of the more
discriminating L2D features (especially minutiae).190 Not all types of minutiae were considered
in each study.191
Study Authors, (Number of Prints) Number of Minutiae
Minutia Type
Ridge ending

Example

Gupta, (1,000
Osterburg et al.,
Lin et al.,
(39 fingerprints)
ulnar loops)
(76 fingerprints)
Unknown number 8,591 cells of 1
14,280 minutiae
mm2
of minutiae
7.50%
8.32%
9.60%

Bifurcation
opening

8.00%

3.82%

2.60%

Deviation

0.90%

Not considered

Not considered

Bridge

0.80%

1.22%

Not considered

Island

2.50%

1.77%

0.99%

Ibid.
Stoney, D. “Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality.” In Advances in Fingerprint Technology, edited by Henry
C. Lee and R.E. Gaensslen, 327–87. 2nd ed. CRC Press, 2001, p. 327.
191
A more recent analysis appears in Gutièrrez, E., V. Galera, J. Martínez, et al. “Biological Variability of the
Minutiae in the Fingerprints of a Sample of the Spanish Population.” Forensic Science International, 172 (2007): 98.
189
190
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Minutia Type

Example

Gupta

Osterburg et al.

Lin et al.

Interruption

0.90%

1.39%

1.20%

Hook

2.00%

0.75%

0.48%

Lake

2.50%

0.64%

0.17%

Dot

3.50%

1.51%

0.52%

Crossing

0.50%

Not considered

Not considered

Transversal

0.50%

Not considered

Not considered

Return

0.80%

Not considered

Not considered

Double
bifurcation

Not considered

0.14%

0.27%

Trifurcation

Not considered

0.09%

Not considered

Angular line

Not considered

Not considered

0.17%

Delta

Not considered

0.20%

Not considered

Other multiple
occurrence

Not considered

3.55%

Not considered

Absence of
minutiae

Not considered

76.60%

83.90%

Table 3.4: Relative frequencies for different types of minutiae according to Gupta (1968),192
Osterburg et al. (1977),193 and Lin et al. (1982)194, 195

192
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Gupta, S. “Statistical Survey of Ridge Characteristics.” International Criminal Police Review, 218 (1968): 130.
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Study Authors, (Number of Prints) Number of Minutiae

Minutia Type

Ridge ending
Bifurcation
opening
Bifurcation
closing
Deviation
Bridge
Island
Interruption
Hook
Lake
Dot
Crossing
Transversal
Return
Double bifurcation
Trifurcation
Delta
Other multiple
occurrence

Santamaria
Beltran, (1,000
fingerprints)
Unknown
number of
minutiae
53.40%
15.10%

45.90%
34.10%

49.70%
15.90%

56.80%
43.20%

13.10%

Not considered

Not considered

Not considered

2.20%
1.30%
5.40%
1.60%
Not considered
4.20%
2.20%
0.22%
1.30%
0.024%
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered

Not considered
1.90%
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
3.20%
8.30%
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
1.70%
3.10%

Not considered
5.58%
10.30%
Not considered
3.50%
2.63%
10.20%
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
0.64%
0.28%
1.35%
Not considered

Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
5.30%
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered
Not considered

Kingston, (100
ulnar loops)
2,464 minutiae

Sclove, (39
fingerprints)
2,536 minutiae

Stoney, (412
thumbs–distal
area) 2,645
minutiae

Table 3.5: Relative frequencies for different types of minutiae according to Santamaria Beltran
(1953),196 Kingston (1964),197 Sclove (1979-1980),198 and Stoney (1985)199

Osterburg, J., T. Parthasarathy, T. Raghavan, et al. “Development of a Mathematical Formula for the Calculation
of Fingerprint Probabilities Based on Individual Characteristics.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 72
(1977): 772.
194
Lin, C., J. Liu, J. Osterburg, et al. “Fingerprint Comparison I: Similarity of Fingerprints.” Journal of Forensic
Science, 27, no. 2 (1982): 290.
195
Images adapted from Champod, C. Reconnaissance Automatique et Analyse Statistique des Minuties sur les
Empreintes Digitales. PhD Thesis. Institut de Police Scientifique et de Criminologie, Université de Lausanne,
Lausanne, Suisse, 1996.
196
Santamaria Beltran, F. “Une Nouvelle Méthode d’Évaluation des Points Caracteristiques des Crêtes Papillaires.”
Assemblée Générale de la Commission International de Police Criminelle – Oslo. 24–29 June 1953; Santamaria
Beltran, F. “Sous-Commission á la Dactyloscopie, Nouveaux Concepts d’Évaluation des Points Caractéristiques de
F. Santamaria Beltran.” Assemblée Générale de la Commission International de Police Criminelle – Oslo. 25 June
193

Chapter 3: Interpreting Latent Prints

60

Although this information could be helpful to an examiner, the data have significant limitations.
There is no standardized nomenclature for the type of minutiae considered, how they were
counted, how the absence of minutiae was evaluated, or how minutiae were distinguished
from one another (e.g., when two bifurcations should be counted as two events or one double
bifurcation event). This lack of standardized terminology applies across the entire fingerprint
comparison field200 and makes comparison across these studies extremely challenging.
Also, the density of minutiae and their relative proportions depends greatly on their positioning
on the papillary surface (especially in relation to core and deltas). For example, areas such as
deltas and ridge flow regions along “type lines” tend to produce a higher number of minutiae.
None of the studies took this into account. More recent models have begun to account for this
phenomenon by using data-driven approaches that do not rely on pre-defined categories.201
L3D Features202
Limited statistical analyses of pores, or by extension, of L3D features of fingerprints, have been
carried out for latent print comparisons in a forensic context. Ashbaugh indicated that 20 to
30 corresponding pores between a latent print and a reference print would be sufficient for an
individualization.203 Roddy and Stosz concurred.204 However, their models relied on questionable
independence assumptions205 and, more importantly, did not take into account the potential lack
of reproducibility of these features from one impression to the next. Parsons et al. investigated
within-source variability and concluded that “due to contamination and inherent dependence,
matching on 20 pores as has been previously suggested (Ashbaugh, 1983) appears to us overly
optimistic. On the basis of this study, we would conjecture that good fingerprints with more

1953; Santamaria Beltran, F. “A New Method for Evaluating Ridge Characteristics.” Fingerprint and Identification
Magazine, 36, no.11 (1955).
197
Kingston, C. “Probabilistic Analysis of Partial Fingerprint Patterns.” Doctorate of Criminology diss., University
of California, Berkeley, 1964.
198
Sclove, S. “The Occurrence of Fingerprint Characteristics as a Two-Dimensional Process.” Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 74 (1979): 588; Sclove, S. “The Occurrence of Fingerprint Characteristics as a
Two-Dimensional Poisson Process.” Communications in Statistics – Theoretical Methods, A9 (1980): 675.
199
Stoney, D. “A Quantitative Assessment of Fingerprint Individuality.” PhD thesis, University of California, Davis,
1985.
200
Saviers, K. “Friction Skin Characteristics: A Study and Comparison of Proposed Standards.” Journal of Forensic
Identification, 39 (1989): 157.
201
Champod, C. and P. Margot. “Computer Assisted Analysis of Minutiae Occurrences on Fingerprints.”
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Fingerprint Detection and Identification. 1995; Neumann,
Champod, Puch-Solis, et al., op. cit.; Egli, N. “Interpretation of Partial Fingermarks Using an Automated Fingerprint
Identification System.” PhD thesis, École des Sciences Criminelles, University of Lausanne, 2009; Su, C. and S.
Srihari. “Probability of Random Correspondence for Fingerprints.” Computation Forensics: Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 5718 (2009): 55.
202
This section comes from the supplementary report C. Champod provided on October 21, 2009, to The Fingerprint
Inquiry of Scotland, available at www.thefingerprintinquiryscotland.org.uk/inquiry/2090.html, accessed April 22,
2011.
203
Ashbaugh, D. “Poroscopy.” RCMP Gazette, 45, no. 2 (1983): 12.
204
Roddy and Stosz, op. cit.
205
Parsons, N., J. Smith, E. Thönnes, et al. “Rotationally Invariant Statistics for Examining the Evidence from the
Pores in Fingerprints.” Law Probability & Risk, 7, no. 1 (2007): 1.
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than about 80 pores appear to have potentially strong evidential value using this extraction
algorithm.” 206
Some biometric identification systems use pores and other features, such as dots and incipient
ridges, to increase the efficiency of matching algorithms based on minutiae.207 However, highquality input prints increase the performance of such systems; L3D may have minimal added
value for forensic latent prints of varying clarity and degrees of distortion.
3.5.2

Recommendations and Best Practices

Data on minutiae rarity, density, and location should be important to latent print examiners in
weighting different types of minutiae. These data can contribute to an expert’s informal judgment
on the relative frequency of a given minutia. At the moment, surveys providing such information
are available only for fingerprints, not for other forms of friction ridge areas such as palms or
feet. Furthermore, the above data illustrate that a simple additive rule with equal weight for
each minutiae within a fingerprint, such as a 12-point standard, ignores statistically important
information. The data clearly show, as many examiners well recognize, that all minutiae are not
equally useful for interpretation. For example, it may be seven times more common to see a ridge
ending within a delta zone than a hook. The amount of discriminating information provided by
the former is thus significantly less than that provided by the latter. Future research could better
quantify the weight that should be assigned to different types of minutiae. Educating examiners
about existing statistics, the limitations of these data, and the potential value of better statistics
will advance the field.
Recommendation 3.5: Because statistical information plays a fundamental role in
weighting latent print feature evidence, training should include the best available
empirical information and should educate examiners about probabilistic reasoning in
using that information.
Given the current limitations in data and probabilistic models, other difficulties in weighting
fingerprint evidence arise in some circumstances. Modern investigations often compare latent
prints to exemplars from AFIS searches. Such exemplars raise the possibility of increased
similarity to a latent print that actually comes from a different source. This phenomenon has
been called “incidental similarity.”208 Of course, the computer programs that generate candidates
compare prints differently than human examiners do; nevertheless, when looking in a large
database for those prints that bear the greatest similarity to the latent print in question, these
Ibid.
Chen, Y. and A. Jain. “Dots and Incipients: Extended Features for Partial Fingerprint Matching.” Paper presented
at the Biometrics Symposium 2007; Kryszczuk, K., A. Drygajlo, and P. Morier. “Study of the Distinctiveness of
Level 2 and Level 3 Features in Fragmentary Fingerprint Comparison.” Presented at the Proceedings of Biometric
Authentication Workshop, ECCV, Prague, Czech Republic 2004, 124–33; Jain, Chen, and Demirkus, op. cit.; Zhao,
Q., D. Zhang, L. Zhang, et al. “High Resolution Partial Fingerprint Alignment Using Pore-Valley Descriptors.”
Pattern Recognition, 2009; Vatsa, M., R. Singh, A. Noore, et al. “Combining Pores and Ridges with Minutiae for
Improved Fingerprint Verification.” Signal Processing, 89, no. 12 (2009): 2676–85.
208
For a discussion of this issue see Dror, I. and J. Mnookin. “The Use of Technology in Human Expert Domains:
Challenges and Risks Arising From the Use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensic Science.”
Law, Probability & Risk, 9 (2010): 47–67.
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programs could select a print from a nonsource that is far more similar to the latent print than
examiners are accustomed to seeing.209
An examiner whose idea of the necessary amount of information for a match comes from a
nondatabase world may not be taking into account the possibility of incidental similarity that a
large database carries with it. Unfortunately, no one has studied whether incidental similarity in a
database context is a substantial problem,210 and it is tricky to recommend modifications to an
interpretive system that is largely non-formalized. However, the Working Group believes that
interpreting the quality of the evidence in such cases requires special care because the chances of
finding a close nonmatch are higher. Such care might include strategies such as being more
explicit about the weight assigned to individual features, using a higher threshold before reaching
the conclusion for a match, or narrowing the tolerances for visual differences in appearance.
These considerations lead to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 3.6: When comparing latent prints to exemplars generated through
AFIS searches, examiners must recognize the possibility and dangers of incidental
similarity. Adjustments such as a higher decision threshold, stricter tolerances for
differences in appearance, and explicit feature weighting need to be considered.
Modifying quality assurance practices for this scenario also should be considered.
3.5.3

Research Needs in Feature Weighting

There is a strong need for systematic studies pertaining to the reproducibility and discriminating
strength of fingerprint features. More specifically, although the prevalence of particular L1D
features is well documented, a more complete understanding of the dependencies in these
features between fingers is desirable. Regarding L2D features, there is limited research that
would allow a global assessment (without strong independence assumptions) of the strength of
minutiae configurations. Likewise, the information power of L3D features is not fully understood
nor has it fully been explored for forensic use. Limited systematic studies have been carried out
on features such as creases, lines, and scars, which are useful to support the evaluation process
when these features are present. These studies should take into account variables such as sex,
finger number, pattern, and race.
Such research is important when the examiner subjectively assigns weight to a set of features.
Empirical studies on rarity can inform these experience-based judgments and help allow an
examiner to assign appropriate weights to sets of features. Moreover, research exploring how
examiners overestimate or underestimate the significance of features as a function of training,
motivation, or context of the examination would be useful.

Ibid.
But see Ulery, B., A. Hicklin, J. Buscaglia, et al. “Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint
Decisions.” Proceedings of the NAS. 2011. This experiment found relatively few false identifications for a sample of
latent prints drawn in part from the results of AFIS searches, discussed supra Chapter 2).
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210

63

Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis

3.6

Discrepancy Interpretation

In the friction ridge discipline, tolerance has been described as “the limits of how much
distortion or difference is still considered within the parameters of agreement.”211 No two images,
even if from the same source, will look identical. The question is the extent to which differences
in the appearance of a particular friction ridge feature in the impression should be considered
consistent with it coming from the same source as the exemplar print.
3.6.1

Corresponding Stages in the Latent Print Examination Process Map

The decision regarding distortion occurs in several places in the latent print examination process.
During the Analysis phase, an examiner observes not only the distinctive details of the latent
print (step 210), but also analyzes the relevant distortion present in the latent print (step 220).
Factors that affect the appearance of a latent print include the pliability of skin, condition of skin,
deposition pressure, lateral movement, matrix (substance coating the ridges), substrate (surface
on which the print is deposited), and development method.212 An important part of the initial
analysis is the determination of how these factors might affect the latent print.
A similar, but separate, analysis is conducted on the known print (step 330). Pliability and
condition of skin, recording method (e.g., ink or livescan), deposition pressure, lateral
movement, and other factors can distort these impressions as well.
In the Comparison phase, an examiner observes the latent and known prints side by side. The
examiner must decide whether to tolerate the observed dissimilarities at all three levels of
detail. If the two prints cannot be excluded based on L1D (step 500), the examiner continues the
comparison to determine if the previously selected target group (step 290) falls within tolerance
in the known print (step 510). If so, the examiner continues comparing additional detail. As
dissimilarities are detected during the process, the examiner must determine if those differences
are within tolerance for identification (step 600).
3.6.2

Findings from Existing Research

To assess distortion accurately, examiners must understand the flexibility of the skin, the limits of
skin deformation, and other factors that may affect the appearance of a friction ridge impression.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the range of distortion that can be expected on prints left by the same finger.

211
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Ashbaugh, 1999, op. cit.
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Figure 3.2: Examples of skin distortion on prints of the same finger with arrows indicating location of
the same minutiae in different impressions213

In developing automated fingerprint recognition systems, the biometrics industry conducted
considerable research into the flexibility of skin.214 However, nonlinear distortion is complex.
Although some research examines the effect of different pressures and motions on friction ridge
impressions,215 examiners must predominantly rely on the knowledge gained during training and
subsequent experience to recognize and interpret distortion.
Under the one-dissimilarity doctrine, an examiner who does not know the cause of a dissimilarity
must exclude the two prints as having come from the same source.216 Under this rule, an incorrect
interpretation of just one dissimilarity could lead to an erroneous exclusion. Some examiners do
not accept the “one-dissimilarity” doctrine, believing it to be too strict given thecomplexity of
impressions and the difficulty of distinguishing “true” dissimilarities from other distortions. Even
among those examiners who do accept the rule in theory, it is not clear how rigorously it operates
in practice. Faced with overwhelming detail in agreement and only one dissimilarity, examiners
may have an understandable tendency to rationalize away the dissimilarity, even if they are not
confident about its cause. Research does not establish whether such rationalization increases
the accuracy of ultimate decisions or decreases it. It is certainly possible that a willingness to
explain away difference in the face of a large amount of similarity would lead, on balance, to
greater accuracy. Confirmation bias—the tendency to give more weight to confirming rather than
disconfirming information—has been observed in many human endeavors (see Chapter 2). This
type of bias also could occur if information from the known print influences the interpretation
of the latent print. To minimize this effect, a thorough analysis of the latent print should be
conducted before analyzing the known print.
Although some literature demonstrates the effects that different distortions may have on friction
ridge impressions,217 little research has tested the examiner’s ability to accurately identify the
Fingerprint images adapted courtesy of the Instiut de Police Scientifique, Université de Lausanne.
Dorai, C., N. Ratha, and R. Bolle. “Dynamic Behavior Analysis in Compressed Fingerprint Videos.” IEEE
Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, 14, no. 1 (2004): 58–73.
215
Cowger, J. Friction Ridge Skin: Comparison and Identification of Fingerprints. CRC Press, 1992; Maceo, op. cit.
216
Thornton, J. “The One-Dissimilarity Doctrine in Fingerprint Identification.” International Criminal Police
Review, 32, no. 306 (1977): 89–95.
217
Maceo, op. cit.
213
214

65

Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis

different types of distortion. Such research is more common in other disciplines. In the medical
field, for example, research has investigated how an expert develops the complex skill of
interpreting X-ray images with a high degree of accuracy.218 Within the fingerprint field, the
limited research has suggested that some assumptions about the causes of distortion have been
wrong.219
3.6.3

Recommendations and Best Practices

Given the importance of judgments that must be made about distortion in latent prints, it is
critical that such judgments be documented clearly. As with other interpretive stages, examiners
also need to document any modifications that are made after seeing the exemplar. Thus,
Recommendations 3.1 and 3.2, described earlier in this chapter, are relevant to distortion.
Likewise, steps to minimize cognitive biases are important for judgments regarding discrepancy.
Therefore, Recommendation 3.3, that unnecessary information be kept from examiners, is also
important in this context.
3.6.4

Research Needs in Discrepancy Interpretation

Variability of Distortion
Examiners must predominantly rely on the knowledge gained during training and subsequent
experience to recognize and interpret distortion. Underestimating the variability of distortion may
lead to a false exclusion, while overestimating the variability may lead to a false identification.
Studies to measure the variability of distortion and the extreme limits of distortion are needed.
Identification and Interpretation of Distortion
An examiner’s ability to identify types of distortion has not been thoroughly studied. Research
is needed not only to determine if an examiner’s working assumptions regarding the effects and
degree of distortion have an empirical basis but also to determine if, or in what circumstances, a
misattribution of distortion may lead to an incorrect conclusion. Experiments in which “ground
truth” is known to the researchers (see Chapter 2) are appropriate for this purpose.
Contextual Bias
There has been little research in the fingerprint domain to determine the extent to which
contextual information affects the interpretation of dissimilarities. More research is needed
to determine when various context effects, such as confirmation bias, may lead to erroneous
conclusions.

3.7

Source Attribution

Within the ACE-V process, three traditional options have been available to the examiner to
signify findings. First, the examiner can conclude that the source of a known print is the source
Sowden, P., I. Davies, and P. Roling. “Perceptual Learning of the Detection of Features in X-Ray Images: A
Functional Role for Improvements in Adults’ Visual Sensitivity?” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 26, no. 1 (2000): 379–90.
219
Langenburg, G. “Deposition of Bloody Friction Ridge Impressions.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 58, no. 3
(2008): 355–389.
218
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of the questioned print. In current practice, this identification is a claim that the latent matches
the exemplar and that it would not match exemplars from anyone else in the world. Second, the
examiner can conclude that the exemplar and the latent do not match and cannot share a common
source, which is a categorical exclusion. Finally, the examiner may determine that the
corresponding information in the latent and exemplar prints is inadequate to permit a conclusion.
In this case, the examiner would state that the comparison was “inconclusive” and would provide
no additional information about the chances that the two prints did or did not share a common
source. The ultimate decision occurs near the end of the Process Map, at step 720 or 750, when
the examiner determines whether the latent print matches the exemplar.
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3.7.1

Findings from Existing Research

The Decision Process
Much has been written about the decision process by which a latent print examiner moves from
feature detection and weighting, through a comparison with the exemplar, to reach a decision.220
Broadly speaking, an examiner uses an intuitive procedure to arrive at a subjective probability
for source attribution. If this probability is high enough, the examiner declares an identification.
If it is low enough, the examiner declares an exclusion, and if it is somewhere between these
extremes, the examiner makes no inference (inconclusive).
Bayesian decision theory offers a more complete, formal model of the intuitive decisionmaking process.221 According to this model, a latent print examiner should consider both the
source probability and the costs and benefits (utilities) of correct and incorrect decisions. More
specifically, the Bayesian examiner:
(1) Assesses the prior probability that source of the exemplar left the latent print. An
examiner who purports to rely solely on the information in the prints rather than the
context of the case or the other evidence against this individual would have no reason to
distinguish this individual from anyone else on the planet capable of being where the
latent print was found. An examiner who considers more details of the case might treat
the source of the exemplar as equivalent to a random person drawn from a smaller
population of conceivable suspects. Such reasoning leads to the reciprocal of the size of
the relevant population as the prior probability.
(2) Assesses the weight of the evidence as a function of the similarities and differences
observed between the latent print and the exemplar. Formally, the weight is a likelihood
ratio, as discussed below and in Chapter 1. Examiners may arrive at the weight intuitively
(using their knowledge and experience) or by consulting data-driven likelihood models.
However, these models currently use fewer features than a human examiner would, and
they have other limitations.
(3) Computes the posterior probability of the proposition that the source of the exemplar left
the latent print by combining the prior probability and the likelihood ratio according to
Bayes’s rule (see Chapter 1).
(4) Combines the posterior probabilities with the utilities of the possible correct and
incorrect decisions to reach and report the optimal decision.

220
For an overview of the decision process and discussion of the philosophy of making individualization decisions,
see generally Ashbaugh, 1999, op. cit.; Vanderkolk, J. “Levels of Quality and Quantity in Detail.” Journal of
Forensic Identification, 51, no. 5 (2001): 461–68; Kwan, Q. “Inference of Identity of Source.” PhD thesis of
Criminology, University of California, Berkeley, 1977. For discussion of the probabilistic nature of identification or
individualization decisions see Champod, C. “Identification and Individualization.” In Wiley Encyclopedia of
Forensic Sciences, edited by A. Moenssens and A. Jamieson, vol. 3, pp. 1508–11. J. Wiley & Sons, 2009.
221
Biedermann, A., S. Bozza, and F. Taroni. “Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification: Underlying
Logic and Argumentative Implications.” Forensic Science International, 177 (2008): 120.
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Scholarship on the interpretation of forensic evidence argues that (1), (3), and (4) are in the
exclusive province of the fact-finder (e.g., the jury in a trial) rather than the expert.222 In this
view, the examiner should report only the weight of the evidence (2), expressed either
quantitatively or qualitatively. Today, however, in most jurisdictions, the examiner implicitly
takes all the above steps.
Regardless of whether the details of the Bayesian formulation provide an adequate descriptive
or normative model of a latent print examination, the analysis is useful in clarifying the factors
that, in some manner, must inform an identification decision. The weight of the evidence, the
prior probability, the posterior probability, and the utilities of the possible decisions all bear on an
examiner’s ultimate conclusion, but presenting that conclusion is not inherent in the examiner’s
role of evaluating the latent print evidence. In particular, step (2) can be carried out via a
likelihood ratio or through a less formal assessment that characterizes the Evaluation phase of
ACE-V. Having performed this expert function, the examiner then can describe the weight of the
latent print evidence to an investigator or fact-finder (see Chapter 6).
Weight of the Evidence
Evaluation is the phase in a latent print examination during which the examiner assesses the
totality of the features compared in the latent print and the exemplar. This can be thought of as
the end result or the culmination of the stages described in earlier sections of this chapter. There
are many ways for this assessment to occur, two of which are described below.
The ACE-V process attempts to provide the framework from which a transparent threshold for
an accurate and repeatable assessment of friction ridge skin can be established. The Evaluation
phase refers to the final evaluation of whether the comparison results are sufficient to allow a
determination, and if so, whether that determination is an identification or an exclusion. ACE-V
does not, however, prescribe how this is done.223 Friction ridge examination by human beings is
both human-resource intensive and subjective in the way in which the broadly defined ACE-V
process is applied. There are no formal thresholds for any sufficiency determinations, and feature
selection and weighting are matters of personal judgment. This is not to suggest that experts are
poor at any of these tasks. Rather, it is simply to note the absence of objective criteria. Some
countries take a less holistic approach and apply a minimum point standard. Although this does
reduce subjectivity, it does not give adequate attention to variations in the rarity and clarity of
the minutiae. Currently, the traditional ACE-V approach largely lacks validated, transparent
thresholds.
The likelihood ratio approach to evidence interpretation attempts to measure the total weight of
evidence using information about the frequency with which different features are observed in
the population. As explained in Chapter 1, the likelihood ratio is the probability of the data when
one hypothesis is true compared to (divided by) the probability of the data when the competing
hypothesis is true. Because it focuses attention on the support the data provide for the relevant
hypotheses, the likelihood ratio is especially suitable for assessing the contribution of forensic
E.g., Aitken, C. and F. Taroni. Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists. 2nd ed. John
Wiley & Sons, 2004; Kaye, D., D. Bernstein, and J. Mnookin. The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert
Evidence. 2d ed. Aspen Publishers, 2011.
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Mnookin, op. cit.
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findings in a balanced way.224 It applies regardless of the type of forensic evidence
considered.225 The likelihood ratio invites forensic practitioners to assess the likelihood of the
observed findings (the pattern of matching minutiae and other key observations) under the two
different hypotheses that are relevant to the fact-finder (namely, that the prints came from the
same source or different sources).
In the case of latent print identification, the forensic findings are a set of concordances and
dissimilarities (that can be reduced sometimes to a similarity score) of the comparison between
the ridge detail features from the latent print and from an exemplar print from a potential source.
The propositions under which the forensic findings are evaluated reflect the issues at hand; for
example, either the friction ridge skin area of a potential source has truly left the latent print,
or someone else from a relevant population of potential donors is actually the source of the
latent print. Assessing the strength of evidence means answering two questions: (1) What is the
probability of observing the similarities and dissimilarities if the two impressions come from the
same source? (2) What is the probability of observing the similarities and dissimilarities if the
two impressions come from different sources?
The “likelihoods” that form the numerator and denominator of the likelihood ratio can represent
an examiner’s subjective probabilities, or they can be determined from a data-driven probabilistic
model. Without becoming mired in details, one can consider the conceptual steps involved in the
formal modeling. To answer question (1), the similarity score of the latent print and the known
exemplar images are positioned among all the possibilities of comparisons between the exemplar
and distorted images of that precise source. Estimates of the distribution of similarity scores for
distorted prints might be obtained either empirically (if sufficient control prints are available
for that task) or by using a mathematical distortion model with parameters obtained from a
large collection of prints taken from an individual. The location of the observed score within
the estimated distribution indicates the probability of observing the level of agreement found
between the latent print and the known exemplar, given the possibilities of distortion and the
hypothesis that they come from the same source (the numerator).
The denominator requires an estimate of the distribution of similarity scores when pairs of prints
are drawn from different sources. The variation should be larger than that due to distortion alone,
and the level of similarity should be low. The relevant question is whether the similarity score
is more consistent with the type of variation that would be expected if the print originated from
the same source than if it originated from another source. The next chapter reviews research on
methods for automating the assessment of the likelihood ratio.
One final topic associated with the likelihood ratio deserves attention. This concerns the
interpretation of the likelihood ratio when an AFIS database search produces the candidate for
comparison. There has been extensive debate, primarily in regard to DNA database trawls, about
For a short introduction, see Champod, C. and I. Evett. “Evidence Interpretation: A Logical Approach.” In Wiley
Encyclopedia of Forensic Sciences, edited by A. Moenssens and A. Jamieson, vol. 2, pp. 968–76. J. Wiley & Sons,
2009.
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Aitken, op.cit.; Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit. The LR framework has been recommended in a standard
adopted by all laboratories affiliated with the Association of Forensic Science Providers. Association of Forensic
Science Providers. “Standards for the Formulation of Evaluative Forensic Science Expert Opinion.” Science and
Justice, 49, no. 3 (2009): 161–64.
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how the search process affects the likelihood ratio. Most scholarship suggests that producing the
suspect through a database search lowers the prior probability and raises the likelihood ratio.226 It
lowers the prior because there normally was
Box 3.1: Studies on the Effect of Biasing
no stronger reason to suspect the subject
of the “hit” than there was to suspect other Information
persons in the database.230 It raises the
In two studies in 2006, researchers collected casework
likelihood ratio primarily by eliminating
that had been analyzed by experienced latent print
analysts during their normal routine work several years
(or least reducing the source probabilities
earlier.227 The laboratory presented this casework to
for) all other individuals represented in
the analysts again in the ordinary flow of casework. In
the database.231 How to present the results
the first study, five examiners received a latent print
of a database search most fairly remains
and exemplar that they had previously classified as
debatable, but the concerns raised earlier
a match along with new contextual information that
about exemplars resulting from AFIS
very strongly suggested that the pair did not match.228
searches would be handled differently if
Three of the five changed from their earlier conclusion
the examiner were presenting both a prior
of an identification to an exclusion. Another found the
probability and a likelihood ratio instead of evidence inconclusive.229
collapsing these quantities into a subjective
In the second study, six analysts received eight pairs
source attribution.
Knowledge of Examiner Performance
It can be difficult to create realistic
scenarios in which examiners re-examine
the same set of prints or in which they
examine a set of prints for which the
correct conclusion is known. As a result,
controlled experiments that would
illuminate the actual decisionmaking
and source-attribution processes of latent
print examiners during casework are
unusual. The limited studies that have been
done, however, suggest that variation in
decisions occur, especially when contextual
information is varied. Two noteworthy
studies are discussed in Box 3.1.

of prints from earlier casework that was a mix of
exclusion and individualization decisions. This time, the
biasing information was weaker, and a control group
that received no biasing contextual information was
present. Only two of the six examiners made consistent
decisions across all eight pairs of prints; the others
changed one or more of the earlier decisions. Of the
forty-eight presentations, there were six changes from
the earlier judgments. In the biasing condition, there
were three changes from individualization to exclusion,
and one from individualization to inconclusive. In the
control group of examiners who were not given any
biasing contextual information, there was one change
from individualization to exclusion and one from
exclusion to individualization. The authors interpreted
these outcomes as establishing “that fingerprint experts
were vulnerable to biasing information when they were
presented within relatively routine day-to-day contexts,
such as corroborative (or conflicting) evidence of
confession to the crime.”

These experiments pose a real challenge.
Experience is of enormous value and
allows experts in a range of fields to
operate at a high level. At the same time, experts can be prone to context effects. Although
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For a review of the DNA literature, see Kaye, D. “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis
of DNA Database Trawls.” North Carolina Law Review, 87, no. 2 (2009): 425–503.
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Dror and Charlton, op. cit.; Dror, Charlton, and Peron, op. cit.
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The experts were told that the prints were from the highly publicized misidentification of Brandon Mayfield in the
Madrid train bombing case.
229
The study had no control group that unknowingly revisited earlier, challenging pairs of prints that they had
determined to match.
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additional study is clearly required, the evidence to date in the psychological literature, including
the limited number of studies specific to latent print examination, supports Recommendation 3.3,
which states that analysts should not be given contextual information that is not directly relevant
to their analysis.
3.7.2

Recommendations and Best Practices

The discussion of the decision process, the way in which the weight of evidence is determined,
and the possibility of errors all argue strongly that the common practice of claiming to uniquely
identify an individual is not appropriate. As indicated above, a fingerprint identification was
traditionally considered an “individualization,” meaning that the latent print was considered
identified to one finger of a specific individual as opposed to every other potential source in
the universe. However, the recent attention focused on this issue reveals that this definition
needlessly claims too much, is not adequately established by fundamental research, and is
impossible to validate solely on the basis of experience. Nor does fingerprint evidence have
objective standards or a well-validated statistical model that can provide an objective measure
of the strength of the fingerprint evidence in a given instance. Therefore, examiners should
not claim to be able to exclude every other finger in the world as a potential source. Rather,
an identification decision suggests a substantial enough similarity that the examiner believes
that the two impressions originated from a common source. But whether any other finger in
the world might also be able to leave an impression with a comparable amount of similarity is
not fully known, and the examiner’s testimony should not suggest otherwise. Regardless of the
specific words used to describe an identification, examiners should refrain from claiming that an
identification means that they have excluded all other individuals in the world.
Recommendation 3.7: Because empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not
support a source attribution to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent
print examiners should not report or testify, directly or by implication, to a source
attribution to the exclusion of all others in the world.
As explained in Chapter 1, the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study
and Technology (SWGFAST) recently drafted language that eliminates this needlessly strong
meaning of an identification (although SWGFAST also elected to continue to use the term
“individualization” notwithstanding its long association with this idea). The proposed SWGFAST
draft states, “Individualization of an impression to one source is the decision that the likelihood
the impression was made by another (different) source is so remote that it is considered as a
practical impossibility.”232
Eliminating the previous “to the exclusion of all others” language from the definition is a step
in the right direction. However, the new text raises two concerns. First, it is unnecessary for an
examiner to reach conclusions about what is a “practical impossibility.” Although fingerprints
are clearly highly discriminating, until further research permits better validated statements about
probabilities, neither experience nor statistical modeling justifies conclusions about what is or is
not practically possible across a population of billions of individuals (and billions times billions
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Draft for Comment: Standards
for Examining Friction Ridge Impressions and Resulting Conclusions (To Replace: Friction Ridge Examination
Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, Version 1.01, and Standards for Conclusions, Version 1.0). Version 1.0.
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, August 2010, p. 4.
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of possible pairs of prints). Second, given that the word “individualization” has been associated
precisely with the “to the exclusion of all others” claim of universal individualization based
on a premise of general uniqueness (see Chapter 1), it is potentially problematic and confusing
to attempt to redefine it by fiat. Using alternative terminology might be a superior solution to
attempting to “legislate” a new and slightly modified meaning to a much-criticized term and
theory.
In July 2010, the membership of the International Association for Identification (IAI) adopted
Resolution 2010-18, allowing members to give qualified opinions if supported with a statistical
model “accepted as valid by the IAI.”233 However, the IAI also stated that it does not endorse
any models as ready for casework or introduction into the courtroom. The resolution is another
important step in the right direction, and the Working Group supports further movement in this
direction.
Until statistical models are implemented, concerns remain about over-expressing the evidence
(see Chapter 6). In addition, there are legitimate concerns about under-expressing, or not
expressing at all, the wealth of evidence that can be found in the large grey zone between
“identification” and “exclusion.” In the future, it seems likely that examiners will be required to
provide more nuanced information than the current, narrow range of allowable conclusions. In
time, it should be possible to provide quantitative measures in the form of likelihood ratios or
posterior probabilities (see Chapters 4 and 6). Even if this does not happen, qualified conclusions
consistent with existing knowledge should be permitted.
The difficult problem here is to find a balance between the two views of how to report fingerprint
evidence, since both views have strengths and weaknesses. If absolute conclusions are not
allowed, then one is left only with reported conclusions that allow for more than one possible
donor of a latent print, as is the case with other types of forensic evidence canvassed in Chapter
6. Conversely, there may be instances in which a single source attribution is warranted based
upon the theory of local uniqueness outlined in Chapter 1. If qualified opinions are not allowed,
then one may be keeping from fact-finders evidence that exists in the grey continuum between
absolute source attribution and absolute exclusion. There is often evidence that is strongly
associative to a source, based upon high likelihood ratios (either explicitly or implicitly
derived), but that does not rise to the level at which an examiner feels comfortable providing a
traditional “identification” conclusion. This evidence and the decision to withhold it are typically
not communicated to the fact-finders. This all-or-nothing approach keeps potentially critical
evidence from fact-finders based on the profession’s need to maintain categorical opinions of
“identification” or “exclusion.” Alternatively, there may be instances (for example, when dealing
with fully rolled fingerprints, identification of deceased individuals, and ten-print examinations)
when categorical decisions such as “identification” or “exclusion” are completely warranted,
justified by the overwhelming availability of discriminating features, and practical for the
circumstances. Finding the balance between these issues is not easy, especially in the absence of
data showing which approach is most appropriate for the circumstances and which approach will
not confuse or mislead the fact-finders.
International Association for Identification. IAI Resolution 2010-18. International Association for Identification,
July 16, 2010.
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The Working Group could not resolve the important questions surrounding whether, or when,
latent print examiners should be permitted to testify to probabilities rather than absolute
categories, nor did it endeavor to determine what form probabilistic testimony should take. These
issues will continue to grow in both salience and importance in the coming years. Hence, the
Working Group strongly recommends ongoing attention to this issue.
Recommendation 3.8: The friction ridge examiner community and other experts should
determine under what circumstances a qualified rather than an absolute conclusion is
warranted.
3.7.3

Research Needs in Source Attribution

Research in the latent print domain in past decades has largely been centered on automated
fingerprint identification systems and physical and chemical detection techniques. Very little
research, until the last few years, has centered on human performance in pattern recognition and
interpretation. Much more research is needed not only to validate ideas being put forward today
but also to expand understanding further.
•

Research and testing to develop greater knowledge about error rates for latent print
examination must be undertaken. While a single error rate for the field is neither desirable
nor achievable, it is critical to develop more knowledge about error rates, what affects
them, and the extent to which they are correlated to the relative difficulty of comparisons
(see Chapter 2). Indeed, it is possible that such work will help define levels of complexity.

•

It will be important to understand what influences affect not only the ultimate decisions
of examiners but also their decision-making thresholds. It is entirely possible that
bias influences decision thresholds, but not decision outcomes, in easy latent print
comparisons. At what point does this impact on thresholds change outcomes?

•

With expanded knowledge on thresholds must come research that investigates whether
considering certain features makes examiners more vulnerable to inaccurate decisions.

•

More research is needed into the relationship between risk and cost to examiners when
making decisions. For example, does the cultural default position of law enforcement
and its relationship with forensic practitioners create an environment in which latent print
examiners shun the inconclusiveness of evidence in favor of more definitive conclusions
that are more conducive to current law enforcement expectations? Research will better
inform whether there needs to be a change in the culture of forensic support services in
relation to their policing partners.

•

The confidence associated with decision making in latent print examination should be
studied to see if confidence levels are consistent when making identifications as opposed
to exclusions. It will also be important to determine under what circumstances a qualified
conclusion would be warranted, whereby a lack of strong confidence in a particular
decision based upon a latent print comparison might be better expressed as “consistent
with.” In other words, when might it be appropriate to offer a conclusion that is less
emphatic?
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3.8

The Need for Research

The previous sections each ended with a list of research topics relevant to the particular
interpretative stage. This section characterizes in broad terms the types of research that
are required and incorporates a final recommendation about the importance of the federal
government finding a mechanism to fund a research program.
The research topics identified throughout the chapter can be broadly categorized into three
types: (1) developing metrics or measurements that characterize key elements of the interpretive
process, (2) assessing the reliability of measures or determinations, and (3) determining the
factors associated with different performance levels.
3.8.1

Developing Metrics

Across the interpretive stages, there is a need to carefully define elements being used by
examiners in a manner that allows the processes to be studied quantitatively. Examples
include developing a way to characterize selected features (perhaps by location and degree of
confidence), developing a series of indicators of sufficiency, conducting additional work on the
frequency of features in different populations, and perhaps ultimately developing a measure of
the complexity of a particular comparison.
3.8.2

Assessing Reliability, Reproducibility, and Validity

A process for making measurements or decisions is reliable when the outcomes are repeatable
and reproducible, both within and across examiners. It is important that feature selection,
sufficiency determination, feature weighting, judgments regarding distortion, and ultimate
decisions be reproducible. An examiner repeatedly presented with the same sets of prints should
obtain the same interpretive conclusions (intra-examiner reliability), and different examiners also
should be able to obtain the same results (inter-examiner reproducibility). For many, these two
concepts are at the heart of the ongoing discussion about the desirability of research to reaffirm
the consistency of latent print judgments. Some research has been conducted on this issue,234 but
more is needed.
Accuracy is whether the determinations made by the analyst correctly express the true state of
the world. This accuracy can be measured in various ways, as discussed in Chapter 2. A final
term, validity, also refers to accuracy but extends further to encompass the issue of whether the
measurements, judgments, and decisions being made are appropriate for their common uses.
Thus, validity is a relative term. The polygraph is a valid means of detecting stress, but its
validity as a device to detect conscious deception is much more doubtful. Whether ACE-V does
what its practitioners claim it does and whether the resulting decisions are adequately supported
by scientific knowledge are questions about validity.

Langenburg, G. “A Performance Study of the ACE-V Process: A Pilot Study to Measure the Accuracy, Precision,
Reproducibility, Repeatability, and Biasability of Conclusions Resulting from the ACE-V Process.” Journal of
Forensic Identification, 59, no. 2 (2009): 219–57; Evett and Williams, op. cit.; Dror and Charlton, op. cit.
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3.8.3 Explaining Variations in Performance
The final element of a research program would attempt to explain observed variations in
reliability or accuracy. A key question that underlies much of the discussion in this chapter
is how the complexity of a comparison impacts the reliability of the determined conclusions.
There are, however, as many types of analyses as one can imagine. Relating performance
to the individual characteristics of the examiner, including physical characteristics, training
completed, and aspects of the working environment, may help supervisors determine strategies
for recruitment and training to optimize performance. This list is not comprehensive. It argues
strongly, however, as do other chapters in this report, for an extensive research program.
Recommendation 3.9: The federal government should support a research program that
aims to:
a. Develop measures and metrics relevant to the analysis of latent prints;
b. Use such metrics to assess the reproducibility, reliability, and validity of various
interpretive stages of latent print analysis; and
c. Identify key factors related to variations in performance of latent print
examiners during the interpretation process.

3.9 Summary
For each interpretive stage of latent print examination, this chapter offers recommendations and
best practices to help ensure the accuracy and transparency of the interpretive processes. The
chapter describes and defines the multiple critical interpretive stages that are part of every latent
print comparison. The Working Group based its analysis and recommendations on the current
state of knowledge established by published research regarding the interpretive stages and on the
implications of this research for potential concerns and pitfalls that may arise in the interpretive
process.
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Chapter 4: Looking Ahead to Emerging and Improving Technology
Introduction and Scope
Latent print examiners use online databases, digital enhancement software, and other types of
technology to assist with the Analysis, Comparison, Examination, and Verification (ACE-V)
process. Combining these tools with the examiner’s own expertise can make investigations more
reliable and easier to explain to juries. This chapter discusses how these and newer technologies
can automate complicated and work-intensive parts of the process and thereby reduce human
error. In particular, the chapter addresses the following technology-related questions:

4.1

•

Fingerprint and palm print databases at the federal, state, and local levels can be searched
through automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) databases, which saves
examiners from manually searching through hundreds of exemplars looking for close
matches. How can these systems (and the training provided to examiners in their use) be
improved to provide greater confidence in the results and more value to examiners?

•

Digital scanning devices known as livescan are frequently used to capture exemplar
prints and to submit them to automated systems. This process allows high-quality digital
images to be stored in central databases. How can this technology be improved?

•

When comparing digital exemplars to digital latent prints, examiners can enhance the
images to clarify minute details. What are the best practices for enhancement? The
process of enhancement can be challenged in court, so examiners must understand and be
able to explain the technology.

•

When testifying, examiners should qualify their conclusions instead of stating an
exclusion or identification in absolute terms. With modern computational power,
researchers have implemented various probabilistic models to allow examiners to
quantify the similarities between two prints and to assess the implications of these
similarities. How can these models be used, and what are their long-term implications?

•

How can automated systems assist in ascertaining the quality and quantity of the features
in a latent print?

•

How do examiners interact with new technological tools? How can technology-training
programs be more effective for examiners at all career levels?

Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems

AFIS databases exist at federal, state, and local levels.235 The Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), holds
most of the fingerprint sets and other identification records collected in the country, both from
criminal and civil sources. In addition, every state either has its own AFIS or shares an AFIS with
other states. Many localities, especially large metropolitan areas, have their own systems as
See generally Moses, K. “Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS).” The Fingerprint Sourcebook.
National Institute of Justice, 2011.
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well. All of these automated systems have capabilities such as latent print searching, electronic
image storage, and fingerprint image transmission, and some include palm prints as well.236 In
criminal cases, IAFIS searches through millions of criminal entries and returns results in about
10 minutes.237
4.1.1

Training

The companies that supply AFIS software and hardware provide general training on using the
system, but they do not clearly define which latent prints are most suitable for database searches.
With experience, latent print examiners may develop an understanding of what makes a latent
print of “AFIS quality” for a particular system, but receiving formal instruction and training in
making these determinations would be more efficient.
Likewise, AFIS vendors typically do not provide training on how to encode a latent print
to maximize the match capabilities of the system. An AFIS search merely provides a list of
exemplars with the highest similarity scores, as determined by a proprietary algorithm. Latent
print examiners often use trial and error, entering the same latent print multiple ways to see the
effect on the resulting candidate list. Vendors should expand their training programs to include
instruction in the most effective methods for encoding.
In addition, more education on the meaning of the AFIS scores could be useful. Some examiners
use rank or score as a filter, hoping to avoid wasting time on fruitless comparisons. Thus, many
examiners will not look beyond rank 5 or 10 (sometimes by policy). Some examiners use a
system-specific score as a cutoff. Others look at candidates based upon the differences between
scores, believing that any score that is substantially greater than that for the next candidate is
worth comparing, whereas a series of candidates with very similar scores are much less likely
to be matches. Some examiners look at all the candidates, assigning some weight to a high
AFIS score or rank. Still other examiners entirely disregard score and rank information. There
is some evidence that knowing the rank of an AFIS candidate influences the judgments of some
examiners, but it is not clear whether this knowledge benefits or hinders the ACE-V process.238
On the basis of the available research, we can make no recommendation on whether the
examiner should be blinded to the scores or ranks of AFIS-generated exemplars when conducting
comparisons and evaluations. Regardless of the advisability of knowing the scores or ranks of
these exemplars, however, latent print examiners who frequently work with exemplars from
AFIS searches should have a clear understanding of how the system works and the meaning and
limitations of AFIS scores and ranks.

Ibid.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.” Accessed November
25, 2011. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis.
238
See Dror, I., K. Wertheim, P. Fraser-Mackenzie, et al. “The Impact of Human-Technology Cooperation and
Distributed Cognition in Forensic Science: Biasing Effects of AFIS Contextual Information on Human Experts.”
Journal of Forensic Sciences (forthcoming).
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4.1.2

AFIS Algorithms

AFIS algorithms could be expanded to match prints to account for the diagnostic value of
the positions at which minutiae are located. Exploiting this information might improve AFIS
searches, and research into the utility of using the additional information might assist in the
development of probabilistic models (as discussed in section 4.3.1).
4.1.3

Interoperability

The 2009 report of the National Research Council239 recommends improving the interoperability
of AFIS systems among states and the FBI. Searching multiple databases would help states
identify criminals who have been fingerprinted in other states. Because the National Institute of
Standards and Technology has established a separate working group on this topic, this Working
Group did not pursue this issue.
4.1.4

Other Skin Surfaces

Automated search technology can be applied to impressions from all friction ridge skin areas,
such as palmar (palm or digital joint) or plantar (toe or foot) friction ridges. These impressions
sometimes are searched if the capability exists within the automated identification system of the
investigating department. Nonetheless, exemplars from these areas are collected less frequently,
and it may prove difficult to construct large databases for these impressions.
Recommendation 4.1: The federal government should support research programs to
improve automated fingerprint identification systems. Such programs could address the
following issues:
a. Expanding the algorithms used to match prints to account for the fact that the
diagnostic value of minutiae depends on the region in which they are located;
b. Making fingerprint and palm print databases interoperable among local, state,
and federal automated identification systems; and
c. Increasing compatibility between automated identification systems and other
latent print software tools, including digital enhancement programs, probability
calculation programs, and automated quality assessment programs.

4.2

Digital Images

4.2.1

Livescan Systems

Police departments (and other government agencies) traditionally recorded known exemplars by
inking a person’s ten fingers and rolling them onto a paper ten-print card. Larger departments
now use livescan technology to digitally capture finger and palm prints.240 This inkless method
captures digital images of exemplar prints, which can be transmitted together with demographic
data and mug shots to a central location. The system rejects the print if the quality falls below a
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. National Academies
Press, 2009.
240
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certain threshold. When properly maintained and used by adequately trained personnel, livescan
can improve both the quality and speed of the ten-print collection process.
However, livescan technology can be improved. For example, livescan can produce distorted
images of the flow of friction ridge skin because of the process of recording a three-dimensional
object on a two-dimensional surface. Some livescan (and almost all automated fingerprint
identification) systems compress images. This practice causes critical details in the friction ridge
impression to be lost, even when the images are decompressed. Most AFIS and livescan systems
use images scanned at 500 pixels per inch. Although this standard satisfies the FBI’s Electronic
Fingerprint Transmission Specification standard, such images, especially if highly compressed,
may not capture all Level 3 Detail (L3D) that would be desirable for examiners performing
comparisons. Because of these limitations, many examiners prefer inked prints over livescan
images for final comparisons.
4.2.2

Digital Enhancements

The use of digital processing and enhancement is now routine in latent print analysis. If properly
used to remove background distractions that are not part of the friction ridge detail, digital
enhancement can improve both the examiner’s ability to analyze the image and the jury’s ability
to understand the evidence. Yet filtering an image also could create artifacts that an examiner
might mistake for minutiae. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide examples of applying filters to digital
images.

Figure 4.1: Example of a color replacement filter to remove color from a playing card241

Images reproduced and adapted courtesy of Robert Garrett, past president and chairman of the board of the
International Association for Identification.
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Figure 4.2: Example of filters used to adjust color levels and to reverse the colors242

Because of the possibility of artifacts, judges should not unquestioningly accept an expert’s
claim that an enhanced image is accurate. There is a growing judicial recognition that the
party introducing enhanced images as trial exhibits must be able to defend the enhancements
in each case.243 In State v. Swinton,244 the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the admission of
a photograph of a digitally enhanced bite mark; however, the court rejected the prosecution’s
argument that the court should accept the enhancement as easily as the original photograph. The
court accepted the enhancement because the expert testified “in specific detail as to the process”
of programming the enhancement software. Moreover, the court rejected overlays created with
Adobe Photoshop because the witness could not explain the use of the program for that purpose.
The California Supreme Court issued a similar opinion in People v. McWhorter.245 In that case,
a defense expert prepared an enhanced image of a window. In upholding the exclusion of the
testimony, the court noted that the expert “could not identify the computer program he used to
enhance or ‘electronically emboss’ the image in question, nor could he satisfactorily explain the
full nature of the process he used to create it.”246
Although Swinton and McWhorter may have insisted on more thorough foundations than are
typical, the decisions highlight the importance of clearly understanding the process and benefits
of digitally enhancing images. Under the usual rules for scientific evidence and for authenticating
photographs, an expert must be able to demonstrate that the software can accurately enhance the
original image and that it was used properly.
The Scientific Working Group on Imaging Technology (SWGIT) has proposed best practices
for the acquisition, storage, and processing of images.247 Underlying the guidelines are several
basic principles. In particular, forensic service providers should validate latent print enhancement
technologies prior to use in casework. To maintain an appropriate audit trail, the providers
242
Images reproduced and adapted courtesy of Robert Garrett, past president and chairman of the board of the
International Association for Identification.
243
State v. Hartman, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (Ohio 2001).
244
State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921 (Conn. 2004).
245
212 P.3d 692 (Cal. 2009).
246
Ibid, 726.
247
See International Association for Identification: Scientific Working Group on Imaging Technology (SWGIT).
Accessed April 23, 2011. http://www.theiai.org/guidelines/swgit/index.php.
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should retain the unenhanced image and should track any digital enhancements made to
subsequent copies. Examiners should make it clear in their documentation and testimony that
an image has been enhanced. If the proffered image is enhanced, the proponent should make
the earlier versions of the image available to the opposition before trial. If the examiner cropped
the image, the deleted material should be available for inspection. The proponent should not
be permitted to claim that the original, unaltered image is unavailable due to the enhancement
software that was used.
In many cases, examiners employ enhancement techniques during their analyses but submit
the unaltered images to the court as evidence.248 Forensic service providers should ensure
every examiner has received training in the technology used to assist in analysis. Moreover,
the provider should announce guidelines for the use of such technology. Forensic services
providers should follow the best practices the proposed by SWGIT for the acquisition, storage,
and processing of images. Developers should validate enhancement technologies used in latent
print processing. The laboratory using the technology should validate the technology in its work
environment and should retain the original, unenhanced image.

4.3

Probabilistic Models to Assess Latent Print Evidence

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, examiners often offer opinions as to the source of the latent
print in absolute terms. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 6, a 1979 resolution of the International
Association for Identification announced that it was professional misconduct for an examiner to
use the term “probable” in a final opinion.249 Although Resolution 2010-18 declares that the prior
resolution was “not consistent with advancements,”250 most courts still allow the examiner to
opine in absolute terms and to attribute a particular fingerprint impression to a single individual’s
finger to the exclusion of all other persons in the world. These courts do not demand that the
examiner quantify the extent of any uncertainty (see Chapter 6).
However, Chapter 3 recommends against testimony in this form. There is always some non-zero
probability that some skin other than the defendant’s produced the latent print. Even when this
probability is so small that a source attribution is warranted, the opinion would be more precise
and complete if the examiner could provide an estimate of this probability. Models to allow and
support this qualified response are being developed and validated.
4.3.1

Probabilistic Models

The last 100 years have seen many efforts to characterize the significance of similarities between
pairs of fingerprints. Some models have tried to demonstrate the discriminating power of latent

Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Fingerprint Evidence Obtained or Visualized by Chemical, Laser, and
Digitally Enhanced Imaging Processes, ALR 5th Alert, 110 (2003): 213.
249
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250
International Association for Identification. IAI Resolution 2010-18. International Association for Identification,
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print evidence, other models have aimed at proving the uniqueness of latent print impressions,
and still others have focused on quantifying the weight of the latent print evidence in the case.251
Probability models date back to Galton’s 1892 model.252 Modern efforts to determine the
probability of correct latent print identification are based upon determining the locations of
minutiae,253 of minutiae and ridges,254 and even of pores255 (see Figure 4.3). These models
incorporate measures of tolerance in accounting for skin distortion and the degradation of crime
scene impressions. To date, research into probability models has been limited to the distal
segments of the fingers; the remainder of the friction ridge skin has not been considered. By
estimating the probability of random correspondence for any given set of latent print features
rather than the probability of all of the features of a complete exemplar, the calculations reflect
the quantity of information present in the latent fingerprint.

Figure 4.3: An example of some minutiae locations in a fingerprint256

Although the modern models represent a major improvement over the early efforts, most models
assume independence among minutiae.257 That is, they assume that the occurrence of one minutia
has no relationship to the occurrence of any other set of minutiae. However, minutiae might not
be independent. Some data (see Chapter 3) indicate that the frequency of certain
251
Stoney, D. “Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality.” In Advances in Fingerprint Technology, edited by Henry
C. Lee and R.E. Gaensslen, 327–87. 2nd ed. CRC Press, 2001; Langenburg, G. “Scientific Research in the Forensic
Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization.” In The Fingerprint Sourcebook. National Institute of Justice, 2011.
252
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Features.” In Proceedings, International Conference on Biometrics (ICB), Advances in Biometrics, Third
International Conference, Alghero, Italy, June 2–5, 2009; Su, C. and S. Srihari. “Evaluation of Rarity of Fingerprints
in Forensics.” In Proceedings of Neural Information Processing Systems Conference, Vancouver, Canada, December
2010.
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minutiae varies depending on the location of the minutiae within the larger pattern. One study
reports that in 100,000 randomly chosen fingerprints of exemplar quality, there is only a 10−14
probability that some pair of them will match in regard to both minutiae and ridge shape.258
Without the assumption of independence, however, the computed probability could be orders of
magnitude higher.259
Likelihood Ratio Models
Some scientists have developed models that provide likelihood ratios in biometric verification260
and in forensic friction ridge analysis.261 The likelihood ratio combines information on the
similarity and rarity of features in a pair of prints. In one approach, the initial step is to
quantitatively compare an appropriate set of features characterizing Level 1 Detail (L1D) such
as ridge flow, Level 2 Detail (L2D) such as minutiae, and minute Level 3 Detail (L3D) details
such as pores between the two fingerprint images. This process of marking features can be
entirely manual or partly or fully automated. If a single number is used as an overall measure
of similarity and rarity, its probability distributions in two populations can be considered. One
probability distribution comes from a large number of images derived from the same finger;
the other comes from a sample of images derived from the fingers of different individuals. The
likelihood ratio indicates how many times more probable it is to find characteristics with the
overall similarity score when the known exemplar and the latent come from the same finger
than when they come from different fingers. (For further explanation of likelihood ratios, see
Chapters 1, 3, and 6.)
Studies of likelihood ratio models have produced at least three important findings.262 First, when
fingerprint impressions come from the same source, they display a large number of matching
features, and the likelihood ratio is large. Second, same-source impressions infrequently yield
likelihood ratios less than one when the two impressions have the same origin. Conversely,
likelihood ratios greater than one seldom appear when the two prints have different origins. Thus,
research with data sets in which ground truth is known demonstrates that the models usually
point to the correct conclusion. In addition, these data sets can be used to estimate error rates for
making all decisions based strictly upon a particular threshold for the likelihood ratio. Finding
much larger likelihood ratios for impressions from the same source than for impressions from
different sources supports the claim that fingerprints contain highly discriminating
258
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information. Finally, different configurations of the same number of minutiae produce different
likelihood ratios, depending on the spatial relationship between the minutiae. In many instances,
configurations with few minutiae have larger likelihood ratios than configurations with more
minutiae. It follows that a simple count of matching minutiae is an imprecise measure of the
similarity of two prints.
Future Probabilistic Models
Additional work should be done to further demonstrate the reliability and validity of latent
print probabilistic models. This work will necessitate studies with large-scale, representative
databases. Furthermore, once a model is validated, careful thought must be given to the best
method of communicating its output to the actors in the criminal justice system (see Chapter 6).
To facilitate the development of probabilistic models, a research database could be created by
removing personal identifiers from digital images in AFIS databases. Anonymous versions of
criminal DNA databases have been used for statistical research,263 and there is no insuperable
legal obstacle to doing the same with fingerprint records in the possession of the government.264
The only social or psychological risk to individuals whose prints are in the existing databases is
that the de-identified images from a criminal file somehow would permit a researcher to discover
who has been arrested for or convicted of unspecified crimes. However, the researchers have
no means to link an image with a name, and even if they could do so, that an individual has a
criminal conviction normally is not private information. Therefore, AFIS database administrators
should take the simple step of de-identifying a large set of digital images for research purposes.
This will permit the validation of probabilistic models and will facilitate studies into the
frequencies of various fingerprint features (discussed in Chapter 3).
Recommendation 4.2: To facilitate the validation of probabilistic models and other
statistical research, the federal government should create large, anonymous databases
of exemplars and latent prints.
More generally, with suitable support for modern research, some of the probability models that
researchers are currently developing could be added to the examiner’s toolkit in the near future.
To prepare for such models, the latent print examiner community should formulate workflow
guidelines to transition the models from the research setting to the forensic laboratory and should
begin training examiners in elementary probability and statistics to enable them to interpret the
output of the models. Recommendations 3.5 and 3.9 in Chapter 3, concerning federal support of
research and educating examiners about statistical methods, are pertinent here.
4.3.2

Admissibility

Once validation studies are published, opinions based upon a probability model could be
proffered in court. If opposing counsel objects and challenges the validity of the models, the
courts would need to determine the admissibility of the evidence. As discussed in Chapter 6, the
leading standards in the United States for making this determination are the scientific validity
Kaye, D. “Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What Is the FBI Afraid Of?” Cornell Journal of Law
and Public Policy, 19 (2009): 145.
264
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 3789g(b).
263

85

Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis

standard of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.265 and the general acceptance standard
of Frye v. United States.266 Under these standards, the proponent of the output of a statistical
model or an examiner’s opinion based on this model would have to show that the model is valid
or generally accepted in the scientific community. It is premature to predict which probabilistic
models will be validated and proven useful in court; the optimal model may prove to be one
that has yet to be proposed. It is possible that multiple opinions based upon different probability
models as well as the output of the model itself would be admissible.
4.3.3

Implications of the Validation of a Probabilistic Model

A useable probabilistic model could significantly affect the methods of latent print examination.
First, the model might require new metrics in latent print images, that is, the documentation
and measurement of new features. Some of the current models rely on measurements that many
examiners do not take, such as the distance between friction ridge features. If measurements and
the computation can be automated, then the use of the model could reduce the risk of human
error in making and using such measurements.
Additionally, judicial acceptance of testimony based upon a probabilistic model could change
the presentation of examiners’ opinions in court. Chapters 3 and 6 urge that examiners clearly
communicate the qualified nature of an opinion to the court. Reliance on statistical models would
enable the examiner to acknowledge the uncertainty of the conclusion or to dispense with a
binary opinion.
Lastly, judicial acceptance of probabilistic models would not force examiners to become
statisticians, but it would require them to be familiar with certain statistical concepts to testify to
probabilities or to an opinion based upon a probabilistic model. Specifically, examiners would
need to understand uncertainty, variability, conditional probabilities, probability distributions,
and likelihood ratios. They should also be able to explain these concepts to judges and juries.
Statisticians and the latent print examiner community can collaborate to design a training
program for examiners.
Recommendation 4.3: The latent print examiner community should expand the training
of examiners in elementary probability theory to enable examiners to properly utilize
the output of probabilistic models.

4.4

New Technologies for Latent Print Examination

4.4.1

Automated Quality Assessment

Early in the examination process, the examiner must decide whether the latent print is suitable
for further analysis—this is the Analysis phase in the ACE-V process. In the experience of the
Working Group, this initial quality assessment of the latent print is often the weak link in the
analytical process, as examiners could make two types of errors. In the first type of error, the
examiner prematurely discards a print that should be deemed suitable for further analysis and
265
266
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comparison, possibly resulting in a missed identification or exclusion. In the second type of
error, the examiner continues to evaluate a latent print that he ought to have deemed unsuitable
for further processing. This outcome results in wasted time and might even contribute to an
erroneous identification.
Currently available automated systems can assist in various steps within the Analysis phase.
Automated systems can measure the distance between certain features in two images. They can
also generate probabilities for such distances under the assumptions that the image of the latent
print comes from a finger known to have produced an exemplar and that the latent comes from a
finger of a randomly selected individual represented in a reference set of exemplars from many
individuals. Such conditional probabilities might be used in their own right or to corroborate
or contradict the judgment of a human examiner. Thus, an automated technique employing
a validated algorithm for judging the quality of an image and its suitability for forensic
identification would be extremely useful.
There have been attempts to develop automated quality assessment technology.267 Although
the efforts have so far met with limited success,268 automation seems possible. Given a suitable
way to calibrate the extent and clarity of the features in the latent and exemplar prints, an
objective quality measure could be calculated. This is not to say that the task will be easy. The
challenges to creating an automated quality assessment procedure are threefold: (1) identifying
the most critical elements to assess the quality of an image, (2) choosing a metric to assess
each element selected, and (3) combining these assessments to determine when the quality is
sufficient to warrant further effort. Just as prints vary in clarity and completeness, examiners
vary in experience and skill. An impression deemed unsuitable by an examiner of lesser skill
might be considered useful by a more seasoned examiner. In addition, if an algorithm indicates
that a latent print is suitable, an examiner might feel pressured to go beyond the normal comfort
level to reach a definite conclusion.269 This pressure may be compounded by the widespread
assumption that if a print is judged to be of value, a comparison with an exemplar print should
always permit the examiner to either identify or exclude. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
algorithms can be developed to mimic this type of human interpretation, especially the evaluation
of L3D, or that examiners can develop an effective strategy for employing such technology.
Ultimately, the research may yield the conclusion that automation cannot improve the initial
quality assessment. Any investigation into the possibility of automating this stage ought to be
conducted with these risks and challenges in mind. Nevertheless, because the Analysis phase is
so important to the overall examination, a concerted effort to automate the quality assessment
step, at least partially, is worthwhile.
Hicklin, A., et al. “Latent Fingerprint Quality: A Survey of Examiners.” Journal of Forensic Identification, Jul–
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Recommendation 4.4: The federal government should continue funding research into
automation of the initial quality assessment step in latent print analysis.
4.4.2

Latent Print Examiner Attitudes toward New Technology

Some veteran examiners began their careers well before the advent of modern technologies such
as AFIS, livescan, and digital enhancement. Younger examiners have likely worked with these
technologies throughout their professional lives. Understandably, examiners vary in their comfort
level in using the most sophisticated technologies. Some examiners prefer to use a magnifying
glass or loupe to study hard copies of the images. Others routinely compare on-screen images.
Manufacturers should take two steps to make examiners comfortable with new technologies.
First, manufacturers should ensure that new products are as usable as reasonably possible (see
Chapter 7). Second, manufacturers should expand their training programs. Traditionally, training
programs have focused primarily on the technical aspects of the instrumentation. Training
programs also should confront the fact that some examiners may subconsciously resist new
technologies that supplant the methods that they have been using for decades. In addition to
teaching examiners the specific mechanics of using the new technology, the program ought to
attempt to enhance the trainee’s general technology skills. Chapter 8 provides more information
on training improvements.
Forensic laboratory staff members should collaborate with manufacturers on the development
of training programs and usable tools. As the consumers of the tools and training programs, the
laboratory staff members have unique perspectives that can make a significant contribution to
both development projects. Chapter 7 addresses this topic of holistic and user-centered design in
more detail.

4.5

Summary

Technology can help latent print examiners fully analyze evidence and reach reasonable
conclusions that they can defend in court. Some of these technologies, such as AFIS, livescan,
and digital enhancement software, already exist; however, there is room to improve these
products, and further research should be conducted to enhance these technologies.
In addition, research into probability models that allow examiners to qualify their conclusions
should continue. Quantitative measures of fingerprint similarity can and have been developed.
The likelihood ratio for a measurement indicates how many times more probable it is for a pair
of prints from the same source to possess the measured degree of similarity than it is for a pair
from different sources to be that similar. By expressing the strength of the evidence in this way
and noting uncertainties in the values of the likelihood ratios, experts leave it to the judge or
jury to use the degree of similarity, along with the other evidence in the case, to decide whether
a pair of prints has a common source (see Chapter 6). Research into models that generate
valid probabilities should continue, and examiners should receive training to explain relevant
probabilities and statistics in court. Finally, research should be conducted into software to assist
examiners with quantity and quality assessments for latent prints.
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Examiners and other forensic laboratory staff members should work with technology
manufacturers to ensure that the products are designed for ease of use and that training programs
are sufficient. Training programs should consider those examiners who may be reluctant to rely
on new technology processes that augment their traditional methods of moving through the
Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation phases. Research into new and valuable technologies
and the further validation of existing technologies and methods will have a positive, long-term
impact on the latent print community.
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Chapter 5: Reports and Documentation
Introduction and Scope
This chapter concerns written records of the results of friction ridge skin impression
examinations in criminal investigations. The process of documenting an examination can help
address human factors issues that could lead to inferential errors. Best practices for documenting
the examination and producing a summary report for investigators and the judicial system
increase the likelihood that the conclusions of the examiner are accurate and supported and will
be used appropriately.
The two recommendations presented here are intended to increase the level of comprehensibility,
transparency, and completeness of written (or electronic) records without imposing impractical
and undue demands on the often over-burdened agencies and examiners. In developing these
recommendations, the Working Group was guided by, but not confined to, existing standards and
guidelines of professional organizations and accrediting bodies.
Throughout the chapter, the generic term “record” denotes both the written report and the
underlying documentation, such as bench notes and copies of images. This chapter does not
attempt to specify precisely how to allocate the information between the report and the residual
documentation, but it does list the minimum information that should appear in the summary
report. It also urges that reports use clearly defined terms so as to be most useful to criminal
investigators, lawyers, judges, and juries. To provide the rationale for the recommendations, the
chapter begins with a description of the value and purposes of contemporaneous documentation
of examinations and the preparation of written reports.

5.1 Reporting and Documentation for Quality Assurance and Control
A written report of an examination of friction ridge skin impressions presents the examiner’s
findings, indicates how the examiner arrived at these findings, and refers to more detailed
documentation of the process. These records serve both scientific and legal functions. From
the scientific standpoint, proceeding according to a well-defined, uniform protocol and
contemporaneously recording the results can improve interpretation (see Chapter 3). In addition,
“thorough documentation of this process allows for the transparency required for competent
reviewers to determine that the data and case information have been appropriately considered.”270
“By ensuring that the examiner has followed the prescribed procedure, and by permitting
external review, reports are a quality [assurance and] control mechanism.”271
These considerations lead to the overarching principle that a report and supporting notes or
materials should document the examination process in sufficient detail so that a reviewing expert
could verify the validity of the examiner’s assessment of the evidence. This principle is
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Strengthening Forensic Science in
the United States: A Path Forward, Position Statement. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study
and Technology, 2009.
271
American Bar Association. Standards for Criminal Justice: DNA Evidence. 3rd ed. American Bar Association,
2007, p. 72.
270
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incorporated in Recommendation 3.1 (Chapter 3) and endorsed by scientific working groups
from a variety of forensic disciplines, including friction ridge analysis,272 firearms and toolmarks
analysis,273 and drug analysis.274 It leads to more specific recommendations that further define the
minimum level of detail required for quality assurance and control purposes. Before presenting
these more detailed recommendations, it is helpful to consider the role that reporting and
documentation play in the legal system.

5.2

Legal Purposes of Written Records

5.2.1

Pretrial Uses of Reports

Expert reports convey useful information to the prosecution and defense before trial. “Because
the reports are discoverable, they assist attorneys in preparing for trial and thus render effective
representation.”275 Accordingly, one federal magistrate judge recently urged that
to ensure that defense counsel can make any challenges to the admissibility of
toolmark identification evidence and that courts may conduct hearings to resolve
these challenges based on sufficient record, the Government should be required to
strictly and timely comply with its [pretrial discovery] obligations regarding the
opinions to be offered by firearms examiners in sufficient detail and sufficiently
far in advance of motions deadlines or trials as to enable defense counsel to
evaluate the conclusions and bases, determine whether to engage experts to test
them, and if appropriate, challenge them.276
Moreover, due process principles require the prosecution to disclose information that is
“favorable to the accused”277 and “material either to guilt or to punishment,”278 as well as
“evidence that the defense might have used to impeach the government’s witnesses by showing
bias or interest.”279 The prosecution is responsible for disclosing all such information, even if it
is in the hands of the law enforcement agency.280 Making a good faith effort to ensure reports
contain all known exculpatory and impeachment material helps the government comply with its
disclosure obligations and avoid accusations of hiding relevant evidence. As in other fields,281
such accusations are not unheard of in regard to latent print examinations.282
272
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Finally, although the forensic expert cannot control the actions of police or prosecutors, the
expert may have an ethical obligation to avoid such practices as “preparation of reports
containing minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’ ammunition for
cross-examination,” “reporting of findings without an interpretation on the assumption that if an
interpretation is required it can be provided from the witness box,” and “omitting some
significant point from a report to trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner.”283
5.2.2

Trial Uses of Reports

In addition to their pretrial uses, reports can assist experts who testify. Although there can be
obstacles (discussed below) to introducing the report itself into evidence, documentation of the
chain of custody of the evidence is crucial, and the written materials can be consulted to refresh a
witness’s recollection. In addition, when a report is admitted as an exhibit, it becomes part of the
trial record, which allows the jury to rely on the statements in it and to consult it during jury
deliberations. Admission thus can streamline the presentation and can reduce the time needed to
present the results during trial. Indeed, laboratory reports sometimes are admitted by stipulation
in lieu of live testimony.
When a prosecutor offers a report into evidence, however, a defendant can object that it is
hearsay. Although a laboratory report offered into evidence to prove the facts recorded in it is
technically hearsay, in many jurisdictions laboratory reports are admissible under an exception to
the hearsay rule.284 In addition, even if the hearsay objection prevails and the report is not
evidence in its own right, the expert who prepared the report or another expert may be permitted
to rely on it as part of the basis for the testifying expert’s own opinion.285
If the prosecutor does not present the author of the report for cross-examination at trial, a
defendant also can object that the absence of the witness violates the constitutional right to
confront one’s accusers. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents the
prosecution from introducing “testimonial” statements accusing the defendant without producing
See, e.g., Edwards, H. “Solving the Problems that Plague the Forensic Science Community.” Jurimetrics Journal
of Law, Science, and Technology, 50 (2009): 9; Henson, S. “Brady Violations by DPS Fingerprint Examiners? Is
Fingerprint Examination even Science?” Grits for Breakfast. Blog post, October 9, 2010. Accessed November 25,
2011. http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2010/10/brady-violations-by-dps-fingerprint.html.
283
Lucas, D. “The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the Limits.” Journal of Forensic
Sciences, 34 (1989): 724. Examples of such expert advocacy by forensic serologists can be found in Garrett, B.
Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong. Harvard University Press, 2011.
284
The hearsay issue is somewhat intricate. Congress expressly excluded police reports prepared for criminal
prosecutions from the public records exception to the hearsay rule in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B). One line
of cases reasons that this provision implies that crime laboratory reports also are outside the scope of the related
Rule 803(6) business records exception to the hearsay rule. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). Other
federal circuits are more willing to apply the business-records exception. E.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d
1353, 1359 (8th Cir. 1988). State court opinions also are conflicting. Compare Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d
1261 (Pa. 2007) (admissible hearsay), with People v. McDaniel, 670 N.W.2d 659 (Mich. 2003) (inadmissible
hearsay). Some states have enacted specific rules to overcome the hearsay objection to crime laboratory reports.
E.g., Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 111, §13; People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ill. 2000) (referring
to Illinois statute).
285
E.g., Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 709 (Ind. 2009); Kaye, D., D. Bernstein, and J. Mnookin. The New
Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence. 2nd ed. Aspen Publishers, 2011. § 4.6.
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the author of the statements for cross-examination. In Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts,286 the
Supreme Court applied this doctrine to sworn statements from laboratory analysts at the state
Department of Public Health. Their “certificates of analysis”287 contained “only the bare bones
statement that ‘the substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’ At the time of trial, petitioner did
not know what tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether
interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts
may not have possessed.”288 The Court determined that because the “analysts’ statements [were]
prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial, [they] were testimony against [the] petitioner,
and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”289 Thus, whether or
not the certificates were inadmissible as hearsay, the state should not have relied on them without
giving the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the analysts themselves.
Because reports of friction ridge examinations conducted at the request of criminal investigators
are also testimonial, these reports cannot serve as a complete substitute for the courtroom
testimony of the examiners if the defendant objects to their introduction. Nevertheless, written
records can facilitate the presentation of the prosecution’s case and make the trial more efficient.
Melendez Diaz noted that “it is not the case that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in
establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device
must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”290 Portions of a laboratory report or
documentation detailing these matters might be considered non-testimonial. Moreover, the
defendant’s right to confrontation does not prevent the prosecution from presenting a laboratory
report with the testimony of the analyst or examiner. Indeed, if the analyst is unavailable to
testify, the report still may be admissible if the “defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”291 In addition, there may be cases in which an expert witness who did not
perform the original examination can testify to or rely on the contents of a report from the expert
who did.292 Finally, like the hearsay rule, “the right to confrontation may, of course, be waived,
including by failure to object to the offending evidence … .”293 In fact, jurisdictions are free to
adopt statutes or rules that enable a prosecutor to secure such a waiver by giving pretrial notice
of the intent to use the report as long as “the defendant is given a period of time in which he may
Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
Ibid., p. 2531.
288
Ibid., p. 2537.
289
Ibid., p. 2540.
290
Ibid., p. 2532, note 1.
291
Ibid., p. 2531.
292
Compare People v. Williams, 939 N.E. 2d 268, 270 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Williams v. Illinois, 80
U.S.L.W. 3003 (U.S. June 28, 2011) (allowing surrogate testimony from a DNA analyst at a state laboratory who
compared a crime-scene DNA profile generated by a private laboratory to the profile from defendant’s blood sample
and determined that they matched), with Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011) (“Surrogate testimony”
about a defendant’s blood alcohol level was inadmissible when the forensic analyst who conducted the gas
chromatography, wrote a report, and signed a certificate of analysis did not testify but was not shown to be
unavailable to testify and the witness who testified in his place worked at the same laboratory and was familiar with
its procedures but had not participated in the testing or supervised the original analyst.)
Of course, the Confrontation Clause does not bar testimony from a fingerprint examiner who re-examines a
set of images to form an independent expert opinion. The significant questions pertain only to presenting or relying
on “testimonial statements” about the images made by other examiners who are not themselves made available for
cross-examination. See Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit., § 4.10.
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Melendez Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535 n. 3.
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object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial.”294 However,
a more complete report could reduce the chance that the defense will demand the presence of the
examiner and could enhance the chance that a laboratory supervisor or other analyst can testify at
a trial if the examining analyst is unavailable.
In sum, the value of comprehensive written records in trial and pretrial proceedings reinforces
Recommendation 3.1, calling for contemporaneous documentation that makes “the interpretive
process as transparent as possible” and “sufficient to permit another examiner to assess the
accuracy and validity of the initial examiner’s assessment of the evidence.” In addition, the fact
that the readers of an examiner’s report in a case scheduled for trial are likely to be lawyers,
judges, or jurors prompts a related recommendation directed specifically at the examiner’s
summary report:
Recommendation 5.1: The report of the examination should ensure that the findings
and their limitations are intelligible to non-experts.
This recommendation finds support in the views of legal and scientific organizations, such as the
American Bar Association295 and the National Research Council,296 as well as forensic science
working groups and organizations, such as the European Network of Forensic Science
Institutes297 and the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs.298 The
European Network, for example, explains that
the reports of forensic investigations will be read by a wide variety of individuals,
many of whom will have little knowledge of science. They may have to be read
aloud in courts of law to inform judges and advocates and, in some jurisdictions,
members of a jury. Reports must, therefore, be written as clearly and
unambiguously as possible. Great care must be taken to ensure that all details
relating to the examinations undertaken, and the scientific rationale on which the
examinations are based, are described in language that can be understood by
nonscientists.299

Ibid., p. 2541. If the defendant does object, it appears that the state cannot place the burden of calling the witness
on the defendant. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S.Ct. 1316 (2010).
295
American Bar Association, op. cit., Standard 16-3.3(c).
296
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. National Academies
Press, 2009, p. 186; National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council Committee on Scientific Assessment
of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition Comparison. Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence. National
Academies Press, 2004, p. 110.
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European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Standing Committee for Quality and Competence. Performance
Based Standards for Forensic Science Practitioners. European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Standing
Committee for Quality and Competence, July 2004.
298
Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs. Supplemental Document SD-1 for Part I, A Code of
Professional Practice for Drug Analysts. Recommendation 2.3.1. Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of
Seized Drugs, October 2004.
299
European Network, op. cit., Activity I.
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5.3

Minimal Contents of a Report

There is no hard and fast line between the information that should be recorded in reports versus
contemporaneous, supporting documentation. One laboratory could include considerable detail
in a report prepared for police or litigants, while another might store much of the same
documentation elsewhere and write a shorter report that simply refers to the underlying
documentation. Therefore, the Working Group does not propose a one-size-fits-all division of the
necessary information. Instead, the outline below contains the minimum content of a report and
indicates what additional information should be recorded, either in the report or in related
documentation. This chapter’s appendices offer sample reports of varying length and detail.
Broadly speaking, a report should describe the items submitted to the latent print examiner, how
the examiner processed these items, and how the examiner reached any conclusions. Although it
has been said that “case documentation is not complete if the record-keeping process does not
begin at the crime scene,”300 and a full report certainly could describe the entire chain of
evidence, the focus here is on the processing, examination, and conclusions about the material
after it is delivered to a latent print examiner. The essential contents of a report on these phases
of evidence assessment are listed at the conclusion of this section in Recommendation 5.2, and
the appendices to this chapter present sample reports. The recommendation covers such matters
as reporting on each step of the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V)
process; noting non-essential, domain-irrelevant information known to the examiner (if any);
noting the existence of documentation outside the report itself; and presenting results and
defining terms.
5.3.1

Images of Friction Ridge Impressions

Friction ridge impressions on surfaces may be examined on that surface, developed from that
surface, or placed into another format (such as a photograph or scan) for analysis and
comparison. When a development process was used, or when the image was copied into another
format, the report should define the process that was used and indicate that an image of the
developed friction ridge impression was retained.
5.3.2

List of Comparisons

Latent prints can be compared to other latent prints to see if the same individual was present at
both locations. They can be compared to a ten-print card or other exemplar from a known
individual. In addition, exemplars from an individual whose identity is in question can be
compared to exemplars from known individuals. The report should list which images were
compared to one another.
Traditionally, latent prints have been compared with ten-print cards for pre-existing suspects in a
case. The creation of large databases of computer-searchable images permits comparisons to
individuals culled with automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) software (Chapter 4).
Peterson, P., C. Dreyfus, M. Gische, et al. “Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State of the Science.” Forensic
Science Communications, 11, no. 4 (October 2009).
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If an AFIS search has been conducted, the report should specify the results. A record of the AFIS
candidate list should be retrievable.
5.3.3

Method and Conclusions

Just as a report should indicate how latent prints were made visible, it also should state the
procedure used to make comparisons between friction skin impressions and to draw conclusions
from these comparisons.301 The conventional procedure for associating latent and known prints
involves the ACE-V process described in Chapter 1. Traditionally, the outcome of ACE-V has
been expressed in terms of three possible categories: individualization, exclusion, or
inconclusive.302 Nonetheless, scientific research or reasoning does not limit reported results to
these three categories.303 A more finely graded set of categories is possible (see, for example,
Chapter 9), and the computer-based methods described in the preceding chapter are another way
to measure the features of prints and the degree of similarity between pairs of prints. As
automated systems advance and are further validated with large data sets, they will be useful in
conjunction with (or conceivably, at some time in the future, instead of) ACE-V. But, whatever
procedures are employed to draw inferences from the evidence—ACE-V or otherwise—the
report should designate them and should frame the conclusions in a manner that is accurate and
scientifically appropriate.
5.3.4

Limitations

For the sake of lay readers, a report may contain some general warnings that indicate its limits.
For example, if no comparisons were made, the report might note that the absence of any usable
latent prints, or even any smudges, does not mean that the surface was never touched. If the
examiner associates the latent print with a known finger, the report might observe that, standing
alone, this association does not indicate how, why, or when the latent print was deposited.
Statements like these are included in reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They
are not necessary to present the results of an examination or to document how it was conducted,
but they may be helpful for some readers.
In addition, if there are significant reasons to question any conclusions, these should be noted.304
As the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs concluded, forensic analysts
have the professional responsibility to present both written and oral “advice … in a clear and
objective manner”305 —a duty that entails “considering and providing alternative explanations or
Compare American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors. Guidelines for Forensic Laboratory Management
Practices. American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, 1987.
302
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standards for Conclusions.
Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, September 2003.
303
Budowle, B., J. Buscaglia, and R. Perlman. “Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge Comparisons as a
Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations.” Forensic Science Communications, 8
(January 2006); Haber, L. and R. Haber. Challenges to Fingerprints: A Guidebook for Prosecution and Defense and
Examiners. Lawyers and Judges Publishing Co., 2009.
304
European Network, op. cit., Standard I1(c); NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community, op. cit., pp. 21-22; SWGDRUG, 2004, op. cit., Recommendation 2.3.1. But see Scientific
Working Group on Materials Analysis. Forensic Human Hair Examination Guidelines. Scientific Working Group
on Materials Analysis, April 2005.
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SWGDRUG, 2011, op.cit., Recommendation 2.3(a).
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interpretations for their findings, where appropriate; making clear the strengths and any
limitations in their advice or evidence; [and] declaring anything that might undermine the
integrity of their evidence or its use … .”306
5.3.5

Verification and Consultation

If the examiner followed the ACE-V process, the report should disclose or refer the reader to the
record of who verified the results, when verification occurred, and what information the
verifying examiner had about the previous comparisons. If the Verification phase involved a
difference of opinion, then the existence of the disagreement should be noted in the report and
the basis for the final consensus should be stated in the report or other documentation.307
In some cases, an examiner seeks guidance from another expert (examiner or supervisor) before
reaching a conclusion. Consultation is a way of sharing expertise and does not mean that there is
a conflict. A poor quality unknown print, a poor quality known print, an irregular substrate,
excessive deposition or lateral pressure, limited Level 2 Detail (see Chapters 3), and other factors
could lead an examiner to consult with others. A conflict occurs when an examiner does not
agree with another examiner during the verification, technical review, or administrative review.
Such a disagreement is resolved in discussions among examiners who initially reached different
conclusions or with the involvement of supervisory personnel up to the level of the laboratory
director, if necessary. The recommendation for disclosure applies to conflicts rather than
consultations.
5.3.6

Context

Chapters 1 and 3 discuss the potentially biasing effects of contextual information. As those
chapters explained, observers’ expectations have been shown to influence judgment in a broad
range of tasks. Because “the possibility of biases influencing the decision making process of
examiners” cannot be dismissed,308 a report should reveal the context of the examination by
describing or referring the reader to the information about the case that an examiner received.
For example, the possibility of an expectancy effect in comparing and evaluating a pair of prints
argues in favor of revealing whether an examiner was informed that the exemplars were for
elimination purposes, that they came from suspects in the case, or that they were the result of an
AFIS search.309
Chapter 3 observes that in some laboratories, examiners are exposed to a great deal of
information that is clearly not related to or necessary for their analysis and calls upon
laboratories to minimize the amount of extraneous, domain-irrelevant information that is
SWGDRUG, 2004, op. cit., Recommendation 2.3.1.
Compare SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit., Standard 5.
308
SWGFAST, 2009, op. cit.
309
Dror, I. and J. Mnookin. “The Use of Technology in Human Expert Domains: Challenges and Risks Arising
From the Use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensic Science.” Law, Probability & Risk, 9
(2010): 47 – 67. An additional reason to document the fact of an AFIS search arises when candidates from this
search are excluded. These exclusions increase the probative value of a match to a suspect. Aitken, C. and F. Taroni.
Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists. 2nd ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2004; Kaye, D.
“Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis of DNA Database Trawls.” North Carolina Law
Review, 87, no. 2 (2009): 425 – 503. For a modest number of exclusions, however, the effect is small.
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provided to examiners. The recommendation here complements this suggestion by asking for
disclosure of the information actually provided to examiners. This does not mean that the
examiner must write out everything that is known about the background of the case. For
example, if an examiner was exposed to a police case file or report containing information about
the suspect’s criminal record or the suspect’s admissions to the police, the report could simply
note that the examiner read the police report that contained information about the suspect before
reaching a conclusion.
5.3.7

References to Other Documentation

The report itself should at least describe the highlights of the examination of the evidence, and it
should be an “accurate summary of significant material contained in the case notes.”310 But it
need not present every detail of the process. If documentation, such as bench notes or additional
images, is not appended to the report, the report should note that these materials are on file and
can be obtained from the laboratory upon request.311
For example, if more than one examiner reached a conclusion about the sufficiency or similarity
of two images, the conclusions should be recorded in the documentation and noted in the
summary report. The quality assurance and quality control measures in place also should be
noted. Because these measures would be spelled out in written protocols and statements of
standard operating procedures, it should be sufficient to refer to these documents.
The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST)
suggests that “the substrate, development medium, or preservation method can have a significant
impact on the appearance of a latent print” and that “additional analytical factors, particularly on
complex prints, provide the basis for distortion interpretation and explanations for variation in
appearance.”312 Consequently, the documentation should record information about the substrate,
development medium, and preservation method (e.g., lift, photograph, or legible copy).
The results of the effort to develop prints also should be documented by annotated images or
written descriptions that record how many and which prints were determined to be suitable for
comparison as well as the existence of prints determined to be unsuitable for comparison.313 If
the latent print examiner uses enhancement technology, he or she should retain the unenhanced
image and maintain an audit trail of all digital enhancements to subsequent copies (see Chapter
4). The FBI laboratory suggests that
once the evidence has been received in the Latent Print Unit for processing, case
note documentation should chronologically include each activity and the results of
the activity. Documentation should include any development techniques applied,
the date the process was applied, and the result. The documented result should
include the presence or absence of any prints and the indication of whether the
developed prints are suitable for capture either through scanning or photography.
ASCLD, op. cit., p. 43.
See European Network, op. cit., Standard I1(f).
312
SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit., p. 2.
313
Compare ibid., Standard 1.1.2.
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This documentation process should continue until all processing techniques have
been applied or the processing is discontinued.314
Furthermore, it recommends that
case documentation should indicate the number of latent prints of value detected
on each item, along with a description of the item, and which items did not
contain any latent prints or latent prints of value. Additional requirements include
the disposition of any images containing latent prints of value and any images of
latent prints that were not analyzed, compared, or evaluated.315
SWGFAST suggests that “documentation … may be accomplished by making a ‘no value’
notation (e.g., ‘NV’) on a lift, photograph, or legible copy retained as part of the case record [or]
by indicating in case notes that ‘no value’ impressions are present on a lift or photograph.”316
Although SWGFAST adds that “copies of latent prints that are of no value do not need to be
retained in the case record,” this Working Group recommends retaining all images for possible
later review.
Finally, the report or associated documentation should record the features that the examiner(s)
considered and relied on in reaching a conclusion of identification, including those features used
in any verification. All comparisons conducted during the course of the examination, including
latent to exemplar, latent to latent, and exemplar to exemplar, should be documented. In some
cases, a number of exclusions may be made. For example, an AFIS search will generate a list of
candidates. When, in screening these candidates, exemplars are readily excluded, the
documentation need not show the specific feature or features used for the exclusion, but the
exemplars should be retained or be kept retrievable.317
The report or supporting documentation should explain, through annotations on images or in
some other fashion, the features of the unknown that were selected for analysis and used for
comparison.318 An apparent dissimilarity that is attributed to distortion or another cause should
be noted.319 Providing this information complies with the International Organization for
Standardization’s ISO/IEC 17025: 2005, clause 5.10.5,320 which requires that “the laboratory
shall document the basis upon which the opinions and interpretations have been made” and
responds to the concern that examiners might fail “to document which features within a latent
print support their reasoning and conclusions.”321 A verifying examiner’s notes or other
materials should document the verification in similar detail.
As discussed in Chapter 3, contemporaneous documentation of each major step in the
examination process can help ensure the examination is conducted properly and thus reduce the

Peterson, Dreyfus, Gische, et al., op. cit.
Ibid.
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SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit., p. 3.
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Ibid., Standard 2.4.
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Ibid., Preamble. See also Chapter 3.
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Compare SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit., p. 2.
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International Organization for Standardization. General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and
Calibration Laboratories, ISO/IEC 17025:2005(E), 2d ed. International Organization for Standardization, 2005.
321
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chance of error. It also can provide a record that might be useful for testimony by the examiner
or other possible expert witnesses at a later time.
5.3.8

Definition of Terms

A report should define important technical terms, either explicitly or by reference to an
authoritative, readily available source. For example, latent print examiners often refer to
“individualization” as “identification,”322 but in ordinary parlance, an identification need not be
an assertion that only one person on Earth could be the source of an impression. An eyewitness
description might be used to “identify” a suspect, even though the individual so identified would
not be the only person in the world to fit the description. Even the word “individualize” is not
self-defining. It might mean that in a closed group of, say, seven suspects, only one suspect’s
finger could be the source of a latent print, or it might represent a more powerful assertion that
no other finger that has ever been or ever will be in existence can produce so similar a latent
print. An explicit definition informs the reader of the intended meaning, and Chapter 1 discusses
ways to define terms relating to the process of establishing an association between a known
individual and a latent print. The importance of defining terms clearly is widely recognized in the
forensic sciences,323 and this part of the recommendation also follows from Recommendation 5.1
on making the report understandable to lay readers.
Recommendation 5.2: A report should:
a. Identify the latent print examiner(s);
b. Describe the items submitted to the examiner(s);
c. List the procedures used by the examiner to develop, visualize, or enhance the
friction ridge impressions;
d. List all comparisons conducted;
e. State all conclusions with the method used to reach them;
f. Note any important limitations to the conclusions;
g. Indicate whether a verification was made and whether there was any conflict of
opinion among examiners prior to the reported conclusions;
h. Note (or refer to external documentation of) any information about the case that
the examiner(s) received;
i. Note the existence of additional documentation; and
j. Define important technical terms, either explicitly or by reference to an
authoritative, readily available source.

E.g., SWGFAST, 2003, op. cit., Standard 1. A draft of the document intended to replace these standards does not
use the word “identification.” Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Draft
for Comment: Standards for Examining Friction Ridge Impressions and Resulting Conclusions (To Replace:
Friction Ridge Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, Version 1.01, and Standards for Conclusions,
Version 1.0). Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, August
2010, p. 4. Another draft document, the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and
Technology. Standard Terminology of Friction Ridge Examination (To Replace: Glossary, Version 2.0). Version 3.
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, February 11, 2011, lists
“individualization” as the primary meaning of “identification.”
323
For example, European Network, op. cit., Activity I. SWGDRUG, 2004, op. cit., Recommendation 3.2.1.
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5.4

Summary

A report and documentation that contain the information listed in these recommendations
provide an accessible record of the work of latent print examiners. The level of detail is
sufficient to inform investigators, prosecutors, defense counsel, other experts, and judges or
juries as to how the analysis was conducted and what conclusions were reached. This type of
reporting meets scientific norms, quality assurance, and legal concerns. Appendices offer sample
language for a full report, a shortened report with minimal requirements, and a report with
qualified conclusions.
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Appendix 5-A: Sample Report Summary
Bureau of Investigation						123 Main Street
Laboratory Division, Latent Print Section				
Washington, D.C. 20035
SAMPLE REPORT OF EXAMINATION
To:

BI Agent John Dunne						
Los Angeles Field Office

Date: October 20, 2011

Case Number: LA-123456
Case Title:
Bank of Los Angeles
		
123 California Blvd.
		Los Angeles, CA
		
Aug. 28, 2011
		Bank Robbery
Date specimens received: September 3, 2011
Fingerprint Analyst: Susanne Brown
The items listed below were examined in the Latent Print Section.
Description
Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
Pen with chain
Lift indicated as coming from customer
counter
Table 1: Items examined in Latent Print Section
Item #
1
2
3
4

Results of Examinations
Items of evidence submitted to the Latent Print Section for examination may be examined
visually, examined with various light sources, or processed with chemicals and powders to detect
the presence of latent friction ridge prints. The specific sequence of examinations and processes
depends upon the nature of the evidence.1 I applied the following processes to the submitted
items as follows:

1

See Bureau of Investigation, Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints, Revised 2001.
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Item
#
1

Description

Processing techniques

Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”

Visual, LASER, ultraviolet,
Crimescope, 1,8-Diazafluoren-9one/LASER, Ninhydrin, Physical
Developer
2
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
Visual, LASER, ultraviolet,
Crimescope, 1,8-Diazafluoren-9one/LASER, Ninhydrin, Physical
Developer
3
Pen with chain
Visual, LASER, ultraviolet,
Crimescope, Cyanoacrylate Fuming,
reflective ultraviolet imaging system,
Cyanoacrylate Dye
Stain/LASER/ultraviolet/Crimescope,
White Powder
4
Lift indicated as coming from customer
Visual—see crime scene log for
counter
additional information
Table 2: Processing techniques applied to submitted items
BI conducts friction ridge print examinations using the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V) process. The first phase in the process is Analysis, which is conducted
independently on first the latent then the known prints. During this phase, each print is analyzed
for both the quality and quantity of information present. The qualitative assessment is based
upon the clarity of the friction ridges, the substrate on which the latent print was developed,
deposition and lateral pressures, and the processing techniques applied. The quantitative analysis
takes into account all of the information present in the print, broken down into three levels of
detail. Level 1 Detail consists of the overall ridge flow, including pattern type and orientation of
the print based upon that ridge flow. Level 2 Detail lies in individual ridge paths, including those
of continuous ridges as well as ridges that come to an end, divide to form two or more ridges, or
appear as isolated dots. Analysis of these ridge characteristics accounts for their type, direction,
location, and spatial sequence. Level 3 Detail includes individual ridge attributes, particularly
shape and width along the length of each ridge. The quality and quantity of information observed
during the Analysis phase determines whether the print contains suitable information to conduct
a comparison with another print.
Results of Analysis
I detected four latent fingerprints on Items 1, 2, and 4 that were suitable for comparison:
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Item
#
1

Description
Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”

# of
prints
2

Processing technique
1 1,8-Diazafluoren-9one/LASER, 1 Ninhydrin
Ninhydrin
Black powder lift

2
4

Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
1
Lift indicated as coming from customer
1
counter
Table 3: Prints determined to be suitable for comparison and the processing technique used to
detect them
In the Comparison phase of the ACE-V process, I conducted a side-by-side comparison of a
latent print with an exemplar. I examined both prints for similarities and differences, assessing
ridges sequentially for agreement or disagreement in all levels of detail.

In the Evaluation phase of the ACE-V, I considered all of the information gathered during
Analysis and Comparison to reach conclusions about the origin of the latent prints. I made
identifications as well as exclusions. An exclusion is an opinion that the two prints did not
originate from the same source because there is information in disagreement in the comparable
areas of the two prints that would not be present if the prints came from the same finger. An
identification is an opinion that the two prints originated from the same source because the
information in the comparable areas of two prints is in sufficient agreement. An identification
does not necessarily eliminate the possibility that another person in the world could leave a print
with areas of similar agreement. It means that within the examiner’s experience and knowledge,
no other prints with this much similarity have come from different people.
Results of Comparison and Evaluation
After a conversation with the case agent (see Table 7), I compared the four latent fingerprints to
the fingerprints of THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456, with the following results:
Item
#
1
2
4

Description

# of
prints

Results of comparison with
THOMAS SMITH, BI
#123456
2 Identifications
Exclusion
Exclusion

Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
2
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
1
Lift indicated as coming from customer
1
counter
Table 4: Results of comparisons with THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456

The remaining two unidentified latent fingerprints were searched in the BI automated fingerprint
identification system (AFIS). I reviewed the resulting list of candidates (available upon request
to the BI) and reached the following conclusions:
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Item
#
2
4

Description

Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
Lift indicated as coming from customer
counter
Table 5: Results of AFIS searches

# of
prints
1
1

Results of AFIS search
No Identification effected
Identification with JANE
JONES, BI #987654

The remaining unidentified latent fingerprint (on item #2) is not a fingerprint of JANE JONES,
BI #987654.
Summary of Evaluation
Item
#
1
2

Description
Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form

4

Lift indicated as coming from customer
counter
Table 6: Summary of evaluation

# of
prints
2
1

1

Evaluation Summary
2 Identifications with
THOMAS SMITH, BI
#123456
Not a fingerprint of
THOMAS SMITH, BI
#123456, or JANE JONES,
BI #987654
Identification with JANE
JONES, BI #987654

The presence of a friction ridge print on an item of evidence indicates contact was made between
the source and the item of evidence. The presence of a friction ridge print alone does not
necessarily indicate the significance of either the contact or the time frame during which the
contact occurred.
Due to the many factors involved in the deposition of a friction ridge print, neither the absence of
a friction ridge print on evidence nor the exclusion of a friction ridge print with a given source
necessarily precludes that source from having touched the evidence.
Results of Verifications and Blind Verifications
The Verification phase of the ACE-V process consists of the application of the Analysis,
Comparison, and Evaluation phases of the ACE-V process to a friction ridge print by another
qualified examiner who then expresses his or her agreement or disagreement with the original
examiner’s conclusion. On October 18, 2011, Fingerprint Analyst Robert Johnson, knowing the
outcome of the original examination, verified the identifications. There were no conflicts of
opinion.
On October 19, 2011, Fingerprint Analyst James Bishop conducted a blind verification of the
identification with JANE JONES. (In blind verifications, the verifying examiner is unaware of
the original examiner’s conclusion.) A conflict of opinion occurred during this blind verification
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of the identification with JANE JONES. Initially, the verifier deemed the comparison
inconclusive due to poor quality exemplars. Upon consultation with the primary analyst, the
blind verifier realized that he had not received all available exemplars. After comparing the
additional exemplars, the verifier concurred with the identification decision.
Additional documentation, including bench notes and annotated images of the latent prints for
both the primary analyst and verifiers, is retained as part of the case record and can be provided
upon request. The BI Laboratory Division’s Quality Assurance Manual and Standard Operating
Procedures can be found online at www.BI.org.
Case Information Received by the Fingerprint Analyst
The following table summarizes the case-related information that I received for this case:
Date
September 3,
2011

Communication
Type
Incoming letter

Description

Letter from contributor submitted with the evidence.
Details of case, including type of crime, location
of crime, date of crime, description of how bank
robbery occurred, and description of evidence being
submitted were included in the letter. No individuals
to compare were provided.
Telephone call with Case Agent naming individual
September 14,
Telephone call
2011
(documented
to compare. THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456, had
on Activity &
been developed as a suspect due to information from
Communication Log) a confidential informant.
Table 7: Information on case received by examiner
For questions about the content of this report, please contact Fingerprint Analyst Susanne Brown
at (202) 123-4567.
The specimens are being returned under separate cover.

										Susanne Brown
										Fingerprint Analyst
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Appendix 5-B: Sample Report Summary, Short Version
Bureau of Investigation						123 Main Street
Laboratory Division, Latent Print Section				
Washington, D.C. 20035
SAMPLE REPORT OF EXAMINATION
To:

BI Agent John Dunne						
Los Angeles Field Office

Date: October 20, 2011

Case Number: LA-123456
Case Title:
Bank of Los Angeles
		
123 California Blvd.
		Los Angeles, CA
		
Aug. 28, 2011
		Bank Robbery
Date specimens received: September 3, 2011
Fingerprint Analyst: Susanne Brown
The items listed below were examined in the Latent Print Section.
Description
Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
Pen with chain
Lift indicated as coming from customer
counter
Table 1: Items examined in Latent Print Section
Item #
1
2
3
4

Items of evidence submitted to the Latent Print Section for examination may be examined
visually, examined with various light sources, or processed with chemicals and powders to detect
the presence of latent friction ridge prints. The specific sequence of examinations and processes
depends upon the nature of the evidence.1 A complete list of the processes used in this
submission is maintained in the case record and can be furnished upon request.

1

See Bureau of Investigation, Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints, Revised 2001.
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Results of Examinations
Four latent fingerprints were detected on the items and compared to THOMAS SMITH, BI
#123456, with the following results:
Item
#

Description

# of
prints

1
2
3
4

Results of comparison with
THOMAS SMITH, BI
#123456
2 Identifications
1 Exclusion
N/A
1 Exclusion

Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
2
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
1
Pen with chain
0
Lift indicated as coming from customer
1
counter
Table 2: Results of comparisons with THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456

The remaining unidentified latent fingerprints were searched in the BI automated fingerprint
identification system (AFIS) with the following results:
Item
#
2
4

Description

Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
Lift indicated as coming from customer
counter
Table 3: Results of AFIS searches

# of
prints
1
1

Results of AFIS search
No Identification effected
1 Identification with JANE
JONES, BI #987654

The remaining unidentified latent fingerprint (on item #2) is not a fingerprint of JANE JONES,
BI #987654.
Friction ridge print examinations are conducted using the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V) process. The steps of ACE-V are applied to each examination as
appropriate. Analysis is the assessment of the quantity and quality of the information present in
the print to determine if sufficient reliable details are present to conduct a comparison with
another print. Comparison is the side-by-side observation of friction ridge prints to determine
whether or not the information in two prints is in agreement. Evaluation is the formulation of a
conclusion based upon the information gathered during analysis and comparison. The evaluation
can result in an exclusion, an identification, or an inconclusive outcome. An exclusion is an
opinion that the two prints did not originate from the same source because there is information in
disagreement in the comparable areas of two prints that would not be present if the prints came
from the same finger. An identification is an opinion that the two prints originated from the same
source because the information in the comparable areas of two prints is in sufficient agreement.
An identification does not necessarily eliminate the possibility another person in the world could
leave a print with areas of similar agreement. It means that within the examiner’s experience and
knowledge, no other prints with this much similarity have come from different people.
Verification is the independent application of the Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation phases
of the ACE-V process to a friction ridge print by another examiner.
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The presence of a friction ridge print on an item of evidence indicates that contact was made
between the source and the item of evidence. The presence of a friction ridge print alone does not
necessarily indicate the significance of the contact or the time frame during which the contact
occurred.
Due to the many factors involved in the deposition of a friction ridge print, neither the absence of
a friction ridge print on evidence nor the exclusion of a friction ridge print with a given source
necessarily precludes that source from having touched the evidence.
Verifications of the identifications were conducted by Fingerprint Analyst Robert Johnson,
knowing the outcome of the original examination, on October 18, 2011. There were no conflicts
of opinion.
On October 19, 2011, Fingerprint Analyst James Bishop conducted a blind verification of the
identification with JANE JONES. (In blind verifications, the verifying examiner is unaware of
the original examiner’s conclusion.) A conflict of opinion occurred during this blind verification
of the identification with JANE JONES. Initially, the verifier deemed the comparison
inconclusive due to poor quality exemplars. Upon consultation with the primary analyst, the
blind verifier realized that he had not received all available exemplars. After comparing the
additional exemplars, the verifier concurred with the identification decision.
Additional documentation, including bench notes, annotated images of the latent prints for both
the primary analyst and verifier, and communications indicating the case information received by
the analyst and the date on which that information was received are retained as part of the case
record and can be provided upon request. The BI Laboratory Division’s Quality Assurance
Manual and Standard Operating Procedures can be found online at www.BI.org.
For questions about the content of this report, please contact Fingerprint Analyst Susanne Brown
at (202) 123-4567.
The specimens are being returned under separate cover.

										Susanne Brown
										Fingerprint Analyst
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Appendix 5-C: Sample Report Summary with Qualified Conclusions
Bureau of Investigation						123 Main Street
Laboratory Division, Latent Print Section				
Washington, D.C. 20035
SAMPLE REPORT OF EXAMINATION
To:

BI Agent John Dunne						
Los Angeles Field Office

Date: October 20, 2011

Case Number: LA-123456
Case Title:
Bank of Los Angeles
		
123 California Blvd.
		Los Angeles, CA
		
Aug. 28, 2011
		Bank Robbery
Date specimens received: September 3, 2011
Fingerprint Analyst: Susanne Brown
The items listed below were examined in the Latent Print Section.
Description
Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
Pen with chain
Lift indicated as coming from customer
counter
Table 1: Items examined in Latent Print Section
Item #
1
2
3
4

Items of evidence submitted to the Latent Print Section for examination may be examined
visually, examined with various light sources, or processed with chemicals and powders to detect
the presence of latent friction ridge prints. The specific sequence of examinations and processes
depends upon the nature of the evidence.1 A complete list of the processes used in this
submission is maintained in the case record and can be furnished upon request.

1

See Bureau of Investigation, Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints, Revised 2001.
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Results of Examinations
Friction ridge print examinations are conducted using the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V) process. Analysis is the assessment of the quantity and quality of the
information present in the print to determine if sufficient reliable details are present to conduct a
comparison with another print. Comparison is the side-by-side observation of friction ridge
prints to determine the extent to which the information in two prints is in agreement. Evaluation
is the formulation of an opinion on the degree to which the information gathered during analysis
and comparison supports the hypothesis (S) of a common source for the exemplar and the latent
print or instead supports the hypothesis (D) that the exemplar and the latent come from different
individuals. An opinion of strong support for S does not necessarily eliminate the possibility
another person in the world could leave a print with areas of similar agreement. It means that
within the examiner’s experience and knowledge, prints from the same finger would be expected
to display this much similarity, whereas prints from different fingers would not be. Verification
is the independent application of the Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation phases of the ACE-V
process to a friction ridge print by another examiner.
Four latent fingerprints were detected on the items and compared to exemplar prints from
THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456, to provide evidence for or against the hypothesis that Thomas
Smith is the source of the latent fingerprints.
Item
#

Description

# of
prints

1
2
3
4

Results of comparison with
THOMAS SMITH, BI
#123456
Strong support for S
Strong support for D
N/A
Strong support for D

Demand note beginning, “I have a gun…”
2
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
1
Pen with chain
0
Lift indicated as coming from customer
1
counter
Table 2: Results of comparisons with THOMAS SMITH, BI #123456

The remaining unidentified latent fingerprints were searched in the BI automated fingerprint
identification system (AFIS) with the following results:
Item
#
2
4

Description
Bank of Los Angeles withdrawal form
Lift indicated as coming from customer
counter

Table 3: Results of AFIS searches

# of
prints
1
1

Results of AFIS search
No support for any candidate as
the source
Strong support for JANE
JONES, BI #987654 as the
source

The remaining unidentified latent fingerprint (on item #2) is very different from the exemplar
from JANE JONES, BI #987654 and provides strong support for the hypothesis that she is not its
source.
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The presence of a friction ridge print on an item of evidence indicates contact was made between
the source and the item of evidence. The presence of a friction ridge print alone does not
necessarily indicate the significance of the contact or the time frame during which the contact
occurred.
Due to the many factors involved in the deposition of a friction ridge print, neither the absence of
a friction ridge print on evidence nor the absence of a friction ridge print consistent with a given
source necessarily precludes that source from having touched the evidence.
Blind verifications of all results were conducted by Fingerprint Analyst Robert Johnson on
October 18, 2011. There were no conflicts of opinion.
Additional documentation, including bench notes, annotated images of the latent prints for both
the primary analyst and verifier, and communications indicating the case information received by
the analyst and the date on which that information was received are retained as part of the case
record and can be provided upon request. The BI Laboratory Division’s Quality Assurance
Manual and Standard Operating Procedures can be found online at www.BI.org.
For questions about the content of this report, please contact Fingerprint Analyst Susanne Brown
at (202) 123-4567.
The specimens are being returned under separate cover.

										Susanne Brown
										Fingerprint Analyst
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Chapter 6: Testimony
Introduction and Scope
Latent print examinations are conducted not merely to assist criminal investigators but also to
produce legally admissible evidence that can exonerate or implicate defendants. Fingerprint
evidence has been used in American courts since 1910.327 Other pattern and impression evidence
also has a venerable history.328 In recent years, however, forensic science testimony associating
marks or impressions with specific sources has come under intense scrutiny—first, in the
academic literature,329 then in the courtroom,330 and again in the 2009 National Research Council
(NRC) report.331
Testifying is a quintessentially human activity, and latent print testimony is the product of a
long series of actions in which human factors issues are prominent. Previous chapters focus on
the pretrial stages of the production of latent print evidence. They examine the role of human
perception and cognition in the production of this evidence and ways to maintain or improve
the quality of the resulting evidence. This chapter concentrates on the interactions of latent
print examiners with other participants in the criminal justice system at and shortly before trial.
Human limitations and dispositions are as important in this phase of latent print examination
work as they are in earlier phases. Developing and implementing procedures and practices that
encourage experts to communicate their findings accurately and fairly to lawyers, judges, and
juries and to detect and correct errors in this process is a crucial component of a system that
reduces the opportunities for errors in the production and presentation of courtroom fingerprint
evidence.332
This chapter therefore discusses pretrial communications between experts and lawyers and
makes recommendations about preparation for trial and the information that experts should
communicate to judges and juries. Although the discussion is confined to presenting the results
of examinations of friction skin impressions for the purpose of associating latents (anonymous,
Mnookin, J. “Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling.” Brooklyn Law Review, 67 (2001): 13.
Thomas, F. “Comments on the Discovery of Striation Matching and on early contributions to Forensic Firearms
Identification.” Journal of Forensic Science, 12 (1967): 1 – 7.
329
E.g., Faigman, D., D. Kaye, M. Saks, et al. Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert
Testimony. 1st ed. West Publishing Company, 1997.
330
For discussions of the cases, see McCormick, C. McCormick on Evidence. Edited by Kenneth Broun. 6th ed.
Thomson/West, 2006; Giannelli, P. and E. Imwinkelried. Scientific Evidence. 4th ed. Matthew Bender, 2007, Ch.
18A; Faigman, Kaye, Saks, et al., op. cit.
331
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. National Academies
Press, 2009, pp. 102–106.
332
The Working Group was asked to examine “the role of human factors and their contributions to errors in latent
print analysis.” Clearly, “analysis” does not end with the Analysis phase of the Analysis, Examination, Comparison,
and Verification (ACE-V) process. Nor, in the view of a substantial majority of the Working Group, does it end when
a laboratory examination is completed and a report is signed. “Errors in latent print analysis” as evidence in legal
proceedings can occur because of the manner in which this evidence is presented. Truncating the inquiry into the
work of latent print examiners at the production of a written report would produce an incomplete review of the full
process by which latent print evidence emerges from a crime scene and reaches the legal decision makers, at least in
cases that go to trial.
327
328
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unknown prints) with exemplars (identified, known prints) in criminal trials, and differences
between the civil and criminal rules of discovery are not considered, much of the discussion also
applies to civil cases involving private parties.
Sections 6.1 through 6.5 describe various aspects and functions of expert testimony as well
as some of the most pertinent legal doctrines. Section 6.6 discusses the admissibility and
desirability of different types of testimony about the possibility that an examiner’s finding
that the items are (or are not) associated with one another is incorrect. Section 6.7 describes a
spectrum of conceivable modes of conveying expert knowledge and findings about the possible
association between a friction skin impression and its source. Finally, section 6.8 discusses
quality assurance and quality control for testimony.
To situate testimony about identifications based upon the features of friction ridge skin within the
broader range of forensic identification testimony, the discussion is not confined to the Analysis,
Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V) process as currently practiced. As noted
in earlier chapters, categorical conclusions within ACE-V are not the only way to make and
communicate inferences from the comparison of latent prints and exemplars. In other areas of
forensic science that investigate the possible association between known and unknown samples,
witnesses present their findings differently, and one cannot simply assume that what is most
familiar in one field is the only way to convey expert knowledge in the courtroom. This chapter
therefore surveys a broad range of testimony that, at least in principle, might be provided at trial.
At one pole, an expert might merely inform the judge or jury of the similarities or dissimilarities
in the features of a pair of prints and not draw any inferences from these data. At the other pole,
when the similarity is extensive, the expert might attribute the latent print to a specific finger
(source attribution). In between these poles lie various other forms of qualitative or quantitative
testimony. The Working Group reached no consensus on which one of the various alternative
modes of presentation is best warranted by existing scientific research findings and other
empirical knowledge. Neither does the Group purport to describe which form of testimony best
satisfies the needs of the legal system. But for the reasons given in Chapter 3, the Working Group
agrees that if source attributions are made, they should not be “to the exclusion of all others in
the world” (Recommendation 3.7).
With respect to latent prints, two major concerns relevant to testimony are statements about
error rates and individualization. This chapter does not attempt to settle the arguments among
forensic scientists, psychologists, statisticians, legal scholars, and latent print examiners on
fingerprint individualization and the risks of erroneous identifications or exclusions.333 Instead,
it seeks to place fingerprint identification testimony in a broader context and to consider whether
more modest claims of association and statements about errors would meet the law’s purposes
without compromising the integrity of latent print examiners and without discarding important
information.

For some assessments, see Champod, C. “Fingerprint Examination: Towards More Transparency.” Law,
Probability & Risk, 7 (2008): 111; Mnookin, J. “The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a
Fingerprinting Moderate.” Law, Probability & Risk, 7 (2008): 127.
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6.1

Purpose, Form, and Preparation of Expert Testimony

Expert witnesses use or impart specialized knowledge and information generally unknown to
the jury or judge to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue … .”334 Expert testimony need not be delivered in the form of an opinion. Expert witnesses
also can act as teachers, educating fact finders about pertinent principles or findings in their
disciplines. For example, a latent print expert might explain why prints would not be found
on a particular surface without offering a personal opinion on the reason for their absence in a
particular case.
During a trial, counsel’s questioning frames the expert’s presentation. The expert may not simply
decide what information to discuss but must answer counsel’s questions. This can create some
tension between the goal of being complete and the need to be responsive. In resolving this
tension, “ethical considerations and professional standards properly place a number of constraints
on the expert’s behavior.”335 One such constraint is “a requirement of candor. While an expert is
ordinarily under no legal obligation to volunteer information, professional ethics may compel
this ... when the expert believes that withholding information will change dramatically the picture
that his … analyses, properly understood, convey.”336 Thus, the “guiding principles” proposed by
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/
LAB) advise forensic scientists to “attempt to qualify their responses while testifying when asked
a question with the requirement that a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer be given, if answering ‘yes’ or
‘no’ would be misleading to the judge or the jury.”337
Pretrial preparation with the attorney who will be calling the expert is essential to effective trial
presentation. Preparation includes educating the lawyer, who should understand the evidence
involved, appreciating the limitations of the discipline and the forensic findings, and recognizing
any exculpatory or qualifying information that must be disclosed. Lawyers should not present
the testimony of examiners without first conferring about the expert’s report and anticipated
testimony, including the use of visual aids.338
Recommendation 6.1: The trial preparation process should address the presentation of
technical information in lay terms, the organization of the direct examination, possible
cross-examination, and the possible use of visual aids.
Federal Rules of Evidence 702. In full, the rule states that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
For more extensive discussions of expert testimony, see, for example, Faigman, Kaye, Saks, et al., op. cit.; Giannelli
and Imwinkelried, op. cit.; Kaye, D., D. Bernstein, and J. Mnookin. The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence:
Expert Evidence. 2nd ed. Aspen Publishers, 2011; McCormick, op. cit.
335
Feinberg, S., ed. The Evolving Role of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in the Courts. Springer, 1989, p. 161.
336
Ibid.
337
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board. ASCLD/LAB Guiding
Principles of Professional Responsibility for Crime Laboratories and Forensic Scientists. Version 1.1. 2009,
Principle 19.
338
Using pictures of prints not involved in the case should not be necessary and may be objectionable under the rules
of relevance.
334
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6.2

Pretrial Discovery

There is no legal barrier to defense counsel contacting a prosecution expert to discuss the case.339
Of course, the mere fact that opposing counsel may contact an expert does not require the expert
to cooperate, and there may be concerns about breaching the protection given to an attorney’s
work product. However, openness may help ensure that opposing counsel understands the
discipline, the evidence, and the opinion. It also enhances credibility if the expert on the witness
stand discloses sharing information with opposing counsel.
Different considerations apply to a criminal defense expert. Unless and until a defense expert
is designated a testifying witness, this expert may be considered part of the defense team, and
defense counsel needs to protect confidential communications that come from clients.340 Once
designated as a witness, however, this expert should have the same status as a prosecution expert.

6.3

Ethical and Professional Obligations

An expert witness who is a member of a learned profession has obligations to his profession
as well as to his employer.341 More than 30 years ago, an NRC panel called on “professional
organizations to develop standards for expert witnesses in legal proceedings … .”342 More
recently, the NRC committee on forensic science proposed “a national code of ethics for all
forensic science disciplines” such that “those forensic scientists who commit serious ethical
violations” could be sanctioned “through a certification process for forensic scientists.”343 It
observed that
many forensic science organizations—such as the American Academy of
Forensic Sciences, the California Association of Criminalists, and ASCLD
[American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors]—have codes of ethics or
codes of professional practice imploring members to act with honesty, integrity,
and objectivity; to work within the bounds of their professional competence;
to present testimony and reports in a clear and objective manner; and to avoid
conflicts of interest and potential bias, among other things.344
To avoid incomplete or one-sided presentations, ample disclosure of reasoning, limitations, and
exculpatory material in pretrial reports, as discussed in section 6.1, is especially important, as is
a shared professional ethic that is strong enough to resist pressure from lawyers who sometimes
seek unduly oversimplified and exaggerated presentations of technical information. Thus,
forensic scientists have urged that

Gross, S. “Expert Evidence.” Wisconsin Law Review, 1113 (1991): 1151.
United States v. Tharpe, 38 M.J. 8, 28 (C.M.A. 1993).
341
Feinberg, op. cit., pp. 161-62; Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit., § 11.4(c); Lubet, S. “Expert Witnesses:
Ethics and Professionalism.” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 12 (1999): 465.
342
Feinberg, op. cit., p. 162.
343
NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 214.
344
Ibid.
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all crime laboratories, both public and private, should have a code of ethics/
conduct. These codes need to stress the best interests of society through
government service and justice, government responsibility for professionalism
and cost effectiveness, integrity (both professionally and regarding evidence),
objectivity, staying within the bounds or limits of what the science can provide,
maintaining confidentiality, complying to legal demands such as disclosure, and
being truthful.345
In view of the status of experts who represent a learned and skilled profession and the latitude
given to the form and bases of their testimony (see section 6.1), the Working Group recommends:
Recommendation 6.2: Forensic service providers should adopt codes of ethics that
require testifying in a nonpartisan manner; answering questions from both the
prosecution and the defense directly, accurately, and fully; and providing appropriate
scientific information before, during, and after trial.
This precept already is widely accepted in the forensic community. The Scientific Working
Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) has a short aspirational
code for friction ridge examiners that forbids knowing misrepresentations and specifies
that “testimony shall be rendered in an impartial manner to promote the understanding of
examinations and findings.”346 The guiding principles of ASCLD/LAB specifically state that
“wording should not be such that inferences may be drawn which are not valid, or that slant the
opinion to a particular direction.”347 As previously noted, to achieve impartial testimony, ASCLD/
LAB also advises forensic scientists to “attempt to qualify their responses while testifying when
asked a question with the requirement that a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer be given, if answering
‘yes’ or ‘no’ would be misleading to the judge or the jury.”348 The European Network of Forensic
Science Institutes expects analysts to “deal with questions truthfully, impartially and flexibly in
a language which is concise, unambiguous and admissible;” to “give explanations to specific
questions in a manner that facilitates understanding by nonscientists;” to “consider additional
information and alternative hypotheses that are presented to you;” to “consider and evaluate
these and express relevant opinions taking into account the limitations on opinions which cannot
be given without further examination and investigation;” and to “clearly differentiate between
fact and opinion and ensure that the opinions you express are within your area of expertise.”349
Notwithstanding the valuable role that professional organizations can play in defining and
enforcing ethical requirements, it must be noted that professional organizations can restrict

Budowle, B., M. Bottrell, S. Bunch, et al. “A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic
Sciences and Direction for Continuing Advancement.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 54 (July 2009): 803.
346
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. A Model Policy for Friction Ridge
Examiner Professional Conduct. Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and
Technology, December 2008.
347
ASCLD/LAB, op. cit., Principle 18.
348
Ibid., Principle 19.
349
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Standing Committee for Quality and Competence. Performance
Based Standards for Forensic Science Practitioners. European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Standing
Committee for Quality and Competence, July 2004.
345
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ethically acceptable testimony as well as ethically dubious conduct. As noted in Chapters 1
and 3, the International Association for Identification (IAI) passed a resolution in 1979 making
it professional misconduct for any latent print examiner to provide courtroom testimony
that labeled an identification “possible, probable, or likely,” rather than “certain.”350 Yet, the
insistence on subjective certainty could produce a threshold that is too high—one that excludes
testimony of an association that is less certain but still very useful to the trier of fact. Indeed,
this norm has prompted the criticism that “fingerprint examiners are now unique among
forensic analysts in that they are ethically bound to frame their conclusion in terms of absolute
certainty.”351
In 2010, IAI rescinded its 1979 resolution as “not consistent with advancements since [its]
passage.”352 The new resolution states “that Resolution 1979-7 and Resolution 1980-5 are hereby
rescinded” and approves of “a clear and unambiguous presentation” of “associations based on
… class characteristics (pattern type, ridge flow).” Whether the IAI will interpret this rescission
as allowing its members to testify to degrees of confidence short of subjective certainty remains
to be seen. Presumably, the “advancements” are “mathematically based models to assess the
associative value of the evidence [that] may provide a scientifically sound basis for supporting
the examiner’s opinion.”353 The resolution prevents an examiner from using a model that has
not “been accepted as valid by the IAI” and warns that the “use of mathematically based models
does not relieve the examiner of responsibility for their expert opinion.”354 Chapter 4 also
discusses the importance of validating models and the need for the government to be open with
data for validation studies.

6.4

Expressions of Certainty

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,355 the Supreme Court observed that “it
would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be ‘known’
to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.”356 Thus, courts do not normally
demand absolute certainty from scientists (or any other experts), but they do require more than
conjecture. They exclude expert opinions that are so weak or speculative that they would not be
helpful to a jury relative to the time they could consume and the misunderstandings they might
generate. This is a special application of the broad principle that the trial judge should exclude
even relevant evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
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unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”357
In the medical discipline, to signal that an opinion was sufficiently definitive to be helpful, the
practice of having physicians testify to diagnoses or other opinions in terms of “a reasonable
degree of medical certainty” developed in many jurisdictions.358 In time, this practice spread
to other professions and has led to scientists testifying “to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty.”359
Outside the courtroom, however, scientists do not communicate their findings in this fashion.
An astronomer who reports the discovery of an exoplanet does not characterize the finding as
satisfying some “reasonable degree of scientific certainty.” A chemist who deduces the identity
of a compound from its nuclear magnetic resonance spectrum has no table of degrees of
scientific certainty with which to label the deduction. Scientists might refer to personal degrees
of confidence in a finding or to the degree of controversy surrounding it, but there is no generally
accepted or working definition of a “reasonable degree of certainty” in scientific discourse.360
The dissonance between the legal phrase and the scientific practice creates an issue for latent
print examiners and forensic scientists of all types who are asked to use this phrase. When
meeting with the attorney before trial, an expert not only should inform the attorney of the
conclusion but also should specify the degree of confidence that can be expressed at trial. For
example, an expert might explain to the attorney, and later in court, that although the discipline
does not normally use the phrase “reasonable degree of scientific certainty,” he is very confident
in his conclusions based on his experience and the standards of the field. It is the lawyer’s
responsibility to advocate for the admission of such testimony. Although individual trial judges
could be skeptical of admitting testimony without the familiar accompanying words, it is clear
that no rule of evidence requires the use of a phrase such as “reasonable degree of scientific
certainty.”361 To the contrary, modern courts would not “expect dogmatic diagnoses from a
careful scientist.”362
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Furthermore, even if a scientist is comfortable with the phrase, problems can arise. Some courts
have rejected such testimony as an antidote to what they have deemed to be unjustifiably strong
claims of identity. For example, some courts have concluded that the scientific foundation
for absolute identification of toolmarks is insecure, but they still treat the matches discerned
by skilled examiners as highly probative. This line of authority rejects statements of unique
identification “as a matter of scientific certainty,”363 but permits it “within a reasonable degree of
certainty in the firearms examination field,”364 “to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty,”365 or
only as being “more likely than not.”366 Similar reasoning has been applied to exclude assertions
of scientific certainty for latent fingerprint identification testimony,367 although it remains to be
seen whether such restrictions will displace the widely accepted practice of allowing expressions
of absolute confidence in source attributions.

6.5

Reliability, Validity, General Acceptance, and Prejudice

The courts that have constrained expressions of certainty about holistic pattern matching have
done so to avoid outright exclusion of the evidence. Because scientific evidence might overly
impress a jury, it is held to higher standards for admissibility than most other expert testimony.368
These are the “general acceptance” and scientific “reliability” standards.369 The general
acceptance standard originated in the 1923 case of Frye v. United States.370 In Frye, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the exclusion of testimony from a
psychologist who used a blood-pressure cuff to determine that a defendant’s denial of a murder
to which he had previously confessed was not the result of conscious deception. The Court of
Appeals stated that
just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. … While courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.371
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Over the years, Frye became the dominant test for scientific expert testimony in the United
States.372 In the 1970s or so, however, an alternative standard that simply required scientific
evidence to be especially reliable emerged in a significant minority of jurisdictions.373
In 1993, the Supreme Court confirmed and accelerated this trend. In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,374 plaintiffs alleged that a drug was a teratogen, but the Court of
Appeals held that this theory lacked general acceptance because no published, peer-reviewed
epidemiological studies demonstrated a statistically significant association between the drug and
the type of birth defects experienced by the plaintiffs’ children. The Supreme Court held that,
although the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence were silent about whether they were perpetuating
or abandoning Frye, they implicitly repudiated general acceptance as the sole requirement for
scientific evidence. The Court wrote that while trial judges could continue to consider whether
existing research has produced general scientific acceptance, this factor is not necessarily
dispositive. Rather, the trial court should assess such additional factors as the extent to which the
theory had been tested, the content of peer-reviewed publications, the existence of controlling
standards in applying the technique, and the known error rate of the system.375 Only if this
wide-ranging inquiry revealed that the theory and its implementation were “reliable” would
the evidence satisfy Rule 702. Many state courts now apply the Daubert standard, but the Frye
standard remains intact in other states.
Finally, in 1999, the Supreme Court addressed a question left open in Daubert: whether
nonscientific expert evidence was to be assessed with the factors articulated for the testimony
of physicians, toxicologists, and epidemiologists at issue in Daubert itself. In Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael,376 the Court upheld the District Court’s exclusion of an engineer’s determination
that a tire blew out because of a manufacturing defect as resting on an inadequately validated
form of “visual and tactile inspection.” In doing so, it squarely rejected the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit’s view that “a Daubert analysis” applies only where an expert relies “on the
application of scientific principles,” rather than “on skill- or experience-based observation.”377
The Kumho Court held that the trial court had the discretion to evaluate technical or experiential
expert testimony in light of the factors listed in Daubert, but it added that “the test of reliability
is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to
all experts or in every case.”378 The Court explained that
Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’
obligation—applies not only to testimony based on “scientific” knowledge, but
also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge. See
Fed. Rule Evid. 702. We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more
of the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help
determine that testimony’s reliability. But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test
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374
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of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily
nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.379
Daubert inspired many attacks on identification procedures that police laboratories routinely
performed and that criminal courts universally accepted. If these procedures were held to the
standards required for the approval of new drugs, or for a consensus among epidemiologists
that a substance is a human carcinogen, it seemed that they might be tossed out of court. Latent
fingerprint identification, long considered the gold standard for forensic identification techniques,
was not immune from these challenges. In fact, in one noted case, a federal district judge—and a
former dean of the law schools at the University of Pennsylvania and Yale University—ruled that
because the ACE-V process failed to meet the Daubert test for scientific evidence, an examiner
could not testify to an individualization (but could fulfill the teaching function of an expert by
demonstrating to the jury the remarkable congruence in the images being compared); however,
the court promptly reconsidered and vacated the order, reasoning that fingerprint testimony was
as good as many other forms of skilled expert testimony.380 Judge Pollak wrote that
I am not persuaded that courts should defer admission of testimony with respect
to fingerprinting— ... ‘the bedrock forensic identifier of the 20th century’—until
academic investigators ... have made substantial headway on a ‘verification
and validation’ research agenda. Such research would be all to the good. But to
postpone present in-court utilization of this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending
such research would be to make the best the enemy of the good.381
In other words, the judge emphasized the “flexibility” of Kumho over the earlier search for more
extensive scientific validation.
More recently, as noted in section 6.4, a small number of courts have curtailed the certainty with
which a judgment of individualization of toolmarks may be expressed. They reason that enough
scientific research and experience has been accumulated to establish the value of holistic pattern
matching of toolmarks as a contribution of skilled witnesses, but these courts do not allow the
prosecution or the expert witness to portray an individualization as the product of a rigorous,
scientific technique.382
By insisting that holistic comparisons are rigorous scientific experiments, practitioners
have invited challenges based upon the most demanding legal standards. Many latent print
examiners are prone to emphasize that they follow the “scientific method.” A Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) publication, for example, maintains that “the ACE-V ... methodology, is a
series of steps found within the scientific method,”383 and SWGFAST defines ACE-V as “the
Ibid.
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acronym for a scientific method.”384 Naturally, some witnesses express this view in their
testimony. In State v. Foreman,385 a latent print examiner from Connecticut’s state forensic
laboratory with “extensive qualifications” testified that “our comparisons are conducted
through a scientific methodology known as ACE-V.”386 During cross-examination, he reiterated
that “based on our training, education, experience, based on fact and history of fingerprints,
fingerprints is a science. As I explained earlier, the comparison methodology using ACE-V
methodology is a scientific methodology.”387
As we have seen, however, when confronted with serious controversy over the scientific nature
of inferences from a technique or procedure that is portrayed or perceived as highly scientific,
the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate sufficient scientific studies to establish the
technique’s validity or its general acceptance (depending on the jurisdiction). When the process
is more intuitively accessible and is not heavily wrapped in the rhetoric of science, courts
dispense with a showing of scientific validation or general scientific acceptance.388 In particular,
courts impressed with the Daubert objections to toolmark and fingerprint identification have
emphasized the flexibility provided by Kumho to admit the evidence, at least where the expert
does not attest to scientific certainty.389 Testimony that the evaluation process is strictly scientific
or produces scientifically certain results thus undermines the theory that some courts have used
to overcome Rule 702 objections.
Proponents of expert testimony may need to be aware of two other issues. First, evidence must
be such that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.390 The
proponent must also assess whether a debate over how to label the expert’s approach—as a
“scientific” method—could divert the jury’s attention from the adequacy of the examiner’s
conclusions in the particular case. As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, ACE-V maps the steps of a
process, but it does not provide specific functional guidance on how to carry out that process nor
does it detail what the substantive content of those various steps should be. As a result, the legal
and scientific literature contains assertions that “merely following the steps of ACE-V does not
imply that one is proceeding in a scientific manner,”391 that the invocation of the scientific
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method is only an “analogy,”392 that “ACE-V is an acronym, not a methodology,”393 that it is
“a broadly stated framework”394 better described as “common sense,”395 and that “the ACE-V
protocol remains obscure”396 because it rests on “an ill-defined, flexible, and explicitly subjective
criterion.”397 Such statements are listed not to endorse them and not to decide the semantic or
philosophical question of whether ACE-V is scientific.398 Instead, these statements suggest that
objections based on the premise that it is prejudicial to describe ACE-V as “science” can be
avoided by referring to ACE-V as a systematic and widely used process for determining whether
two patterns have a common origin.
Second, advances in computer pattern matching for fingerprint identification can be expected
to come before the courts, and these surely will have to be evaluated under the Frye or Daubert
standard for pure scientific evidence. For example, as explained in Chapter 4, automated systems
can measure the distance (in an abstract mathematical space) between certain features in two
images. They can generate probabilities for such distances under the assumption that the image
of the unknown print comes from a finger known to have produced an exemplar and that it came
from a finger of a randomly selected individual represented in a reference set of exemplars from
many individuals. Such conditional probabilities (also known as “likelihoods”), if they rest on
adequate data and valid models, might be used in their own right or to reinforce (or contradict)
the judgments of a human examiner. Before this can happen in a jurisdiction that applies the
general acceptance standard, scientific studies validating the automated system must convince
the scientific community that it is reliable and accurate for this particular use. In jurisdictions that
follow Daubert, a court should assess factors such as the extent of peer-reviewed publications
and the known error rate of the system to assure itself that the theory and its implementation are
scientifically sound.

6.6

Errors and Error Rates

Chapter 2 describes the major types of errors in examining two impressions to determine whether
they came from the same source. It notes cases in which expert witnesses assured courts that
the ACE-V process, if followed faithfully, could not err, and it covers the resulting criticisms
from commentators, courts, and even within the latent print community. Assertions that false
identifications occur at a rate of less than one in a million comparisons have not fared well either.
Precise estimates of error rates, based on empirical research with a large number of cases in
which ground truth was established, were not available. Yet, virtually all courts accepted expert
testimony that fingerprint identifications and exclusions were absolutely certain to be correct.
In several other fields, where controlled experiments or field studies have been conducted, many
court opinions treat the observed error rates of scientific tests as a consideration affecting the
admissibility of these tests or the weight to be given to the results in a particular case. For
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example, a significant body of controlled experiments and field studies of the accuracy of
polygraphic lie detection has informed opinions on the admissibility of this type of evidence.399
A smaller set of laboratory experiments of visual spectrographic speaker identification also is
available.400
Until very recently, almost no experimental studies of the accuracy of the latent print
examination process existed.401 In 2011, the results of a major experiment, known as the NoblisFBI experiment, were published.402 Because of the size and careful design and execution of
the study, it is sure to play a role in litigation on the admissibility of latent print evidence. As
explained in Chapter 2 (Box 2.4), 169 latent print examiners each were presented with 100
pairs of latent and exemplar prints. In the more than 10,000 presentations deemed of value for
individualization, 97% of the examiners made no false identifications; the remaining 5 examiners
made a total of 6 false identifications, for a false positive rate of about 0.1%. The examiners
made 450 false exclusions for prints deemed of value for identification or exclusion, for a false
negative rate of about 7.5%.403 However, the examiners who volunteered for the experiment
were not a random sample of all examiners, and although the latent prints were chosen to be
representative of casework, the pairings as a group could have been more (or less) challenging
than typical casework. Thus, there is room for additional research on errors and for caution in
applying the measurements of error rates in this study to the performance of particular examiners
in specific cases.
Some observers have proposed using existing proficiency test results (or more rigorous, blind
tests) to produce estimates of or bounds on error rates for a particular examiner, for a given
laboratory, or for the field as a whole.404 As noted in Chapter 3, whether this procedure can
produce reasonably precise estimates of the probability of a false positive or negative in a
particular case is questionable. The issue is hardly new.405 Although the 2009 NRC report is silent
about the value of proficiency test results as an indication of case-specific error rates, two
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400
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previous NRC reports on DNA evidence discuss the topic. A 1992 committee favored the
production of proficiency test results as trial evidence.406 A 1996 committee did not go this far,
but it supported the disclosure of test results in reports.407 Building on these ideas, defendants
have argued that evidence of a DNA match should be inadmissible unless this information
accompanied it. The courts consistently rejected the argument.408
A defendant might seek to introduce statistics to show that examiners as a group do not have
perfect scores on proficiency tests or that the specific witness has made false positive or negative
findings in the past.409 In response to this defensive use of error rates, it has been argued that
the use of an average statistic is “not meaningful” because not all examiners are equal and that
“cumulative error over time is not a meaningful mechanism for assessing current error rate” in
that steps inevitably will be taken to correct errors.410
Both statements are problematic. First, the mean is generally a reasonable estimator of the scores
of the members of a group. If other information on individuals is available, adjustments can be
made to the mean for those individuals.411 If no other information is available, using the sample
mean is still more accurate than random guessing. Second, even if a process is improving over
time, using a recent average is likely to be more accurate than random guessing. Therefore, the
statistics cannot be dismissed as meaningless, but their utility remains debatable. As one group of
latent print examiners argue,
calculating human error rates is a complex undertaking, because unlike
instruments, human beings change, learn, and adapt, particularly when faced
with errors and the quality assurance systems designed to overcome these errors
and improve practices. As a result, the chance that human errors will be made or
repeated is constantly changing.412
No published appellate opinions seem to have considered the admissibility of error-rate statistics
under the principles of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404.413 In Williams v. State,414
Maryland’s highest court reversed a conviction because “the trial judge erred in restricting
Williams from fully cross examining [the DNA analyst] concerning the prevalence of testing
errors and contamination during PCR [polymerase chain reaction] testing at Cellmark.”415 The
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court specifically rejected “the State’s contention that ‘It does not matter if fifty percent of their
cases were contaminated. What matters is this one.’”416 Of course, whatever the result as to the
admissibility of errors in other cases, the trial judge has discretion to exclude past errors that are
not very probative. Indeed, exclusion would seem to be required if the past errors could not have
recurred as a result of corrective action.
Given the emphasis on error rates in post-Daubert opinions, an expert who testifies to an
individualization should understand that a false positive error could arise, in theory, for at
least two logically distinct reasons.417 One is the possibility that somewhere in the world,
another individual has a finger that could have produced a latent print with the same distinctive
features noted in the latent print in the case. The other is that the examiner erred in identifying
the distinctive features or gauging their distinctiveness. A witness can concede that these are
logical possibilities—that there are no absolute certainties—without altering an opinion that the
defendant is very likely to be the source of a high-quality latent print. Indeed, in presenting the
opinion, it might be wise to describe the steps taken to avoid observational and judgmental error.
Consequently, the Working Group recommends:
Recommendation 6.3: A testifying expert should be familiar with the literature related
to error rates. A testifying expert should be prepared to describe the steps taken in
the examination process to reduce the risk of observational and judgmental error.
The expert should not state that errors are inherently impossible or that a method
inherently has a zero error rate.
Recommendation 6.3 is not limited to individualization testimony. A witness who testifies to
the strength of the evidence without stating that the defendant is the only possible source of the
unknown print, as described below in section 6.7, can explain that the evidence is extremely
strong, in part because of the protections against erroneous ascertainment of the relevant features,
the verification by other examiners,418 and the fact that the images are available for verification
by still more experts. However, care must be taken in testifying or arguing that a defendant failed
to do an independent re-analysis. Suggesting that the defendant has an obligation to verify the
findings would be constitutionally objectionable. Nonetheless, if the defendant raises the issue,
the prosecution should be permitted to disclose the fact that other experts can confirm (or refute)
a reported match.419
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Ibid. See also State v. Proctor, 595 S.E.2d 480 (S. Car. 2004) (regarding proficiency test results as potential
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See Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit.
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So.3d 38, 40 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (collecting conflicting cases).
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Imwinkelried and Kaye, op. cit.; National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on DNA
Forensic Science: An Update. The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence. National Academies Press, 1996, pp.
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6.7

Terminology

The 2009 NRC report observes that
many terms are used by forensic examiners in reports and in court testimony to
describe findings, conclusions, and the degrees of association between evidentiary
material (e.g., hairs, fingerprints, fibers) and particular people or objects. Such
terms include but are not limited to “match,” “consistent with,” “identical,”
“similar in all respects tested,” and “cannot be excluded as the source of.”420
According to the committee, the fact that “the forensic science disciplines have not reached
agreement or consensus on the precise meaning of any of these terms” is a “critical” problem.
However, clarity would seem more important than uniformity. From the jurors’ standpoint, it is
not obvious why every testifying expert in every field must use the same phrase to describe a
given degree of association. When the expert defines words such as “match” or “identical” in the
course of the testimony, the choice of one particular synonym over another should not confuse
jurors. What is critical is that the degree of similarity be accurately ascertained and conveyed and
that the implications of the observed degree of similarity be described fairly and clearly.
Unfortunately, disagreement exists regarding what terminology is most appropriate and
warranted. Therefore, this section describes the traditional forms of testimony about an
examiner’s findings, along with several possible alternatives that are at least as well founded
in our current knowledge of the nature of latent prints and the cognitive capacities of human
examiners. The purpose of explicating such alternative formulations is not to insist on the use
of any single set of terms but to canvass the range of potentially admissible testimony about
the implications of the observed similarities and differences between an unknown print and an
exemplar.
6.7.1

Reporting an Exclusion, Match, or Inconclusive Result

All of the disciplines that strive to associate a trace with its source involve two logical steps:
(1) measuring the similarities and differences between two samples, and (2) assessing the
significance of the measurements.421 The measurements pertain to properties of the material or
mark (e.g., the refractive index of glass, the color of hair, the sizes of DNA fragments, or the
concentrations of elements). The significance of finding corresponding characteristics in a pair of
samples depends on how often the combination of those characteristics arises when the samples
come from the same source as opposed to when they originate from different sources.
A quantity that captures this idea is the likelihood ratio. As previously explained (Chapters 1
and 4), the likelihood ratio states how many times more probable the measurements are when
the hypothesis of a common source (s) is true than they are when the hypothesis of a disparate
sources (d) is true. When the likelihood ratio is exactly one—when the measured similarities in a
NAS, NRC, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, op. cit., p. 185.
Kaye, D. “Interpretation: A Legal Perspective.” In Wiley Encyclopedia of Forensic Sciences, edited by A.
Moenssens and A. Jamieson, vol. 3, pp. 1561–65. J. Wiley & Sons, 2009.
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pair of items is as probable for a common source as a disparate one—the analysis is of no value
in informing a decision between these two possibilities. The evidence is logically and legally
irrelevant.422 On the other hand, when the measurements are far more probable for a common
source than for different sources, they are strongly probative of identity (s).
Testimony from examiners who perform pattern matching for identification normally reflects
these two steps of measurement and inference. All the phrases quoted in the NRC report—
“match,” “consistent with,” “identical,” “similar in all respects tested,” and “cannot be excluded
as the source of”—merely express a finding that the measured features in the two samples
being compared show a degree of correspondence. Conversely, when the measurements
do not correspond, an examiner may testify to an “exclusion.” An exclusion means that the
measurements on the two items are so different that they would never (or almost never) arise
when the items have a common source, while the measurements could easily be this different
when the items come from different sources. Thus, when two fingerprints are so different that
they almost certainly could not have come from the same finger, an examiner, via the ultimately
subjective process of “evaluation” described in Chapter 3, may conclude that the finger that
produced the known print did not produce the questioned print. Finally, a forensic analyst may
decline to reach a conclusion about the origin of a trace, such as when an examiner decides
that a latent print is not even worth comparing (“not suitable”) or that a pair of impressions is
worth studying further but that they have too few clear similarities or dissimilarities to warrant a
reasonable judgment of inclusion or exclusion (“inconclusive”).
6.7.2

Describing the Significance of a Match: Global Individualization

The second aspect of pattern matching—describing the significance of the observed degree of
matching—has proven contentious in all fields of forensic identification.423 For this reason, it
is important to consider a spectrum of possible modes of presentation, ranging from the very
powerful assertion that every finger leaves marks that are distinguishable from those of every
other finger (when the marks are of sufficient quality and extent) to the very weak claim that
an observed degree of similarity is at least slightly more likely if the items being compared
originated from the same source than if they came from different sources.
The traditional form of testimony in the field of latent print identification is source attribution
based on the theory of universal individualization (Chapter 1). One survey of the field explains
that
in the friction ridge discipline, an individualization is often reported as, “One
latent fingerprint detected on a demand note has been identified as a fingerprint
of JOHN DOE.” Similarly, when testifying, an examiner often describes the
individualization conclusion with a statement such as, “The latent print on
Government’s Exhibit 10, a revolver, and the fingerprint recorded in the right
index finger block on the fingerprint card bearing the name ‘John Doe’ originated
from the same source.”424
McCormick, op. cit., § 185.
Giannelli and Imwinkelried, op. cit.; Faigman, Kaye, Saks, et al., op. cit.; Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit.
424
Peterson, Dreyfus, Gische, et al., op. cit. See also Cole, S. “Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking About
Expert Evidence as Expert Testimony.” Villanova Law Review, 52 (2007): 803.
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Some witnesses combine statements of individualization with expressions of absolute certainty,
as in United States v. Hugh,425 where “the government’s fingerprint expert … testified that he was
‘100 percent, without a doubt’ certain that ‘the latent print is that of Nolan Hugh.’”
Such testimony has the virtue of stating clearly and unequivocally the examiner’s opinion
of what the observed degree of similarity establishes: that the suspect’s finger is the source
of the latent print. Opinions of “universal individualization” like this one rest on a theory
of “universal general uniqueness.”426 In a Massachusetts case, for example, the expert
“stated that the prints had been ‘individualized’ to a Samantha Rivera, and defined the word
‘individualized’ as meaning ‘to the exclusion of all others.’”427 This is the classical understanding
of “individualization” in forensic science, although, as noted in Chapters 1 and 3, there has been
some movement toward using the term to mean any definitive identification of a single individual
as the source of a latent print.
Until published studies address the criticisms of universal individualization outlined in Chapter
1, challenges under Rule 702 to the admissibility of absolute statements of individualization
will continue. Except for a handful of unreported decisions,428 challenges to the admissibility
of individualization under the existing ACE-V process have failed,429 but the NRC report lends
new fuel to attacks on universal individualization testimony. In addition to characterizing
ACE-V as un-validated and of doubtful reliability,430 the report endorses the view that “in
order to pass scrutiny under Daubert, fingerprint experts should exhibit a greater degree of
epistemological humility. Claims of ‘absolute’ and ‘positive’ identification should be replaced by
more modest claims about the meaning and significance of a ‘match.’”431 To consider how this
could be accomplished, the next several sections consider some alternatives to the traditional
individualization testimony that was based on the theory of global general uniqueness.
6.7.3

Describing the Significance of a Match: Specific Individualization

In a particular case, same-source testimony might be justified even if the claim of universal
general uniqueness were rejected. Imagine a particular case in which only two individuals could
have left the latent print, and an exemplar for one of these two individuals (but not the other) is

United States v. Hugh, No. Crim.A. 03-829, 2009 WL 212420 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28 2009).
Kaye, D. “Identification, Individualization and Uniqueness: What’s the Difference?” Law, Probability & Risk, 8
(2009): 85.
427
Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 56 (Mass. 2010).
428
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Judicial Reasoning in Decisions to Exclude Forensic Identification Evidence on Grounds of Reliability.” Journal of
Forensic Sciences, 56 (2011): 913 – 917. The best known opinions come from a state trial judge in Maryland and
from federal trial judges in Pennsylvania and Utah. State v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007); United
States v. Llera Plaza, Crim. No. 98-362-10, 11, 12, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 344 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, 188
F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Zajac, No. 2:06-cr-00811 CW (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2010).
429
No reported appellate court opinion has limited testimony of individualization. See U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI’s Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the
Office of the Inspector General Report on the Fingerprint Misidentification in the Brandon Mayfield Case. U.S.
Department of Justice, 2011, p. 20, note 22 (listing federal circuit court opinions).
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available. Furthermore, there is an excellent match between the latent and the exemplar, and the
probability of this degree of matching in a finger from a randomly selected individual is a mere
one in one trillion. Then the chance that the other (untested) individual also matches is one in one
trillion. Now, if the potential suspect population were even slightly larger, say, three individuals,
then the chance of a match to either the second or the third untested individual also would be
larger—about two in one trillion. If the suspect population were larger still—say, one thousand
people—then the chance of a match to at least one of these one thousand people would be
roughly one thousand out of one trillion (i.e., one in one billion). In all these small populations,
the chance of a duplicate fingerprint is so small that one can be confident that no other match
would be found.
The FBI uses such reasoning to make source attributions for DNA evidence when the estimated
random-match probability for the specific DNA profile is very small relative to the suspect
population.432 Courts have upheld these source attributions despite defense arguments that
untested relatives might match or that the laboratory could have erred.433 The assertion is not that
every identifying DNA profile is unique in all populations, but only that the probability of finding
no other matching profiles in a smaller population (such as that of the United States) is close
to one. For a one-in-one-trillion probability of a random match to a particular DNA profile, for
example, the probability that no unrelated resident of the United States would match that profile
is approximately 1 – (3 × 108) × 10–12 = 0.997.
This reasoning differs from the theory of global individualization of fingerprints in two respects.
First, the DNA computation pertains only to the population of the United States and not to the
much larger population of the entire world. Second, the DNA computation does not purport
to show that every DNA profile in the smaller population is unique to an individual (and any
identical twin of that individual). Rather, the computation merely gives the probability that the
one profile that has been observed to match the suspect is duplicated in a population of unrelated
individuals. The latter difference is often analogized to the famous Birthday Paradox. You can be
pretty sure that if you are in a room with 22 other people, your birthday is unique to you. If every
birthday is equally frequent in the population and if leap years are ignored, the probability is [1 –
(1/365)]23 = 0.94. But it is more probable than not (p = 0.5073) that at least one pair of people in
the room has the same birthday. A specific birthday probably is unique in the room, but birthdates
are probably not a unique identifier, even in this small population.434
For single-source testimony to be admissible under the theory that the random-match probability
is so small that the duplication probability in a particular region is negligible, the expert would
need to have a reasonable estimate of the random-match probability, or at least an upper bound
on this quantity. Statistical models of fingerprint features date back to Galton, but the early
models suffer from reliance on untested assumptions of independence and the failure to take into
Budowle, B., R. Chakraborty, G. Carmody, et al. “Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA Profile.” Forensic
Science Communications, 2, no. 3 (2000); Kaye, D. and G. Sensabaugh. “Reference Guide on DNA Evidence.”
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. 3rd ed. National Academies Press, 2000.
433
United States v. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658 (D.Md. 2009); People v. Cua, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 391 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011); Young v. State, 879 A.2d 44 (Md. 2005).
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account the spatial relationships of features, distortion, and variability among examiners.435
Recent work is intended to address these limitations, and it is possible that a basis for opinions of
the individuality for some latent prints in various populations can be established.436
6.7.4

Describing the Significance of a Match: Random-Match Probabilities

Although specific-individualization testimony has been held admissible for DNA typing, the
usual testimony is that there is a high degree of similarity and a low probability of such similarity
when the defendant is not the source (but coincidentally possesses similar physical features).
When good estimates of the frequency of the feature set exist, a numerical probability statement
is admissible in court.437
The statistical models for DNA frequencies, being based upon theories of population genetics
and data from many samples, are not of much help with more complex patterns such as
fingerprints that result from different random processes. However, data-driven statistical analyses
of feature combinations could provide highly conservative estimates that should be admissible.
When such “improbability testimony” was presented in the past, however, it rested on an
inadequate scientific foundation. For example, in Commonwealth v. Drayton,438
a fingerprint expert, duly qualified, testified that fingerprints found on the wooden
box and prints taken from the defendant showed twelve “points of similarity,” and
stated his opinion that the fingerprints on the box were those of the defendant. On
redirect examination, the prosecutor asked the witness to give his opinion on the
statistical probability that prints with twelve points of similarity could be made by
two different people. The witness replied that “there is a figure of one out of 387
trillion.”439
On appeal from the resulting conviction, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that although the probability should have been excluded because it “lacked foundation and
exceeded the witness’s expertise,”440 the “brief, cumulative statement concerning statistics was
harmless.”441
Modern databases and computer technology are capable of providing more defensible probability
estimates. One prominent researcher noted that
See Pankanti, S., S. Prabhakar, and A. Jain. “On the Individuality of Fingerprints.” IEEE Transactions on Pattern
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 24, no. 8 (2002): 1010; Stoney, 2001, op. cit. Claims of global uniqueness
founded on older estimates of random-match probabilities are therefore suspect. Yet, such claims persist in
textbooks. E.g., Houck, M. and J. Siegel. Fundamentals of Forensic Science. 2nd ed. Academic Press, 2010, pp. 484
– 485.
436
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systematic research on the selectivity of fingerprint features [points] towards an
extreme selectivity of these features, even when partial and limited information
is considered. ... For example … even very limited configurations of fingerprint
minutiae can provide very powerful evidence with match probabilities in the
order of 1 in a billion, even without considering the statistical contribution of
level 1 features (general pattern, ridge counts, etc.) or other fingerprint features if
available.442
In the words of one forensic science textbook, “no standard model for random-match
probabilities has been adopted for forensic fingerprint casework, but that day is coming.”443
6.7.5

Describing the Significance of a Match: Strength of Evidence

In the types of testimony considered so far, the expert expresses a categorical opinion about
who is the source of a latent print or the probability of a match if an individual other than the
matching suspect is the source. A substantial body of literature urges forensic scientists to eschew
both of these approaches and to confine their testimony to statements about how probable the
evidence is when the defendant, as opposed to another (perhaps randomly selected) individual, is
the source—that is, to presenting likelihoods or likelihood ratios.444
In this likelihood approach, the forensic scientist or analyst never gives an opinion about the
prosecution’s claim that the defendant is the source. Rather, the expert describes in words or
numbers the chances of seeing the evidence in two situations: (1) when the defendant is the
source and (2) when someone else is. As noted earlier, the ratio of these quantities, the likelihood
ratio, measures the strength of the evidence in favor of identity. The NRC report implicitly
endorses this mode of reporting when it states that
although some disciplines have developed vocabulary and scales to be used in
reporting results, they have not become standard practice. This imprecision in
vocabulary stems in part from the paucity of research in forensic science and
the corresponding limitations in interpreting the results of forensic analyses.
Publications such as Evett et al., Aitken and Taroni, and Evett provide the
essential building blocks for the proper assessment and communication of
forensic findings.445
Evett and other forensic scientists propose the following table for “reporting the value of the
support of the evidence.”

Champod, op. cit., p. 113.
Houck and Siegel, op. cit., p. 485.
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Range of Likelihood Ratio
1 < LR ≤ 10
10 < LR ≤ 100
100 < LR ≤ 1000
1000 < LR ≤ 10000
10000 < LR

Strength of Evidence
Limited evidence to support
Moderate evidence to support
Moderately strong evidence to support
Strong evidence to support
Very strong evidence to support

Table 6.1: Strength of likelihood ratios in support of evidence446

Decades ago, a similar mapping, ranging from “not useful” (LR < 4) to “practically proved” (LR
≥ 499), became the norm in the parentage testing community.447
Modern proponents of likelihood-based presentations argue that “the fingerprint profession has
to recognize that conclusions of identification to the exclusion of all others are essentially outside
the realm of the expert witness. … Testimony should limit itself to expressing the contribution
of the findings in favor of one proposition (identity of sources) versus another (nonidentity
of sources).”448 In Europe, the Association of Forensic Science Providers has described how
practitioners can implement this approach to expert evaluations of evidence.449 Even when
precise values of the likelihood ratio for a type of evidence is not available, an expert can rely on
subjective probabilities in a table, such as the one above, to describe the weight of the evidence
without taking the further step of drawing a conclusion about what the evidence proves. In a
fingerprint case, an examiner using this framework might testify that the degree of similarity (a
“match”) is “very strong” evidence that the latent print originated from the defendant’s finger450
because, based on what is known in the field, it is far more probable that this degree of similarity
would occur when comparing the latent print with the defendant’s fingers than with someone
else’s fingers. This is certainly a more modest claim than an absolute source attribution based
on the theory of global general uniqueness. Furthermore, in the case of a competent and careful
comparison, it would be far less vulnerable to the charge of over-claiming. Judicial acceptance
of such testimony need not await the admission of likelihood ratios from the automated systems
described in Chapter 4.

Aitken and Taroni, op. cit.; Evett, I., G. Jackson, J. Lambert, et al. “The Impact of the Principles of Evidence
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Nevertheless, the strength-of-evidence approach is easier to use when more objective estimates
of likelihoods can be computed, and statistical models to estimate likelihood ratios for fingerprint
evidence have been developed. They have the potential to replace rigid, categorical opinions with
more finely graded, numerical expressions of the probative value of the evidence (see Chapter
4). Some experts favor directly presenting the numerical value of the likelihood ratio to the jury,
as is done in some DNA cases.451 Others have proposed comparing the likelihood ratio derived
from the latent and exemplar in the case at hand to simulated ratios for pairings of the latent print
with unrelated exemplars.452 The strength of the evidence then can be stated as the proportion
of known cases with a lower likelihood ratio than that for the case at hand. For instance, the
prosecution could point out that the likelihood ratio is higher than it is for 75% of cases in which
two prints came from the same finger; the defense could reply that the same ratio was lower than
it is for 25% of cases in which the prints came from the same finger.453
Of course, for numerical likelihood ratios to be admissible as evidence, the models must be
adequately validated and accepted in the scientific community, and the courts must be persuaded
that expressing the strength of evidence in the form of a likelihood ratio is not too confusing for
juries.454 The same concerns were raised with the presentation of likelihood ratios in DNA cases,
and this form of testimony has been admitted in that area.455
6.7.6

Describing the Significance of a Match: Posterior Probabilities

One argument for using the likelihood ratio to grade the strength of the evidence comes from a
basic formula of probability theory known as Bayes’s rule (see Chapter 1). The formula describes
the impact of an item of evidence on the odds that a proposition is true. It states that the odds
in favor of the proposition are its prior odds adjusted (multiplicatively) by the likelihood ratio:
posterior odds = likelihood ratio × prior odds. For example, if, before considering a fingerprint
match to a suspect, it is assumed that the odds that the suspect left the latent print are 1 to 300
million (roughly the size of the U.S. population), then, for a match with a likelihood ratio of 1
billion, the posterior odds that the suspect is the source is 109 × 1/(3 × 106) = 333:1.
See Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence, 2010, op. cit.
Gill, P., J. Curran, C. Neumann, et al. “Interpretation of Complex DNA Profiles Using Empirical Models and a
Method to Measure Their Robustness.” Forensic Science International, 2 (2008): 9.
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Computations of this type have been introduced into court, primarily in parentage testing cases
arbitrarily using prior odds of one-to-one. In other areas, courts in America and England have
been less accommodating.456 There are obvious problems in defining the prior probability
distribution. Assuming that everyone in the U.S. could have committed a particular crime, as in
the example above, is plainly unrealistic.
6.7.7

Describing the Significance of a Match: No Inference

When the distinguishing features of trace evidence are extremely rare, the evidence is highly
probative—a particular set of features is many times more probable when the unknown trace
sample and the known sample have a common source than when they do not. But for most
identification technologies, scientific research to quantify the rarity of the set of identifying
features is not feasible or available. Examples include hair morphology, compositional analysis
of bullet lead, handwriting, and toolmarks. Analysis of these characteristics is surely informative,
but it is difficult to provide a sharp estimate of probative value because of the absence of a
typology of features that lends itself to estimates of population frequencies and the inability to
compute a likelihood ratio from public data. In this situation, analysts in some fields do not even
venture an opinion about the significance of the similarities they detect. Thus, in microscopic
hair comparisons, unadorned “consistent with” testimony is the norm. In State v. McGrew,457 for
example, the hair examiner testified as follows:
Court: In regard to the examination. It is simply a physical, visual examination of
the hair.
Analyst: Yes sir.
Court: You simply say that one hair looks like another one or it doesn’t look like
another one.
Analyst: I say it’s sufficiently similar to have come from that person or it is
dissimilar.
Court: And if you say that it ... [is] similar to come from that person ... that
doesn’t mean that it comes from that person.
Analyst: It just simply means that it could have come from that person.
Court: And you do not know the statistical percentages of how many people
would have similar hair?
Analyst: There are no statistics. It’s hard to say.458
Similar testimony appears in some cases involving tests for the concentration of elements in
bullet fragments and bullets found in a defendant’s possession.459
Some courts have followed this no-inference approach in cases involving the comparisons of
documents and toolmarks.460 In United States v. McVeigh461 and United States v. Nichols,462 the
The case law is analyzed in Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit., § 12.8.5.
State v. McGrew, 682 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. 1997).
458
Ibid., p. 1291.
459
Cases are cited in National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Scientific
Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition Comparison. Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence.
National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 91 – 94.
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government sought to show that a padlock at a quarry from which explosives were stolen
had been opened by drilling with a drill bit found in Nichols’s home. In the former case, an
FBI toolmark examiner testified that “this drill bit produced marks that were contained in the
padlock.” In the latter case, when the same witness testified that he had attempted to “determine
whether or not that drill bit made the impressions contained on that lock cylinder,” the district
court struck the testimony “because what is permitted here is to show [only] what he saw through
the microscope and the comparison microscope and then with his experience and training the
similarities that he pointed out.” Thus, the toolmark examiner was allowed to testify to the
marks, but no more than that. Similarly, a few courts confined testimony to comparing features in
handwriting cases and, for a brief moment, in a fingerprint case.463
A slight enhancement to pure “consistent with” testimony is a statement that “the probability of
a match is greater if the bullets came from the same CIVL [compositionally indistinguishable
volume of lead] than if they came from different CIVLs, and the odds that the bullets came from
the same CIVL are greater with the matching evidence than without it.”464 In other words, the
expert can report that the likelihood ratio is greater than one, but not how much greater.
Although the forensic examiners’ experience suggests that the failure to exclude a suspect
based upon the evidence is relevant, the jury has no experience of its own with which to judge
how probative the findings are. Hair and toolmarks, for example, do differ from one instance to
another,465 but it is difficult for the jury to know what to make of testimony that the defendant (or
the material in the defendant’s possession) is consistent with the evidence collected at the crime
scene.466 Nonetheless, compared to complete exclusion of the match, this truncated presentation
makes sense when it is known that the similar characteristics show substantial variation in the
population and when an untutored jury is not likely to overestimate the variability.467 Thus, one
court recently limited a latent print examiner to explaining the basis for a conclusion that “the
latent fingerprint … is consistent with the known print” by describing “the specific characteristics
and markers in the prints” and adding that “based on his experience, certain markers are more
common or less common.”468
The details of fingerprints are extremely variable,469 but those who question the premises of
universal individualization would still object that even with no-inference testimony, the jury will
overvalue the finding of a match. At the other pole, those who believe that a latent print can
Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit.
No. 96-CR-68 (D. Colo. May 5, 1997) (transcript).
462
No. 96-CR-68 (D. Colo. Nov. 10, 1997) (transcript).
463
See, e.g., Mnookin, J. “The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science.” Brooklyn Law Review, 75, no.
4 (2010): 1209.
464
NAS, NRC, Committee on Scientific Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition Comparison, op. cit., p.
97.
465
Vanderkolk, J. Forensic Comparative Science: Qualitative Quantitative Source Determination of Unique
Impressions, Images, and Objects. Academic Press, 2009.
466
Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, op. cit.
467
Kaye, D. “The NRC Bullet-Lead Report: Should Science Committees Make Legal Findings?” Jurimetrics
Journal of Law, Science, and Technology, 46 (2005): 91.
468
United States v. Zajac, No. 2:06-cr-00811 CW (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2010).
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E.g., Stoney, 2001, op. cit., p. 327.
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match only a single individual in the history of life on Earth would object that the absence of
testimony to that effect deprives the jury of useful information.
In sum, the existing practice of latent print experts is to provide a firm opinion regarding whether
a named individual is the source of a questioned print (either a universal individualization or
an exclusion) or to give no opinion (by stating that the unknown impression is insufficient for
a definitive comparison or that the comparison is inconclusive). But other ways to describe the
possible association include statements about the strength of the evidence (the likelihoods) or
the posterior probability. With appropriate data and validated modeling, such statements could
be quantitative (see Chapter 4), but less precise qualitative descriptions of the strength of the
evidence or the source probability also are possible. If expert knowledge permits opinions that
a latent print came from a single individual and could not have come from anyone else in the
world then, a fortiori, it supports opinions such as the following: it is unlikely that the print
came from anyone else in a particular locale, it is much more likely to observe such similar
prints from the same source than from different people, and the similarities in the prints support
the prosecution’s hypothesis that the defendant is the source of the questioned print much more
than they support the defendant’s hypothesis that they originated from different fingers.470 Given
the current state of scientific and professional knowledge, however, it is best to avoid testimony
based on the theory of global general uniqueness. Recommendation 3.7, that examiners not
testify to an identification to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, requires other,
more conservative methods for conveying the probative value of a match. For that reason, this
chapter identifies a broad spectrum of alternatives. The Working Group did not reach a consensus
on which of these alternatives to universal-individualization testimony is best.

6.8

Internal Review of Reports and Testimony

Chapters 4 and 5 emphasize the role of forensic scientists and examiners in communicating their
findings to a variety of audiences, including criminal investigators, lawyers, and judges and
juries. The recommendations include practices to facilitate the accurate and fair transmission of
forensic investigations to these groups. The final recommendation is that a system be instituted
to monitor the reports and testimony of practitioners. Performance reviews can ensure that the
latent print unit’s policies for reporting and testifying are followed and can provide feedback to
sustain and improve performance of these tasks.

Even the current terminology of identification, exclusion, or inconclusive to describe the outcome of the
Evaluation phase of ACE-V could be redefined using the concept of relative likelihood. For example, the definition
of these terms in the first two sample reports in the Appendix to Chapter 5 could be rephrased as follows:
Evaluation is the formulation of a conclusion based upon the information gathered during analysis and
comparison. The evaluation can result in three outcomes: (1) an exclusion is an opinion that the level of
disagreement in comparable areas is far more likely to be observed if the two prints did not originate from
the same source than if they came from the same finger; (2) an identification is an opinion that the level of
agreement in comparable areas is far more likely if the two prints originated from the same finger than if they
came from different sources; or (3) an inconclusive result occurs when the information in comparable areas is
inadequate for an identification or an exclusion.
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Recommendation 6.4: An agency that employs latent print examiners should establish
requirements and guidelines for reporting, documentation, and testimony. The agency
should review a sample of every examiner’s case reports, documentation, and testimony
and affidavits at least annually to verify compliance with these requirements and
guidelines.
SWGFAST and the FBI give similar advice, but their recommendations allow a survey form and
statements from court officials to substitute for direct observation of live, recorded, or transcribed
testimony.471 Presumably “court officials” means judges or lawyers, but review by laboratory
managers and accrediting bodies as part of periodic inspections or in response to complaints
from lawyers or their clients would be more appropriate to identify adherence to professional
canons and organizational policies.

6.9

Summary

This chapter describes the nature and role of expert testimony, pretrial communications between
experts and lawyers, and the legal and ethical principles applicable to expert testimony. It
considers the admissibility of different types of testimony about the possibility of erroneous
identifications or exclusions. It also presents a spectrum of conceivable modes of conveying
expert knowledge and findings about the possible association between a friction skin impression
and its source. These range from a bare description of the relevant similarities, to statements
about the strength of evidence (likelihoods), to outright conclusions about the source (source
attributions or probabilities). Finally, the chapter discusses quality assurance and control for
testimony.

Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Quality Assurance Guidelines for
Latent Print Examiners. Guideline 5.5.1, Version 3.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study
and Technology, September 2006; Peterson, Dreyfus, Gische, et al., op. cit.
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Chapter 7: A Systems Approach to the Work Environment
Introduction and Scope
The environment in which latent print examiners work encompasses physiological and cognitive
factors; management and leadership culture, communications, and collaboration opportunities;
and the physical workspace. Well-designed work environments can improve productivity,
increase user satisfaction, and reduce the risk of errors and injuries. Conversely, poorly designed
environments contribute to poor performance. When an error occurs, most people tend to
blame other humans rather than to consider the design, environmental working conditions, or
management culture of the total system.472 Yet errors are often the consequence of an entire
system.473
A study of human factors examines human operators’ physical and psychological needs,
capabilities, and limitations in both normal and emergency operations. A thorough analysis of
workstations, job demands, mental workload, organizational characteristics, training needs, and
supervisory systems is necessary to facilitate and enhance performance. Large-scale disasters,
such as the accidents at the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear power plants, the Bhopal
pesticide plant, and the Challenger space shuttle dramatically highlight the need for such
analyses.474
Figure 7.1 sketches an example of a human factors framework that, if not properly understood,
can lead to adverse events. This chapter addresses issues displayed in Tiers 1–3 of the figure
and analyzes the latent print examiners’ work environments to identify factors that could affect
their performance. It enumerates the factors that contribute to an effective latent print analysis
work environment, and it describes the anatomical, physiological, and psychological aspects of
latent print examiners in their environment. It also suggests ways for managers to reduce injuries
and errors; to increase productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness; and to improve the comfort of
latent print examiners.

Luthar, S., D. Cicchetti, B. Becker. “Research on Resilience: Response to Commentaries.” Child Development,
71, no. 3 (2003): 573.
473
Hopp, P., C. Smith, B. Clegg, et al. “Interruption Management: The Use of Attention-Directing Tactile Cues.”
Human Factors, 47 (2005): 1; National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality of
Health Care in America. To Err Is Human: Building A Safer Health System. National Academies Press, 1999;
Chignell, M. and J. Waterworth. Multimedia, Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics. 2nd ed. John Wiley &
Sons, 1997; Bagot, G. “Ergonomics in the Laboratory Environment.” Nursing Management, 25 1994): 50; Henning,
R., P. Jacques, G. Kissel, et al. “Frequent Short Rest Breaks From Computer Work: Effects on Productivity and
Well-Being at Two Field Sites.” Ergonomics, 40 (January 1997): 78; Ezzelle, J., I. Rodriguez-Chavez, J. Darden, et
al. “Guidelines on Good Clinical Laboratory Practice: Bridging Operations Between Research and Clinical Research
Laboratories.” Journal of Pharmaceutical and Biomedical Analysis, 46 (January 2008): 18; Grogan, E., R. Stiles,
D. France, et al. “The Impact of Aviation-Based Teamwork Training on the Attitudes of Health-Care Professionals.”
Journal of the American College of Surgeons, 199 (December 2004): 843.
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Shrivastava, P., I. Mitroff, D. Miller, et al. “Understanding Industrial Crises.” Journal of Management Studies, 25,
no. 4 (1988): 285.
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Figure 7.1: A human factors framework475

Image adapted from Henriksen, K., E. Dayton, M. Keyes, et al. “Understanding Adverse Events: A Human
Factors Framework.” In Patient Safety and Quality: An Evidence-Based Handbook for Nurses edited by Ronda G.
Hughes. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2008.
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7.1

Human Factors and the Work Environment

The study of human factors focuses on
the interaction between human and
products, decisions, procedures,
workspaces, and the overall environment
encountered at work and in daily
living.477 As the Institute of Medicine
explains, most factors that give rise to
preventable adverse events are
systemic.478 These events are not just the
result of isolated or idiosyncratic
behavior.
Often, people are required to work in
poorly designed environments that have
not had human strengths and limitations
incorporated into the design process. A
work environment can be disruptive,
stressful, and unsafe, leading to
unnecessary fatigue. It is well understood
in various industries, including
“high-risk industries” such as the
medical profession, that a physical work
environment purposefully designed for
the nature of the work to be performed
will result in improved efficiency and
productivity.479 Proper design of the
physical workspace, standardization of
facility systems and equipment,
ventilation systems for pathogen control,
appropriate and adjustable lighting, and
noise reduction are necessary for
lowering stress and improving
performance.

Box 7.1: Three Mile Island Accident
The Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident is the
most investigated accident in the history of the commercial
nuclear industry. Because human factors considerations
were not included in the design of the control room,
operators experienced problems locating or accessing the
tools and information they needed.
•

•
•
•

•
•

System controls were not located near the
instruments that displayed the condition of the
system. For example, operators could not view
the indicator display for the high-pressure system
while operating the throttle valve to adjust
pressure.
Some instruments looked very similar and were
located near one another but controlled different
functions.
Other instruments were difficult to read due to
glare from poor lighting or obstruction by other
controls.
Throughout the control room, there was no
consistent meaning of indicators (such as lights
and alarms) or function of instruments (such as
levers and knobs) between controls.
At the time of the accident, operators in the control
room heard 3 alarms and saw more than 1,600
blinking lights.
Operators had not received adequate stress training
to enable them to cope with such a large-scale,
multiple systems failure.476

These design problems illustrate the range of situations
and conditions that the human factors approach should
consider.

Meshkati, N. “Human Factors in Large-Scale Technological Systems’ Accidents: Three-Mile Island, Bhopal,
Chernobyl.” Organization & Environment, 5, no. 2 (June 1991): 133–54.
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Sanders, J. and E. McCormick. Human Factors Engineering and Design. McGraw-Hill
Science/Engineering/Math, 1993.
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NAS, Institute of Medicine, op. cit.
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Ulrich, R., X. Quan, C. Zimring, et al. “The Role of the Physical Environment in the Hospital of the 21st
Century: A Once-In-A-Lifetime Opportunity.” In Designing the 21st Century Hospital Project, The Center for
Health Design. May 2005. See also Chapanis, A., W. Garner, and C. Morgan. Applied Experimental Psychology:
Human Factors Engineering Design. Wiley, 1985 (“It is in the system design of the work environment as a whole
where efficiencies and productivity will be realized.”).
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Sound workplace design begins with a thorough understanding of user requirements. Since
the early 1970s, architects have used methods, similar to function and task analysis techniques
developed by human factors practitioners, that inventory all of the activities that will be
performed in an environment to ensure that the appropriate requirements are defined and
implemented. 480
The International Organization of Standardization’s standard on ergonomic requirements (ISO
9241) defines usability as “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified context of
use.” 481
In its narrowest sense, usability involves the evaluation of a system; in its broadest sense,
usability involves users throughout the system lifecycle (i.e., through the requirements definition,
design, development, and evaluation phases).482 The most successful designs involve users
iteratively starting with the early stages of design to develop and refine the designs.483 This
usercentered design process involves:
•
•
•
•
•

Early focus on users, their tasks, and their environments;
Active involvement of users;
Appropriate allocation of function between user and system;
Incorporation of user-derived feedback into the design; and
Iterative design, where a prototype is designed, tested, and modified.484

By contributing to the design of a usable work environment, latent print examiners can enhance
ease of use, improve user performance and satisfaction, and reduce system complexity and
support and training costs. The goal of designing a work environment following usability
principles is to improve performance, to increase accuracy, to decrease time to prepare latent
prints for search, to decrease support and training costs, and to increase user acceptance.
Appendix A provides additional information on user-centered design.
Recommendation 7.1: A structured approach that involves users throughout the entire
design and implementation process should be followed when designing technology
systems and the physical work environment. In addition, forensic service providers
should perform usability testing to optimize user performance and user satisfaction
before deployment.

Zimring, C., M. Rashid, and K. Kampschroer. “Facility Performance Evaluation (FPE).” Whole Building Design
Guide. National Institute of Building Sciences. 2010.
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International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomic Requirements for Office Work with Visual Display
Terminals (VDTs)—Part 11: Guidance on Usability, ISO 9241-11:1998. International Organization for
Standardization, 1998.
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U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology. Usability & Biometrics:
Ensuring Successful Biometric Systems. National Institute of Standards and Technology, June 11, 2008.
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Nielsen, J. Usability Engineering. Morgan Kaufmann, 1993.
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7.2

A Human Factors Approach to Latent Print Practices

A truly usable work environment considers the needs of the latent print examiners throughout
the design, development, and evaluation process. This process requires environmental designers
to define the context of use (including the users’ individual characteristics), to define the user’s
and the organization’s requirements for the space, to develop a design solution to meet those
requirements, and to conduct user evaluations to ensure that the environment is meeting all
requirements as efficiently as possible.485
7.2.1

Methodology

A human factors approach focuses on users’ needs and expectations and integrates direct user
feedback throughout the design process. To achieve this goal, human factors experts may observe
or interview users to better understand their needs, work processes, and the methodologies they
apply in completing their work.
To better understand latent print examiners’ methodologies and processes as well as their
environments, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Visualization and
Usability Group interviewed a total of 16 latent print examiners from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Secret Service,
and the New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services. Following these initial
interviews, the team spent 2 days observing latent examiner teams at the Maryland State Forensic
Laboratory, FBI, and United States Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) while
they performed their usual work tasks in their usual work environments.
After approximately 21 hours of interviews and 32 hours of observation sessions, the team
discovered that each organization uses a well-defined process to decide who performs which
task, how they complete each task, and how they transition between tasks. The agencies
also require specific documentation for each task and utilize procedures for transitioning the
documentation through the steps. Each organization and its examiners are very comfortable with
their processes and, to some extent, proud of them. These processes are tailored or unique to each
organization.
The physical layout of each facility is very different and seems to depend on the size of the
organization. Of the surveyed organizations, many have a separate workspace for the chemical
processing of the evidence. Most examiners have a small desk, and in the larger organizations,
the examiners’ desks are in small cubicles. Most of the desks are covered with stacks of paper,
including photos and printouts. Printing and scanning are consistently important activities, and
many desks include printers and scanners. The impression from all of the interviews is that the
organizations are “paper bound.” Structured forms seem to be essential to all organizations.
Some organizations use “shops” or task-specific stations. For example, examiners use one
workstation exclusively for case management, another for accessing the state automated
International Organization for Standardization. Human-Centered Design Process for Interactive Systems, ISO
13407:1999. Withdrawn, 1999. Revised by International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomics of HumanSystem Interaction—Part 210: Human-Centered Design for Interactive Systems, ISO 9241-210:2010. International
Organization for Standardization, 2010.
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fingerprint identification system (AFIS) database, another for accessing the local AFIS database,
and another for linking to the FBI’s Integrated AFIS database. The examiner moves the physical
evidence and associated documentation from station to station when working through the steps
of the process.
In short, there is no one specific or even general solution to the design and specification of
the laboratory environment. Design specifications must be tailored to individual departments.
However, although each organization has a somewhat different process for examining latent
prints, the NIST usability team recognized general similarities.
Common Features of the Manual Examination Process
Examiners use a manual process when the latent prints are not of AFIS quality or when there is
a known suspect and it is necessary to eliminate victim prints. The manual examination process
generally includes the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Prepare package (includes lift cards and latent photos);
Confirm package contents;
Assign card numbers to lift cards and latent photos;
Determine suitability of prints;
Mark latent print with symbols to document possible anatomical regions and print
orientation;
Pull exemplar prints for comparison;
Begin comparison process on suitable prints;
Document results of the comparison; and
Conduct verification and technical review.

Common Features of the AFIS Process
When using AFIS, the examiners at the agencies studied generally perform the following steps:
1. Select a latent print to search;
2. Scan the print into the system or obtain a digital print;
3. Process the digital image in external image processing software;
4. Enter case data;
5. Encode unique ridge characteristics;
6. Set search criteria;
7. Launch AFIS search;
8. Examine the resulting candidate images;
9. Conduct verification and technical review; and
10. Document additional case data.
7.2.2

Work Environment Usability Goals

Environment designers, including software developers, should apply the user-centered design
process to identify the requirements of the organization. Then, they should translate usability
goals into measurable objectives for the latent print examiner environment. Environment
designers can use these metrics to assess an environment’s usability. Examples of commonly
used usability criteria include:
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•
•
•
•
•

Success rate (effectiveness): Can users successfully work in the environment?
Time on task (efficiency): Can users perform their tasks quickly in the environment?
Time to learn a task (learnability): How long does it take a user to learn a product or the
system?
Memorability: Can users remember how to use the system, and does it aid the user in
reducing the potential for error?
Satisfaction: Are users comfortable in the environment?486

The tables and additional information in Appendix A provide a short description of each of these
usability goals and include some questions for environment designers to consider.
7.2.3

Design Approach for Latent Print Examination Environment

A user-centered design process involves users throughout the product lifecycle. When used for
latent print examiners, the approach includes:
•
•
•
•
•

Identifying the types of users who will be using the workspaces (e.g., latent print
examiners, forensic specialists, lab managers);
Defining the context of use, including the operational environment (physical
environment), user characteristics (anthropometrics), tasks, and social environment;
Determining the user and organizational requirements, including business requirements,
visual requirements, environmental requirements, and technical requirements;
Developing the design solution, including the physical space (e.g., lighting, air quality,
workspace, and noise), system design, and user interface; and
Conducting an evaluation, including usability testing of the visual and environmental
requirements of latent print examination tasks.487

The design process reflects the fact that all aspects of the workflow and environment are
interrelated. An examination of a forensic service provider’s process map and an independent
detailed analysis of how work is actually performed can reveal procedures that can lead to error.
Consideration should be given to the nature and demands of the work, the tools and technologies
used, the physical environment, and the organizational conditions, such as the level of
communication and collaboration among the individuals who perform the work or use the end
product. These elements are interdependent; a change in one work element has implications for
the other elements.

7.3

Observations of Impact Factors

Latent print comparisons require concentration. The environment in which an examiner works
influences his or her ability to maintain the necessary level of attentiveness. It is not enough to
consider only how the examiner will fit and function in the space from a physical perspective.

486
487
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Attention to the impact that the physical workspace may have on cognitive processes, including
attentiveness, awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment, is critical.
The following factors, which are discussed below, could influence the latent print examiner’s
work: occupational health and safety; medical surveillance; workstation configurations; software
applications and systems; screen interfaces; the placement, type, and format of instructions,
assistance, and help documentation; air quality, including temperature and humidity; lighting;
noise; interruptions or distractions; location of the workstation; and stress.
7.3.1

Occupational Health and Safety Issues

Occupational health and safety within the forensic laboratory system is mandatory. However,
workplace safety is not always a conscious or primary concern of latent print examiners. They
are generally busy with casework, trial preparation, proficiency testing, and other concerns.
The latent print examiner has the potential to come in contact with most types of physical
evidence submitted to the forensic service provider. Hazards may originate from the item of
evidence through sharp edges, chemical and biological contamination, or other hazards; the
evidence may also include firearms, ammunition, or explosives. Of special concern are items
contaminated or stained with human bodily fluids, which may contain blood-borne pathogens.
Additionally, latent print processing may employ hazardous chemicals, particulates, and intense
light sources. Chemical exposure is a serious concern. During the processing of latent prints,
examiners could be exposed to fumes, dust, and toxic or caustic chemicals. Additionally,
postanalysis protection of certain latent examinations on physical evidence must be employed to
eliminate the chance of contamination to persons in the evidence chain of possession. This
typically is accomplished by storing the evidence in a container that prevents trace reagent
exposure.
An accident can have an effect on an examiner’s efficiency and performance quality. For
example, a malfunctioning fume hood could expose the examiner to vapors that impair
performance. Likewise, an employee who slips and falls in the work area could sprain a muscle
or fracture a bone, requiring medical attention and possibly resulting in long-term pain or limited
range of motion or dexterity. An injured examiner may have to compensate during the
examination procedure, and this could affect the results.
Many standards are relevant here, including Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) Standards, 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910, 1960, 1904; OSHA’s
bloodborne pathogens standard (29 CFR 1910.1030); and OSHA’s requirements for personal
protective equipment (29 CFR, 1910 Subpart I). Guidelines for safety committees are found in
29 CFR 1960. Airborne contaminant limits are described in 29 CFR 1910.1000.
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7.3.2

Medical Surveillance

Vision testing is important for latent print examiners. Studies indicate that age, environment,
and task-specific activity can cause vision to deteriorate.488 It is not clear which tests are the
most appropriate for evaluating vision challenges for latent print analysis.489 Table 7.1 indicates
the American Optometric Association’s recommended frequency for eye examinations for adult
patients. Individuals at risk “include those with diabetes, hypertension, or a family history of
ocular disease (e.g., glaucoma, macular degeneration) … ; those working in occupations that are
highly demanding visually or eye hazardous; those taking prescription or nonprescription drugs
with ocular side effects; those wearing contact lenses; and those with other health concerns or
conditions.”490

Patient Age
18 to 40 years
41 to 60 years
61 years and older

Examination Interval
Asymptomatic (Risk Free)
At Risk
Every 2 years
Every 1 to 2 years or as recommended
Every 2 years
Every 1 to 2 years or as recommended
Every 1 year
Every 1 year or as recommended

Table 7.1: Recommended eye examination frequency for adult patients491

Various tests are available to examine visual performance. For example, the Snellen chart is often
used to measure visual acuity. Likewise, the Amsler Grid, a square grid with a black dot in the
center, is used to detect changes in the central visual field. Proper use of the grid can detect very
subtle changes in vision caused by a small amount of fluid under the retina.
Contrast sensitivity tests check for the ability to differentiate between light and dark. Regular use
of the Hamilton Veale contrast sensitivity test, illustrated in Figure 7.2, is one effective way to
Sunness, J., G. Rubin, C. Applegate, et al. “Visual Function Abnormalities and Prognosis in Eyes with AgeRelated Geographic Atrophy of the Macula and Good Visual Acuity.” Ophthalmology, 104 (1997): 1677.; Sunness,
J., G. Rubin, A. Broman, et al. “Low Luminance Visual Dysfunction as a Predictor of Subsequent Visual Acuity
Loss from Geographic Atrophy in Age-Related Macular Degeneration.” Ophthalmology, 115 (2008): 1480;
Midena, E., A. Degli, M. Blarzino, et al. “Macular Function Impairment in Eyes with Early Age-Related Macular
Degeneration.” Investigative Ophthalmology & Visual Science, 38 (February 1997): 469; Abramov, I. and J. Gordon.
“Color Vision Panel Tests: A Metric for Interpreting Numeric Analytic Indices.” Optometry & Vision Science,
86 (2009): 146; Montés-Micó, R. and T. Ferrer-Blasco. “Contrast Sensitivity Loss in the Peripheral Visual Field
Following Laser in Situ Keratomileusis.” Journal of Cataract and Refractive Surgery, 33 (2007): 1120; Kon, C. and
D. De Alwis. “A New Colour Vision Test for Clinical Use.” Eye (London, England), 10, pt. 1 (1996): 65-74.
489
Powers, M. “Paper Tools for Assessing Visual Function.” Optometry & Vision Science, 86 (2009): 613.; Bartlett,
H., L. Davies, and F. Eperjesi. “The Macular Mapping Test: A Reliability Study.” BMC Ophthalmology, 10 (2005):
18; Leat, S. and G. Woo. “The Validity of Current Clinical Tests of Contrast Sensitivity and Their Ability to Predict
Reading Speed in Low Vision.” Eye (London, England), 11, pt. 6 (1997): 893; Witmer, M., C. Margo, and M.
Drucker. “Tilted Optic Disks.” Survey of Ophthalmology, 10 (2010): 403; Barnhardt, C., S. Clock, B. Demmer, et
al. “Color Vision Screening for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities: A Comparison Between the Neitz Test of
Color Vision and Color Vision Testing Made Easy.” Optometry, 77 (2006): 211; Isaac, D., M. Avila, and A. Cialdini.
“Comparison of the Original Amsler Grid with the Preferential Hyperacuity Perimeter for Detecting
Choroidal Neovascularization in Age-Related Macular Degeneration.” Optometry, 79 (2008): 397.
490
American Optometric Association. Comprehensive Adult Eye and Vision Examination. American Optometric
Association, 2005.
491
Adapted from American Optometric Association, op. cit.
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monitor contrast sensitivity function over time.492 Forensic service
providers should perform other vision tests regularly so that
examiners know when they need to seek corrections to their sight
to maintain high visual acuity.
Recommendation 7.2: Forensic service providers should
institute medical surveillance for examiners with respect to
activities specific to friction ridge examination. Corrective
measures should be taken when appropriate and recorded.
The program should include a baseline visual examination
followed by annual vision testing to detect vision
deficiencies that may affect interpretation of the evidence.
The federal government should support research
Figure 7.2: The Hamilton Veale
to determine the most appropriate tests of visual
contrast sensitivity test
function for friction ridge examiners.
7.3.3

Workstation Configuration

Workstation considerations include the physical location and
design of the workstation as well as the desk height, counter
height, and other spatial layout requirements. Latent print
examinations require sufficient space for the latent prints,
exemplars, documentation worksheets, magnifying glasses,
pointers, writing instruments, and desktop task lighting. The
space should permit the required materials to be laid out for the
sequential process and to be accessible without undue attention or
effort. Clutter is a potential source of frustration and error.
Examiners experience physical problems, such as repetitive
Figure 7.3: An example of
motion injuries, from a lack of ergonomic workstation design.
a poorly designed
workstation
Complicating this design issue is the fact that many examiners
are required to share workstations across shifts. Inadequacies can
include nonadjustable keyboards; awkward positioning of the mouse; chairs, desks, and monitors
that are not adjustable to accommodate for different user heights; inadequate desk space for
papers, work products, and equipment; insufficient leg and knee room under the desk; furniture
that impedes equipment access; and lighting that cannot be adjusted for using magnifiers.
The working environment and user work posture are critical in preventing repetitive motion
injuries. The impact of ergonomics on individual productivity in domains such as automobile
manufacture, food processing, and healthcare is well documented.493 Good ergonomic designs
The Hamilton Veale contrast sensitivity chart should be used in conjunction with an Amsler Grid to detect visual
function loss in all cases with macular degeneration.
493
Cocci, S., K. Namaisvayam, and P. Bordi. “An Investigation of Ergonomic Design and Productivity
Improvements in Foodservice Production Tables.” Foodservice Research International, 16 (2005): 53; Kolich, M.
and S. Taboun. “Ergonomics Modeling and Evaluation of Automobile Seat Comfort.” Ergonomics, 47, no. 8 (June
22, 2004): 841–63; Stone, R. and R. McCloy. “Ergonomics in Medicine and Surgery.” BMJ, 328, no. 7448 (May 6,
2004).
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increase output per worker and reduce errors, accidents, injuries, illnesses, training time,
maintenance time, absenteeism, and turnover. Although no studies have focused on latent
print examiners, there is no reason to believe that the results would not generalize from related
occupations.
At a minimum, an examiner’s workstation should have keyboard shelves that are adjustable
to accommodate different heights; computer mice that can be repositioned; chairs that are
adjustable for height, arms, and back support; desktops that have mechanisms for adjusting
tilt and height; monitors that are adjustable both in height and user proximity; and a desk
with sufficient workspace, legroom, and knee space. Applicable standards include ISO 9241302:2008.494
7.3.4

Software Applications and Systems

It is critical to include latent print examiners in
the design of all solutions, especially technology
solutions. Eliciting requirements from latent
examiners and having them participate in
usability testing is necessary to create successful
and usable products and processes. The usability
testing and evaluation process permits the user
to provide data about what works and what does
not. The iterative nature of the process allows
changes to produce an optimized software
application or solution. Too often, usability
evaluations are carried out, if at all, only after
a product has been designed, developed, and
deployed. Applicable standards are ISO/IEC
9126,495 ISO 9241-210,496 and ISO/IEC 25062497
(software engineering, software product quality
requirements and evaluation, and common
industry format for usability test reports).

Figure 7.4: An example of a poorly designed
user interface

International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomics of Human-System Interaction—Part 302:
Terminology for Electronic Visual Displays, ISO 9241-302:2008. International Organization for Standardization,
2008; International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomics of Human-System Interaction—Part 305: Optical
Laboratory Test Methods for Electronic Visual Displays, ISO 9241-305:2008. International Organization for
Standardization, 2008. Both of these standards replace the withdrawn International Organization for Standardization.
Ergonomic Requirements for Work with Visual Displays Based on Flat Panels), ISO 13406:1999 (withdrawn).
International Organization for Standardization, 1999.
495
International Organization for Standardization. Software Engineering—Product Quality, ISO/IEC 9126:2001.
International Organization for Standardization, 2001.
496
International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomics of Human-System Interaction—Part 210: HumanCentered Design for Interactive Systems, ISO 9241-210:2010. International Organization for Standardization, 2010.
Replaces the withdrawn standard ISO 13407:1999, op. cit.
497
International Organization for Standardization. Software Engineering—Software Product Quality Requirements
and Evaluation (SQuaRE)—Common Industry Format (CIF) for Usability Test Reports, ISO/IEC 25062:2006.
International Organization for Standardization, 2006.
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7.3.5

Screen Interfaces

Poorly designed software interfaces were observed in some laboratories. For example, in Figure
7.4, the color combination (i.e., red background with blue text) is difficult to read, causes
eyestrain, and has the potential to increase errors. The applicable standards are ISO/IEC 9126,498
ISO 10075-2,499 ISO 9241-210,500; and ISO/IEC 14598.501
7.3.6

Instructions, Assistance, and Help

Examiners work across disparate application interfaces, which can be confusing. Managers
should place instructions of all types and formats in locations accessible and visible to
employees. Posted instructions should include icons and font sizes that are large enough to
see. Forensic service providers should also consider the best ways to present error feedback,
assistance, and helpful information to examiners. Although the NIST team did not document
instructional training process or online help functions, any instructions or help should follow
human factors guidelines and standards.
Online documentation, training, and help can be beneficial. Unfortunately, most of the current
online documentation is little more than paper documentation displayed on a computer screen.
Designers of online instruction and documentation should consider the delivery technique and
should utilize indexes, searches, and other navigational tools, including text, graphics, and icons,
to help users find relevant content.502 Research on both hard-copy and online documentation
suggests that users seldom read the entire document.503 Learning styles also influence the user’s
preference in accessing information.504
Many icons used in instructions for examiners do not easily describe the tasks they represent. For
some especially obscure icons, even pop-up label descriptions do not assist in comprehension.505
Designers should use standard icons whenever possible and should conduct usability testing
before launching the prodcut. Applicable standards are ISO/IEC/IEEE 26512506 and ISO/IEC
11581.507
ISO/IEC 9126:2001, op cit.
International Organization for Standardization. Ergonomic Principles Related to Mental Workload—Part 2:
Design Principles, ISO 10075-2:1996. International Organization for Standardization, 1996.
500
ISO 9241-210:2010, op cit.
501
International Organization for Standardization. Information Technology—Software Product Evaluation, ISO/IEC
14598:1999. International Organization for Standardization, 1999.
502
Moallem, A. “Usability of Software Online Documentation: A User Study.” HCI International, 1 (2003): 549.
503
Rettig, M. “Nobody Reads Documentation.” Communications of the ACM, 34 (1991): 19.
504
Kolb, D. Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Prentice Hall, 1984;
Felder, R. “Reaching the Second Tier: Learning and Teaching Styles in College Science Education.” Journal of
College Science Teaching, 23 (1993): 286.
505
Zammit, K. “Computer Icons: A Picture Says a Thousand Words. Or Does It?” Journal of Educational Computing
Research, 23 (2000): 217.
506
International Organization for Standardization. Systems and Software Engineering—Requirements for Acquirers
and Suppliers of User Documentation, ISO/IEC/IEEE 26512:2011. International Organization for Standardization,
2001. Replaces the withdrawn standard I International Organization for Standardization. Information Technology—
Software User Documentation Process, ISO/IEC 15910:1999 (withdrawn). International Organization for
Standardization, 1999.
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7.3.7

Environmental Factors

Air Quality
Air quality refers to the average or extreme temperature and humidity of the location along with
any contaminants. It is often difficult to control air temperature and airflow, especially in open
office spaces. Examiners’ movements between offices and the additional heat resulting from that
movement complicate control over air quality. Fortunately, temperature can be controlled with
some degree of accuracy depending on the building’s heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
(HVAC) system. Indoor temperature affects comfort, perceived air quality, sick building
syndrome symptoms, and performance.508
Suboptimal ventilation rates and higher occupancy density are associated with lower work
performance.509 Improved perceived air quality reduces the intensity of sick building syndrome
symptoms and improves performance.510 Latent print unit managers should monitor the airflow
and temperature in all examiner workspaces and, if needed, should install desktop task or
ambient conditioning systems or air purifying systems. The standards applicable to air quality are
OSHA Section III Chapter 2 (general recommendations for indoor air quality problems including
ventilation, air treatment, and source controls)511 and ISO 16814 (specifying methods to express
the quality of indoor air suitable for human occupancy allowing several acceptable target levels
of indoor air quality depending on local requirements, constraints, and expectations).512
Lighting
Examiners may experience vision problems, eyestrain, and injury with insufficient or
inappropriate lighting. Placing monitors in front of windows increases glare. Glare from
nonadjustable and non-directional lighting fixtures and lamps results in squinting. Inadequate
levels of light for the task, inconsistent background luminosity, a lack of natural lighting, a lack
of window fixtures to control natural light, as well as nonadjustable lamps for use during
magnification all can cause glare. However, studies have found that a view out a window is
associated with better worker performance, less fatigue, and better self-reported health

International Organization for Standardization. Information Technology—User System Interfaces and Symbols—
Icon Symbols and Functions, ISO/IEC 11581:2000. International Organization for Standardization, 2000.
508
Seppänen, O., W. Fisk, and Q. Lei. Effect of Temperatures on Task Performance in Office Environment. Helsinki
Univ. of Technology, Laboratory of Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning, July 2006.
509
Federspeil, C., G. Lui, M. Lahiff, et al. “Worker Performance and Ventilation: Analyses of Individual Data for
Call-Center Workers.” Indoor Air, 14 (2002): 41.
510
Wargocki, P., D. Wyon, J. Sundell, et al. “The Effects of Outdoor Air Supply Rate in an Office on Perceived Air
Quality, Sick Building Syndrome (SBS) Symptoms and Productivity.” Indoor Air, 10, no. 4 (2000): 222–36; Fang,
L., D. Wyon, G. Clausen, et al. “Impact of Indoor Air Temperature and Humidity in an Office on Perceived Air
Quality, SBS Symptoms and Performance.” Indoor Air, 14, supp. 7 (2004): 74–81.
511
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration. OSHA Technical Manual, Section III,
Chapter 2, Indoor Air Quality Investigation. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 1999.
512
International Organization for Standardization. Building Environment Design—Indoor Air Quality—Methods of
Expressing the Quality of Indoor Air for Human Occupancy, ISO 16814:2008. International Organization for
Standardization, 2008.
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conditions.513 Higher levels of daylight illumination have a positive impact on attention span and
short-term memory tests.514
Lighting conditions affect individual performance via the visual, circadian, and perceptual
systems.515 The lighting conditions determine the capabilities of the visual system. The state of
the circadian system (sleep-wake cycle) is influenced by the light-dark cycle. And the “message”
delivered by the perceptual system is influenced by many factors, including light.516 Because the
need for varying levels of light greatly affects examiners’ ability to complete their tasks quickly,
efficiently, and correctly, managers and environment designers should take the following actions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Place monitors away from windows to reduce glare and reflections;
Provide monitor anti-glare screens;
Tilt the monitor screen to avoid reflections;
Adjust screen or character background colors (e.g., black characters on a white screen
will produce less glare than white characters on a blue background);
Use ceiling fixtures that provide controlled, indirect lighting;
Install adjustable light level switches;
Install and use window blinds to control outside light;
Use task lights positioned to avoid shadows;
Provide optimal lighting for examiners using loupes; and
Reduce other brightness sources, such as glossy, reflective paints on walls or highly
reflective work surfaces.

Applicable standards include ISO 8995 (interior lighting, including workplace, emergency, and
safety lighting).517
Noise
Noise interferes with worker performance.518 Noise can prevent workers from hearing signals and
can interfere with a worker’s mental and physical condition. Indeed, noise can be a health hazard.
It can produce serious physical and mental performance problems and psychological stress.
Workers in departments with high noise levels have more disciplinary actions and absenteeism
and less productivity. Noise also appears to affect the quality of work and accident
513
Collins, B. Windows and People: A Literature Survey, Psychological Reaction to Environments With and
Without Windows. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards, 1975; Kaplan, R. and S. Kaplan. The
Experience of Nature: A Psychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
514
Heschong Mahone Group. Windows and Offices: A Study of Office Worker Performance and the Indoor
Environment – CEC PIER 2003. 2003.
515
Leslie, R. “Capturing the Daylight Dividend in Buildings: Why and How?” Building and Environment, 38, no. 2
(February 2003): 381–85.
516
Boyce, P., C. Hunter, and O. Howlette. The Benefits of Daylight Through Windows. Lighting Research Center,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 2003; Juslen, H. and A. Tenner. “Mechanisms Involved in Enhancing Human
Performance by Changing the Lighting in The Industrial Workplace.” International Journal of Industrial
Ergonomics, 35 (2005): 843.
517
International Organization for Standardization, Lighting of Work Places, ISO 8995:2002. International
Organization for Standardization, 2002.
518
Morrison, W., E. Haas, D. Shaffner, et al. “Noise, Stress, and Annoyance in a Pediatric Intensive Care Unit.”
Critical Care Medicine, 31, no. 1 (2003): 113; Topf, M. “Hospital Noise Pollution: An Environmental Stress Model
to Guide Research and Clinical Interventions.” Journal of Advanced Nursing, 31 (2000): 520.
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rates.519 Although humans often adjust by ignoring noise, the ear does not stop processing
sound.520 Distracting noise sources can range from overhead paging systems and equipment
alarms to HVAC systems, plumbing, and other employees.
In a majority of the organizations studied, the NIST team observed staff members playing music
and having conversations that could be distracting. Materials that absorb sound, such as ceiling
and wall materials and carpeting, can mitigate the impact of noise at a modest cost.521 Applicable
standards are ISO 11201522 and OSHA 1910.523
7.3.8

Distractions

Interruptions
Interruptions of the examination process can introduce error. Interruptions can come from
any number or sources, but the design of the workspace can mitigate some of them.524 Such
interruptions can halt the examination process or can result in the examiner attempting to manage
the interruption while continuing with the examination. After an interruption, an examination
might not continue at the same point as it ended.
Conversations are a common form of interruption. Research reveals that in only limited
circumstances are people able to perform two tasks concurrently.525 Conversations actually
demand a high level of cognitive processing to be attentive and to formulate a response. An
examiner whose attention is diverted from the primary task becomes vulnerable to making a
mistake.526
Latent print comparison workstations can be designed as an open space, a semi-private office,
or a private office. In the open space or semi-private office design, the examiner is likely to be
subject to unsolicited conversation either directed to him or overheard from others in the same
area. In a majority of incidents involving cockpit crew errors studied by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), the crews reported having been distracted by conversation at
Noweir, M. “Noise Exposure as Related to Productivity, Disciplinary Actions, Absenteeism, and Accidents
Among Textile Workers.” Journal of Safety Research, 15 (1984): 163; Muzammil, M., A. Khan, F. Hasan, et al.
“Effect of Noise on Human Performance Under Variable Load in a Die Casting Industry – A Case Study.” Journal of
Environmental Science Engineering, 46 (2004): 49.
520
Olaosum, A., O. Ogundiran, and J. Tobih. “Health Hazards of Noise: A Review Article.” Research Journal of
Medical Sciences, 3 (2009): 115.
521
National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Board on Health Care Services. Keeping Patients Safe:
Transforming the Work Environment for Nurses. National Academies Press, 2004.
522
International Organization for Standardization. Acoustics—Noise Emitted by Machinery and Equipment—
Determination of Emission Sound Pressure Levels at a Work Station and at Other Specified Positions in an
Essentially Free Field over a Reflecting Plane with Negligible Environmental Corrections, ISO 11201:2010.
International Organization for Standardization, 2010.
523
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration. Regulations (Standards—29 CFR),
Part 1910.95: Occupational Noise Exposure. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 1991.
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Rosekind, M., P. Gander, L. Cornell, et al. Crew Factors in Flight Operations X: Alertness Management in Flight
Operations Education Module. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2001.
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the time of the incidents.527 The use of private office space significantly reduces the occurrences
of interruption due to conversation. While not the preferred arrangement, semi-private designs
can offer some protection when arranged so that examiners do not directly face each other.
Examples of other forms of communication that can interrupt the cognitive process include
phones, paging systems, and email. It is possible to control each of these in the office
design. In this case, operational policies should address when it is permissible to mute such
communications systems. The NIST team observed that although examiners were more likely to
comment on the distracting effect of telephone and paging systems, greater attention was given
to the Internet when it was available.
The fact that an examiner has many responsibilities complicates the issue of interruptions.
Serving in a training, supervisory, or management role, being called as a witness for the court,
and being on-call to respond to crime scenes may sometimes affect an ongoing examination.
Careful management can mitigate the effects through appropriate scheduling. In addition,
examiners who also serve as crime scene technicians should be neither required nor permitted to
monitor a dispatch radio for purposes of taking calls for service. Many individuals who become
accustomed to being on call fail to recognize the cognitive effort required to be attentive to
what is being broadcast. Managers should rely on alternative forms of notification, including a
screening process by staff members outside the examination work area.
Location
Location refers to the environmental and physical characteristics of the workspace. Of concern is
how the physical environment influences system design and usage. The NIST team observed the
impact of location on various aspects, including:
•
•
•

Too many disparate systems located on multiple workstations and platforms make
it difficult to design the system to meet the user’s anthropometric and ergonomic
requirements;
Not all examiners work in a laboratory environment—some work in cubicles, others
share office space, and some have private offices—which complicates a consistent
ergonomic design; and
Laboratories have increased levels of noise and movement due to multiple processes
occurring over multiple workstations.

Since latent print examination is not always limited to a side-by-side comparison capable of
being performed in a single confined space, such as a desktop, examiners must interface with
multiple systems during the workday. Examiners often use AFIS and digital imaging systems
that are not well integrated and that reside on disparate workstations. As a result, routine task
completion requires a great deal of movement between workstations, across multiple interfaces,
and sometimes between rooms. This activity causes the examiner to move from one space to
another carrying case files and evidence, which reduces efficiency and increases the potential for
error.
Dismukes, K., G. Young, and R. Sumwalt. Cockpit Interruptions and Distractions: Effective Management
Requires A Careful Balancing Act. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1998.
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Office designs that situate all necessary equipment and workstations within a single area will
mitigate these concerns.
Managers, in consultation with human factors experts, should consider gathering information
on the frequency and pattern of examiner movement and behaviors while completing tasks.
This could assist in integrating systems through middleware to allow operation via a single
interface or station wherever possible. If this is not possible, managers should consider the use
of keyboard and monitor switches to allow access to multiple terminals from one workstation to
reduce movement across offices.
Stress
When individuals assess their circumstances as causing stress, their bodies automatically begin a
series of stress-response mechanisms comprised of physiological, behavioral, and psychological
efforts to adapt to the environmental demands.528
Depending on the resources available within a particular agency, it is common for examiners to
spend significant time in ancillary activities, such as maintaining equipment, managing office
supplies, performing data entry tasks, preparing case file folders, inventorying and preparing
case files for archived storage, and serving as phone operators. Such responsibilities can lead to
inefficiency, decreased worker satisfaction, and frustration.
During the NIST team observations, examiners frequently mentioned that they were responsible
for managing information technology (IT) file backups, system or component selection and
installation, integration, and troubleshooting. They also noted that IT support staff member
scheduled routine systems maintenance at peak work periods. This activity led to reduced
productivity, frustration, and potential errors due to the unexpected interruptions while casework
was being performed. The impact of these interruptions led to one examiner’s decision to move
to another laboratory. Managers should interview examiners to determine what workplace
characteristics are considered distracting and stressful and should eliminate any unnecessary
stressors from the work environment.

7.4

Summary

Workspace design has a substantial impact on employees’ productivity, errors, and injuries. A
usable latent print examination environment takes into consideration the needs of each examiner
to develop an environment that improves productivity, reduces the complexity of the work,
increases satisfaction, and reduces the risks of errors and injury.529 Examiners’ office spaces
must reflect good ergonomic design. The workspace and equipment must meet the individual
examiner’s physical and cognitive needs. Systems should be integrated and standardized to
reduce the amount of learning required to complete routine tasks over systems interfaces and
office locations. The work environment cannot be designed with a one-size-fits-all approach.
However, implementing the recommendations in this chapter, employing good ergonomic design
Cohen, S. and M. Rodriguez. “Pathways Linking Affective Disturbances and Physical Disorders.” Health
Psychology, 14 (1995): 374.
529
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Applied Ergonomics, 34 (2003): 419.
528
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principles, and adhering to usability guidelines and standards will improve the environment for
the examiners.
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Appendix 7-A: Design Processes
A.1

User-Centered Design Process

At its core, user-centered design is based upon the concept of developing usable, useful products.
Each user and his context of use must define the user needs. Optimizing safety, comfort,
efficiency, effectiveness, and user satisfaction requires an understanding and application of
usability and the user-centered design process.
Table 7.2 lists usability goals and provides a short description of each, as adapted from Nielsen’s
definition of usability quality metrics. It also provides some questions for latent print examiner
environment designers to consider. When designing any usable system, it is important to consider
these aspects of the user experience.
Usability Goals
Effectiveness

Efficiency

Satisfaction

Learnability

Memorability

Latent Print Examiner-Targeted
Questions
Measure of how well a user can
Can examiners successfully encode a print for
perform a task
submission to AFIS?
Can examiners accurately determine the
orientation of the print?
Measure of how quickly a
Are examiners able to quickly accomplish
user can perform work and the
goals?
accompanying error rate
Can examiners perform tasks with few errors?
Measure of user attitudes,
How well does the environment avoid inducing
perceptions, feelings, and opinions examiner discomfort and frustration?
regarding the environment
Are examiners intimidated by the
environment?
Measure of how quickly a user can Can examiners learn how to use the tools and
become productive
systems?
How long should it take an examiner to learn
the tools and system?
Are examiners able to use the tools and
systems (to some defined level of competence)
after instructions or training?
Measure of how well a returning
If an examiner has used the tool or process
user forms a mental model of the
before, can he remember enough to use it
effectively the next time, or does he have to
environment and remembers how
re-learn it?
to use it
How do experienced examiners differ from
infrequent/novice examiners?
After not using the tool or process for a
period of time, how long should it take for the
examiner to become familiar with it again?
Definition

Table 7.2: Definitions of usability goals and questions that apply specifically to latent print
examiners530
530

Nielsen, op. cit.
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A.2

Iterative Process

Users who are included in the early stages of the design phase can provide feedback and
recommendations that designers can incorporate into the initial prototypes. Designers of
the most successful environments continually refine their prototypes through an iterative,
evolutionary process with users. This iterative process must be user-centered, research-based,
and performance-driven.
User-Centered:
• Identifies the types of users who will be using the workspaces, including latent print
examiners, forensic specialists, and laboratory managers
• Ensures that the needs of the users are considered in the design and development of the
environment
Research-Based:
• Employs research to learn about users and their needs, tasks, environments, level of
expertise, etc.
• Conducts ongoing research with examiners by observing them interacting with the
workspaces, systems, and hardware
Performance-Driven:
• Utilizes information gathered from users and measures user performance to ensure that
design improvements have a measurable impact on users’ effectiveness, efficiency, and
satisfaction

A.3

Context of Use

During the first stage of the user-centered design process, the environmental designer must
consider the “context of use.” The actual conditions under which latent print examination
environments are used must be considered to ensure that the design of the environment will meet
the needs of users and the objectives of the organization.
Throughout the development process (and especially during the early stages of the design
process), designers must be aware of contextual factors that include the business, operational,
and social environments in which the system will be used.

A.4

Defining the Users

The central objective of designing a usable environment is to meet the needs of users within
their operational context. The design of the environment should focus on users’ needs and
expectations, involve users throughout, and integrate feedback from users into the design.
Recognizing the full range of users, designers should define the role each user will have within
the examiner environment. Designers should try to understand the users’ needs, interests, and
goals. Table 7.3 lists information about users that can be relevant to the design of the latent print
examiner’s workspace.
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Questions to Consider when Defining Users’ Requirements
Characteristics

Characteristic Specifics

User Requirements

Age

What is the age range of this user group?

Anthropometrics

What are the heights of the users?
What are the heights of the workstations?

Education

What is the typical education level of the
users?
How much computer experience do the
users have?
How many of the users have experience
with AFIS databases?
How many of the users are new to the
system?
How have users been trained on the
system?
Do any of the users have color blindness?
Do any of the users have contrast
sensitivity?
Do any of the users have dyslexia?
Do users have other characteristics with
respect to visual acuity or other factors?

Experience and
Knowledge Level

Visual Attributes

Does age impact the use of
technology (e.g., marking digital
images versus photographs)?
Are the workstations’ heights
adjustable?
Are the chairs’ heights adjustable?
Can the users reach the tools required
for the tasks?
How does education affect system
usage?
Do the needs of first-time users differ
from those of more frequent users?
Does the system need to
accommodate users with training
needs?

How do these attributes affect the
environmental design?

Table 7.3: Characteristics to consider when designing latent print examiners’ work
environments

A.5

Designing the User Environment

Once the characteristics have been defined, designers can begin to consider other environmental
factors. For example:
•
•
•

When and where will users analyze prints, compare prints, evaluate prints, and verify
prints?
When and where will they interact with AFIS databases or other software systems?
What are the characteristics of the environment, including physical infrastructure;
configuration of workstation; placement of workstation; seating; height, angle, and
distance from user; lighting; noise levels; frequency of tours; temperature and humidity;
placement, type, and format of training materials, policies, procedures, and safety
equipment; and the types of help that are available?
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Designers can use Table 7.4 to help them identify how the environment will be used, to define
possible user requirements and to ask design questions relating to each element of the workspace
and environment.
Questions to Consider
Characteristics
Location

Potential Effects

In what environment will the
workstation be located?
What are the physical characteristics
of this location?
Within the location, how will the
workstation be situated?

Temperature and Humidity

Lighting

Noise
Instructions/Warnings

Assistance

Characteristic Specifics

How does the physical
environment of this location
affect or influence the design and
usage of the system?
How does the placement of the
workstation affect use of and
access to the system?
What spatial requirements are
necessary to facilitate frequent
use?
What is the average temperature for
How do temperature and humidity
the location?
affect the users?
What are the extreme temperatures? Is How does the outside
the area humid?
environment affect performance?
What types of lighting are utilized?
How does the level of lighting
Will the system be utilized at night as affect readability and visibility?
well as during the day?
What is the average noise level?
How does the noise level affect an
individual’s ability to perform?
Where are instructions placed?
Are the instructions large enough?
What is the format of instructions
Are the instructions obstructed?
(e.g., signs, labels, icons)?
What is the appropriate height to
place instructional guides?
What types of help and assistance are Given the environment, what
provided?
is the best way to present error
feedback and helpful information?

Table 7.4: Characteristics regarding each element of an environment
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A.6

Defining User Goals and Tasks

After identifying user characteristics and task requirements, designers should conduct a user and
task analysis by answering questions such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What is the user’s purpose?
What are the user’s needs, interests, and goals?
How will the user interact with the environment?
What are the key tasks the user must perform?
Which tasks will the user perform frequently?
Which tasks are critical to the user’s success in the environment?
Which tasks are critical to the success of the organization?

Designers should consider how human factors issues affect each task. Important tasks that could
be affected by human factors issues should be evaluated first. Designers should consider these
questions for each group of users identified in the previous section.
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Chapter 8: Training and Education
Introduction and Scope
This chapter reviews the history and current state of latent print examiner training programs,
standards, and requirements. It identifies shortcomings in the current system and offers
recommendations to improve training through research into and development of effective
mentoring programs and comprehensive training materials. The chapter also discusses existing
standards of professional organizations, requirements for accreditation, and benefits of
certification. It recommends mandatory certification and accreditation to improve the latent print
field as a whole.

8.1

A History of Training in the United States

The first formal training for latent print examiners in the United States took place during the
1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis when Sergeant John K. Ferrier of Scotland Yard’s Fingerprint
Bureau provided brief “instructions to hundreds of police officers and prison officials.”531 He then
conducted a 7-month training session for 9 people on the comparison of unknown fingerprint
specimens to known exemplars and the classification of fingerprint records.532
By 1915, the International Association for Criminal Identification (later, the International
Association for Identification, or IAI) was formed. One objective was “to provide training,
education, and the publication of information in all forensic disciplines represented by this
Association.”533 The Association also instituted an annual training seminar.534
In 1916, T. G. Cooke and W. K. Evans created a school in Chicago to offer a home-study course.
The school had several names until, in 1926, it became the Institute of Applied Science (IAS).
The IAS course proceeded through various functional areas with reading and competency testing.
Graduation usually required a year and a half of “study monitored and directed by personal and
highly professional, albeit long distance, tutelage. … By 1937, and continuing for many years
after, nearly one half of the individuals in charge of fingerprint bureaus in North America were
IAS graduates.”535
In 1924, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created an Identification Division. It offered
a 2-week fingerprint examiner training program for law enforcement agencies throughout the
country.536 The first week of the program dealt with recognizing fingerprint types, identifying
characteristics, and classifying fingerprint records. The second week focused on comparing

Grieve, D. “The Identification Process: Traditions in Training.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 40 (1990): 199.
Ibid., p. 209.
533
International Association for Identification. Constitution, Article 1, Section 1.03f. International Association for
Identification, 2011.
534
Grieve, op. cit., p. 206.
535
Ibid., p. 207.
536
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Science of Fingerprints: Classification and Uses. U.S. Department of
Justice, 1979.
531
532
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unknown fingerprint specimens to known fingerprint records. The program concentrated on the
development of the skills needed for comparing fingerprints and for developing latent prints.
It did not concern itself with the underlying science that made the work plausible or with
instruction in scientific methodology.
“Ridgeology,”537 a holistic approach to the latent print comparison process that goes beyond the
counting and arrangement of friction ridge minutiae, required latent print examiners to learn
more about friction ridge skin, its discriminating features, and the comparison process. Some
larger agencies created their own training programs, but most small providers relied on existing
examiners to train new ones informally. Without the leadership of a central authority, no formal
training program emerged.
The IAI and the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology
(SWGFAST) have published suggestions concerning training programs for latent print
examiners.538 Although these documents outline the training needs for examiners, neither
organization provides training materials (see section 8.4).
Today, forensic examiners receive training through a wide variety of programs and
approaches, and they follow a range of educational pathways that lead to careers in latent
print examination.539 Latent print examiners may receive some training as part of a formal
undergraduate or graduate program in forensic science or criminal justice, or they may have
acquired their professional skills through on-the-job training.540 Latent print examiners usually
work at law enforcement agencies where training comes from internal mentorships, sometimes
supplemented by external programs and formal training. In this traditional approach, one
generation of trainers transmits its knowledge and skill to the next.541

8.2

Concerns about the Current Training System

Today’s variegated system of training has some benefits, but it lacks uniformity and raises
concerns about quality. For example, the 2009 National Research Council report on forensic
science in the United States observes that latent print training varies from agency to agency and
may include “a formalized training program, may use an informal mentoring process, or may
Ashbaugh, D. Ridgeology: Modern Evaluative Friction Ridge Identification. Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
1999.
538
International Association for Identification. Friction Ridge Skin Identification Training Manual. International
Association for Identification, 2006; Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology.
Standards for the Minimum Qualifications and Training to Competency for Friction Ridge Examiner Trainees
(Latent/Tenprint). Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology,
February 2010.
539
Gaensslen, R. “How Do I Become a Forensic Scientist?, Educational Pathways to Forensic Science Careers.”
Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry, 376 (2003): 1151–55.
540
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Strengthening Forensic Science in
the United States: A Path Forward, Position Statement. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study
and Technology, 2009.
541
In 1990, David Grieve wrote that “fingerprint training is centered around some type of apprenticeship that
contains varying amounts of tutelage, on-the-job training, or self study. Structured, formal courses that provide
complete instruction, either academic or employer designed, are rare.” Grieve, op. cit., p. 195.
537
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send new examiners to a 1- to 2-week course.”542 This lack of standardized training can lead to
a wide range of practices. Informal training programs vary in length from weeks to years, and
testing for competency may not exist within each department.
Recent years have brought notable efforts to standardize formal academic programs in forensic
science;543 however, much of the analysis of education and training has focused on forensic
science degree-granting programs, neglecting training specific to latent print examination. The
absence of enforceable standards has led to heterogeneity in curricula, instructors, pedagogy,
documentation, and mentorships. Some agencies do not have staff members available to mentor
trainees adequately, and even when mentors are available, it is not clear how they are selected or
trained.
Smaller agencies with only a handful of examiners often find it particularly challenging to
provide adequate training. Training might be limited to the most practical aspects of the job, as
pressures are in place to apprentice and to manage the caseload. Because of the lack of industrywide standards, training is limited to the level of expertise of the trainer, which can lead to
perpetuation of improper or inappropriate methods. Limited career paths in smaller agencies can
create high turnover rates that make it constantly necessary to train new examiners.
A few professional and private organizations supply advanced training and education. However,
there has been little to no effort to evaluate the content of the training to show its effectiveness.544
Furthermore, only a fraction of all examiners participate in these courses, leaving the field
without uniform standards and requirements for education and training, consistently qualified
instructors, and comprehensive and updated curricula.

8.3

Recommendations for Training

To improve the training system, it is necessary first to understand what skills and knowledge
are necessary for latent print examination. Examiners must have the proper cognitive abilities
to conduct latent print examinations and to communicate their findings. Specific abilities in
perception and judgment are required for the analysis, comparison, and evaluation of friction
ridge impressions. These go beyond screening for form blindness, color blindness, and visual
acuity.

National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. National Academies
Press, 2009, p. 136. For more extensive discussions, see Cowger, J. “Moving Towards Professionalization of
Latent Print Examiners.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 24 (1979): 591–95; Cooney, L. “Latent Print Training to
Competency: Is it Time for a Universal Training Program?” Journal of Forensic Identification, 60 (2010): 223–58.
543
Technical Working Group for Education and Training in Forensic Science. Education and Training in Forensic
Science: A Guide for Forensic Science Laboratories, Educational Institutions, and Students. National Institute
of Justice, 2004; American Academy of Forensic Sciences, Forensic Science Education Programs Accreditation
Commission. Accreditation Standards. American Academy of Forensic Sciences, revised July 22, 2011, Article I.
544
For additional information on ways to evaluate, see Kirkpatrick, D. and J. Kirkpatrick. Evaluating Training
Programs: The Four Levels. 3rd ed. Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2006.
542
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Recommendation 8.1: The federal government should consider funding research to
determine what educational and cognitive abilities should be prerequisites for training
a latent print examiner. Forensic service providers should have systematic training
programs that develop these abilities as well as educate examiners in the scientific
method, the relevant scientific literature, communication skills, and methods for
logically developing conclusions.
Once a systematic training program on all aspects of latent print examination is developed, it
must be affordable to forensic service providers. Budgetary constraints limit the number of
trainees who can be hired, and training through formal programs outside the agency can be
costly. Previous federally funded incentive programs, such as the Law Enforcement Education
Program (LEEP) and its successor, the U.S. Department of Justice Police Corps program,
were designed to address similar concerns from a broader law enforcement perspective. The
Police Corps program provided scholarships or tuition reimbursements in return for a 4-year
commitment to work as patrol officers in a state or local law enforcement agency. Federal funds
went to states to develop and provide training. In addition, the federal government provided local
and state agencies that hired Police Corps officers $10,000 a year for 4 years of service. Similar
incentives to support training, education, and salaries of latent print examiner trainees would
encourage agencies to create positions or fill vacancies.
Recommendation 8.2: The federal government should develop a forensic latent print
examiner scholarship program to:
a. Fund the post-hire training program and, upon successful completion, provide
tuition reimbursement, loan forgiveness, or other financial assistance to degreed
latent print examiner trainees working in state, local, or private (not-for-profit)
forensic laboratories; and
b. Reimburse the employer for a percentage of the salaries during the training
period.
By learning what specific skills and knowledge are essential to successful latent print
examinations and by implementing programs that allow all examiners to receive proper training,
forensic service providers can ensure that their examiners have the tools they need and can pass
this information on to newer employees.
On-the-job relationships play a critical role in the professional development of new examiners.
Such relationships provide opportunities to receive feedback, counseling, coaching, skill
building, advancement, role modeling, and reinforcement.545 Informal relationships often occur
naturally between co-workers. However, formal mentoring programs allow agencies to foster
developmental relationships between junior and senior staff members by taking an active
role in their initiation by assigning mentors and monitoring this relationship’s effectiveness.
Organizational benefits of establishing formal mentoring programs include transferring
organizational culture and institutional knowledge, reinforcing and encouraging teamwork,
reducing stress, and decreasing turnover.546 Research shows that successful mentoring programs
Kram, K. and M. Bragar. “Career Development Through Mentoring: A Strategic Approach for the 1990s − Part
I.” Mentoring International, 5, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 3–13.
546
Jorgenson, J. Mentoring Programs: An Overview. National Academy of Public Administration, 1992.
545
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include voluntary participation, matching mentors and protégés who are two to three levels apart,
careful selection of mentors, flexible duration, one-on-one mentoring, a no-fault exit provision,
a high priority on program evaluation, and the clear communication of mentoring objectives.547
Poor coordination of mentorship programs can lead to conflicts between the mentoring and
supervisory roles of the mentor, breaches of confidentiality, mentor bias, lack of active listening,
and role confusion.548 Agencies must take care to minimize these risks.
Recommendation 8.3: Agencies should establish formal mentoring programs that define
the roles and responsibilities of the mentor, trainee, and supervisor.
The Working Group appreciates that agencies with limited staff may find it difficult to provide
their own mentoring programs, but these agencies may develop cooperative agreements with
neighboring jurisdictions to support the program. As in all educational programs, the mentors
should be highly qualified. Mentors and instructors, whether in the workplace or in formal
training and educational programs, should possess expert subject-matter knowledge that they can
convey clearly and effectively.

8.4

Recommendations for Curriculum and Information Resources

Although various training materials549 and texts550 for latent print examiners are published and
available, there is a lack of centralized, easily accessible, and readily understandable sources of
valid information. This gap leads to a related recommendation.
Recommendation 8.4: The federal government should establish an expert group to
develop a latent print educational textbook, practical exercises, and assessment tests
(print and online) in consultation with professional organizations, senior latent print
examiners, researchers with content knowledge, experienced trainers, and professionals
experienced in curriculum development.
In developing new curricula, trainers should consider the expertise of the targeted audience and
the teaching and testing methods used.551 Content should be based upon published standards,
peer-reviewed articles, and reference works. Terminology should be consistent throughout the
materials. The content should extend beyond the biology and analysis of friction ridge skin.
Authors should not be confined to experts in latent print examination, but should include experts
Ibid.; Wilson, J. and N. Elman. “Organizational Benefits of Mentoring.” The Executive, 4, no. 4 (1990): 88-94.
Taherian, K. and M. Shekarchian. “Mentoring for Doctors: Do Its Benefits Outweigh Its Disadvantages?”
Medical Teacher, 30 (2008): e95–e99.
549
See, e.g., IAI, op. cit.
550
See, e.g., Saferstein, R. Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic Science. Prentice Hall, 2000; Ashbaugh,
D. Quantitative - Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology. CRC
Press, 1999; Vanderkolk, J. Forensic Comparative Science: Qualitative Quantitative Source Determination of
Unique Impressions, Images, and Objects. Academic Press, 2009; Cowger, J. Friction Ridge Skin: Comparison
and Identification of Fingerprints. CRC Press, 1992; Lee, H. and R. Gaensslen, eds. Advances in Fingerprint
Technology. 2nd ed. CRC Press, 2001; National Institute of Justice and Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge
Analysis, Study and Technology. The Fingerprint Sourcebook. National Institute of Justice, August 2011.
551
See, e.g., Tyler, R. Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction. University of Chicago Press, 1949. Tyler
recommends defining appropriate learning objectives, introducing useful learning experiences, organizing
experiences to maximize their effect, and evaluating the process and revising the areas that were not effective.
547
548
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on cognitive issues, statistics, and forensic science. Hands-on exercises relating to bias and
cognitive processing should be included. Ideally, the effectiveness of the materials should be
evaluated before and after they are deployed.
Recommendation 8.5: Training materials should include topics beyond the technical
aspects of friction ridge analysis, such as:
a. Documentation of work and case notes and written and oral communication;
b. Professional ethics;
c. Human factors issues such as fatigue, bias, cognitive influences, perceptual
influences, and error;
d. Research methods; and
e. Legal aspects of expert testimony.
Existing clearinghouses are an important resource for those undertaking educational and
training activities. For example, the National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology and the
Law (NCSTL) assembles into a publicly searchable database relevant scientific, technological,
and legal resources and a bibliography specific to forensic science content areas, such as
the reliability of automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS).552 Indeed, a resource
comparable to the National Library of Medicine’s PubMed for forensic science could provide
further benefits to researchers, especially given the limited accessibility of some forensic science
publications.553
Recommendation 8.6: The federal government should support a clearinghouse of
materials from existing training programs as well as publications on latent print
identification.

8.5

Existing Standards and Accreditation Requirements

Whatever training programs and materials are developed to supplement the current system,
developing national standards and accreditation requirements are essential to demonstrating
the effectiveness of training. Currently, professional organizations offer a mix of standards,
recommendations, and requirements, but there is no single, national accreditation that indicates
quality.
8.5.1

Standards

Mandatory national standards for educational requirements and for a training curriculum for
the forensic discipline of latent print examination do not exist, although the IAI and SWGFAST
outline the minimum requirements of a training program.
In 1977, the IAI developed its Latent Print Certification Program, which includes education,
training, and experience requirements leading to written and practical examinations. The IAI
For one example of an NCSTL bibliography, see http://www.ncstl.org/education/AFISReliability (accessed
November 29, 2011). Presumably, NCSTL tries to include all significant publications. Abstracts or annotations for
these materials would enhance the value of the bibliography.
553
See Mnookin, J., S. Cole, I. Dror, et al. “The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences.” UCLA Law
Review, 58 (2011): 725.
552
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requires a bachelor’s degree or years of experience as a prerequisite to certification in latent print
examination. Various training courses are offered to help examiners prepare for the exam, but
only one provider is affiliated with the IAI. Each IAI local division sponsors its own conferences
and training.
In addition, SWGFAST documents provide guidance for training programs, examiner
qualifications, proficiency testing, and standardized practices and terminology.554 SWGFAST
has established recommendations for training program content and participation competency.
SWGFAST has also issued standards for friction ridge automation training that focus on image
capturing and the history, theory, and operation of AFIS.555
There have been calls for new examiners to have a science background. SWGFAST also
recommends that latent print examiners possess a bachelor’s degree with some “science-related
coursework.”556 It has been argued that forensic service providers must spend more time and
resources to train applicants who lack this background.557
8.5.2

Requirements for Accreditation

The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/
LAB), Forensic Quality Services, the American Association for Laboratory Accreditation, and
other private organizations accredit forensic service providers. In response to a 2004 report
from the National Institute of Justice,558 the American Academy of Forensic Sciences created
a standing committee known as the Forensic Science Education Programs Accreditation
Commission (FEPAC).559 This Commission “accredits forensic science education programs that
lead to a bachelor’s or master’s degree in forensic science or in natural science with a forensic
science concentration.”560 The degree programs must be “located in a regionally accredited
institution of higher education.”561
ASCLD/LAB requires agencies to have a documented training program and to follow it;
however, there is no guidance as to what the training curriculum should encompass. In a
2009 survey, 75% of the agencies responding reported a formal written training program in
compliance with accreditation requirements.562 The survey found no significant differences
between accredited and non-accredited agencies with regard to aspects of training, such as the
number of comparisons needed, the period of supervised case review, pass-fail policies, and the
existence of a dedicated trainer. However, the low response rate for the survey and the possible
lack of statistical power make these results difficult to interpret.
Ibid.
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standard for Friction Ridge
Automation Training (Latent/Tenprint). Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study
and Technology, May 2009.
556
SWGFAST, 2010, op. cit.
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8.6

Recommendations for Certification and Continuing Education

Professional certification and accreditation programs typically require some form of continuing
education. Continuing education opportunities in the forensic sciences include courses,
professional conferences and seminars, distance learning, apprenticeships, residency, internships,
teaching, and independent learning.563 Latent print examiners should be encouraged to pursue
opportunities for such continuing professional education.
Ongoing education that enhances and improves current latent print work activities could include
an introduction to cognitive processes, statistical data on fingerprint features, basic probability
theory, technological developments, and the ethical and legal responsibilities of latent print
examiners. Management should be aware of the skills and expertise of examiners in order to
identify gaps that could be eliminated through continuing education and training.
Two major impediments to continuing education programs are cost and access. If programs are
not located nearby, or if the costs of enrollment are too high, some examiners will be precluded
from continuing education opportunities. To address this issue, the National Institute of Justice
provides funding for the development and delivery of online continuing education for forensic
scientists and professionals at various levels of knowledge and practice.564
Recommendation 8.7: Forensic service providers should require personnel to
participate in continuing education and to become certified through an accredited
program. Certifying bodies should review current certification tests with the aid of
professionals in test design and psychometrics.
Some jurisdictions have moved toward requiring certification of examiners and accreditation of
laboratories.565 By earning certification, examiners demonstrate their professional competence
and set a knowledge and experience base for themselves, for their employers, and for the public
at large. Additionally, certification has benefits beyond those provided to the individual examiner.
•

Team performance increases each time a new team member is certified;

•

The level of skill that a team has directly affects its performance;

•

Certification standardizes practices within the industry and leads to more cooperation
among organizations;

•

Individuals who earn certification have shown their dedication to personal
accomplishment and improvement and may increase their career opportunities; and

Technical Working Group for Education and Training in Forensic Science, op. cit.
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. “Training.” Accessed November 29, 2011.
http://www.nij.gov/training/welcome.htm; RTI International. “Forensic Science Education: Web-Based Professional
Development and Continuing Education for Forensic Scientists.” Accessed November 29, 2011.
http://www.rti.org/page.cfm/Forensic_Science_Education.
565
New York, Oklahoma, and Texas have state accreditation requirements. National Conference of State
Legislatures. Strengthening Forensic Science Oversight. National Conference of State Legislatures, February 2010.
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•

The public has more confidence in individuals who are certified as meeting some quality
standard.566

By requiring certification of examiners, forensic service providers can ensure and demonstrate
that their employees are competent, knowledgeable, and skilled at all aspects of the latent print
examination process.

8.7

Evaluation of Training Programs

Although FEPAC evaluates and accredits forensic science curriculum in degree-granting
academic institutions, other forensic science training programs do not receive review or
evaluation. Laboratory accreditation and examiner certification programs include educational and
training requirements. However, these requirements only verify that education and training have
occurred; they do not assess the quality of the training programs.567
Certifying and accrediting bodies should evaluate training material and training programs.
Evaluation methods could include student surveys, measurements against defined learning
objectives, or documentation of outcomes. Professional organizations offering training should
actively seek a means for external evaluation of their programs.
Recommendation 8.8: Certifying bodies should ensure that examiners have been
trained to competency. Laboratory accrediting bodies should evaluate the effectiveness
of an agency’s training program.

8.8

Summary

Although some training programs and informational resources exist to educate latent print
examiners, improvement will require a shift to a single, national standard training system that
covers more than the technical tasks involved in latent print examination. A comprehensive
training program should include information about report writing, testifying, maintaining
professional and personal ethics, understanding the influence of cognitive bias, and calculating
statistics. Certification and accreditation organizations should review the effectiveness of
new training programs, and forensic science providers should require their examiners to earn
certification to demonstrate their commitment to quality.

Microsoft Learning Whitepaper. The Value of Certification: Connecting the Dots Between Employers and
Employees. Microsoft Corporation, March 2007; SeaCrest Company. “The Value of Certification.” Credentialing
Talk, August 1, 2007. Accessed October 21, 2011. http://seacrestcompany.blogspot.com/2007/08/value-ofaccreditation.html.
567
For additional discussion of certification, see Chapter 9.
566
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Chapter 9: Human Factors Issues for Management
Introduction
The primary responsibility of management is to develop policies and to promote a culture for
successful completion of tasks. Other chapters in this report focus on factors that affect the
quality of the work in a latent print unit. These include the work environment (Chapter 7), skills
and expertise in interpreting prints (Chapter 3), technology (Chapter 4), reporting and testimony
(Chapters 5 and 6), and personnel training (Chapter 8). Management plays a central role in all
those areas by establishing strategies and a culture that recognizes and responds to human factors
in latent print examination.
Managers must be committed to developing, maintaining, and improving quality assurance
(QA) and quality control (QC) processes. QA includes procedures to ensure that final results are
valid, and QC includes monitoring to verify that procedures are working.568 Taken together, QA
and QC constitute a quality management system. This chapter focuses on the responsibilities
of management in creating an environment that enhances quality through certification,
accreditation, and proficiency testing as well as a systems approach to reducing errors.

9.1

A Management Perspective on Errors

Chapter 2 describes the types of errors that can occur in the complex endeavor of latent
print examination. That chapter used four categories for the possible outcomes of a latent
print examination—identification, inconclusive, exclusion, and not suitable for comparison
(insufficient data). However, forensic service providers differ in the number and names of
possible outcomes of latent print examinations. This chapter uses a more elaborate typology with
five categories: identification, inclusion, inconclusive, exclusion, and not suitable.
In casework, examiners do not start with knowledge of the truth. They reach conclusions based
upon knowledge, training, and experience. The quality management system should continually
evaluate performance. Part of this system is the review of the examiner’s results by another
qualified examiner. If there is conflict, the agency must employ a pre-determined procedure
for resolving the conflict. Having determined the result judged to be “correct,” the agency
would attribute an “error” to one of the examiners. For example, the two images in Figure 9.1
would produce a very complex comparison that could generate different results from different
examiners.

Deming, W. Out of the Crisis. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced Educational Services,
1986.
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Latent print

Exemplar print

Figure 9.1: Latent print from an ashtray and an exemplar print569

Presented with this pair of prints, five different examiners might each report a different
conclusion, as shown in Table 9.1.
Examiner

Result

Explanation

1

Identification

The examiner determined that there is enough similarity between the
latent and exemplar to make an identification.

2

Inclusion

3

Inconclusive

4

Exclusion

5

Not Suitable

The examiner found detail in agreement; however, due to the limited
quality of the latent print, a conclusive identification was not possible.
The examiner also determined that selection of additional print details
would not result in a more definitive conclusion.
The examiner could not determine if there was sufficient agreement
between the latent print and the exemplar print but believes that
additional exemplars could aid in the assessment.
The examiner found similarities between the latent print and the
exemplar print but interpreted the distortion artifacts in the latent print
as actual friction ridge detail and determined that these two impressions
came from different sources.
The examiner determined the latent print was not suitable for comparison
and therefore never compared the latent print to any exemplars.

Table 9.1: Five possible outcomes of the comparison of the latent and exemplar prints in Figure 9.1

If the two prints come from the same source, the conclusions of examiners 3, 4, and 5 may
preclude the conviction of a criminal. If the impressions did not originate from the same source,
then the conclusions reported by examiners 1 and 2 may contribute to the arrest and prosecution
of an innocent person. Procedures that permit an agency to determine which results are most
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likely to be correct, to detect departures from those results, and to investigate the factors that led
to the deviations are critical to the quality management process.
Table 9.2 enumerates the various possible erroneous outcomes in the above example. “Error” in
the table is defined relative to the outcome judged to be most acceptable rather than relative to
the unknown states of nature (see Chapters 2 and 3).
Result Judged To Be Correct

Examiner’s Result

Identification

Inclusion

Inconclusive

Exclusion

Not Suitable

Identification

CORRECT

Erroneous
Identification

Erroneous
Identification

Erroneous
Identification

Erroneous
Identification

Inclusion

Failure to
Identify

CORRECT

Erroneous
Inclusion

Erroneous
Inclusion

Erroneous
Inclusion

Inconclusive

Failure to
Identify

Failure to
Include

CORRECT

Failure to
Exclude

Exclusion

Erroneous
Exclusion

Erroneous
Exclusion

Erroneous
Exclusion

CORRECT

Erroneous
Suitability
Determination
Erroneous
Exclusion

Not Suitable

Failure to
Identify

Failure to
Include

Erroneous
Suitability
Determination

Failure to
Exclude

CORRECT

Table 9.2: Concordance table listing possible “errors” for conclusions in Table 9.1

The agency’s quality management system should track the errors listed above. When errors
(either in the sense defined above or relative to ground truth) are detected, it is critical
to understand the factors (see appendices) that led to them. By strengthening the quality
management system to guard against those factors, the risk of errors can be reduced.

9.2

A Systems Approach to Improving Accuracy

From the systems perspective outlined in Chapter 2, human error in the workplace is not an
isolated action of a given individual. Rather, it is the result of a chain of events that cumulate in
the adverse event. Since Heinrich’s 1931 publication, industry has embraced a sequential theory
of human error.570 James Reason’s 1990 “Swiss cheese” model examines error systematically.
It assumes that there are fundamental elements of all organizations that must work together
harmoniously to achieve efficient and safe operations.571 Taken together, these elements comprise
a “productive system” as depicted in Figure 9.2, an adaptation of Reason’s model.

Heinrich, H., D. Peterson, and N. Roos. Industrial Accident Prevention: A Safety Management Approach. 1st ed.
1931.
571
Reason, J. Human Error. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
570
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Figure 9.2: Components of a productive system adapted to a latent print unit572

For our purposes, the four slices from Reason’s original model have been renamed as Examiner
Actions, Conditions that Affect Performance, Supervisory Issues, and Organizational Influences.
Examiner actions are the mistakes or violations by the examiner. They are what the examiner
did. Conditions that affect performance are factors related to the condition of the examiner,
communication, or the environment that influenced the examiner. Supervisory issues are any
failures in the supervision of the examiner. Lastly, organizational influences are management
decisions and the organizational climate that affect the examiner. All require analysis and
discussion, and Appendix A lists examples of actions in each category.
Based upon this model, forensic analysis can be viewed as a complex system whose product
is the interpretation of forensic evidence. Productive activities within a latent print unit require
reliable, well-maintained equipment and a well-trained professional workforce. These are
included in the Conditions that Affect Performance slice in Figure 9.2. Examiners also need good
management and effective supervision, and managers need appropriate guidance, personnel, and
funding to perform their duties, which is represented in the Supervisory Issues slice. The support
of management comes from decision-makers who set goals and manage available resources,
represented by the Organizational Influences slice. They must balance oft-competing goals of
throughput, due diligence, and resources. These executive decisions typically are based upon
social, economic, and political input from outside the organization as well as on feedback from
managers and workers within it.
Accidents occur when there are breakdowns in the interaction among the components in the
production process.573 These failures, shown as holes in the different slices, make the system
more vulnerable to error, especially when there are multiple failures at each level. Using the

572
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Image adapted from Reason, op. cit.
Ibid.
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“Swiss cheese” model of error causation, an error occurs when the holes from each slice are
aligned.
There are two necessary ingredients to identifying weaknesses in a forensic system: (1) a human
error model to capture and organize the information and (2) forensic experts to analyze the
examination process and to identify the human and other factors that can affect the outcome.
The literature contains many human error models.574 If the underlying assumptions regarding
the nature and cause of error are considered, there are six different perspectives to error
investigation: cognitive, ergonomic, behavioral, medical, psychosocial, and organizational.575
Each perspective on human error investigation has its advantages. Many industries therefore
have employed a multi-perspective approach, using models such as root cause analysis, failure
mode and effects analysis, a management oversight risk tree, a safety management organization
review technique, and the human factors and analysis classifications system (HFACS). This
chapter uses HFACS as a framework for discussion,576 but other error models would elucidate the
same factors
9.2.1

Examiner Actions

Problematic actions of the examiner can be loosely classified as either mistakes or violations.
Mistakes represent normal behavior that fails to produce the desired outcome. Violations refer to
the willful disregard of accepted practices. These mistakes and violations should be considered in
more detail.
Decision-, Skill-, and Perception-Based Mistakes
Decisions are based primarily on three factors: information, knowledge, and experience (see
Chapter 3). In latent print examination, information lies in the latent and exemplar prints, which
must be of sufficient quality and quantity to compare and evaluate. In addition, the examiner
should be provided with other information, such as the surface from which the latent prints
were recovered, the technique used to develop and recover the latent prints, and the method
used to capture the exemplar prints. The examiner applies training, background knowledge, and
experience comparing a broad range of pairs of latent and exemplar prints to assess the available
information. When important information, knowledge, or experience is lacking, mistakes can
occur. Often referred to as honest mistakes, these mistakes typically present themselves as
poorly executed procedures, improper choices, or the misinterpretation or misuse of relevant
information.
Other mistakes occur with little or no conscious thought. For instance, during latent print
examination, examiners can orient many latent prints without conscious attention. Tasks such as
these highly practiced and automatic behaviors are particularly affected by attention or memory
failures. Distractions in the laboratory (see Chapter 7) may lead to a loss of concentration,
erroneous documentation, and other mistakes.

Senders, J. and N. Moray. Human Error: Cause, Prediction, and Reduction. Psychology Press, 1991.
Wiegmann, D. and S. Shappell. A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident Analysis: The Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System. Ashgate Publishing, 2003.
576
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Additionally, mistakes can
occur as a result of the manner
in which the examiners store
and compare latent print data.
For instance, when latent
and exemplar prints have
only limited corresponding
information, the examiner
must search different regions
of the latent print separately,
breaking up the pattern of data
and searching each component.
Examiners who are inclined
to search the latent print as a
complete image (searching
for the whole pattern) can fail
to identify the latent print or
can erroneously exclude the
exemplar.
Examples of these types
of mistakes in latent print
examination are failures to
find target data, to properly
weight the data, to recognize
distortion, and to compare
enough corresponding features.
These types of mistakes can lead
to a conclusion exceeding the
abilityof the examiner, a failure
to search all exemplars, a hurried
or insufficiently thorough
examination, insufficient data to
support the conclusion, a misprioritized level of effort, and
improperly deeming a print to be
suitable or unsuitable.

Box 9.1: Learning from Others: Benchmarking in
Forensic Science
Forensic laboratories and latent print examiners can learn from
each other and from other industries to improve procedures and
human factors considerations. This process, called benchmarking,
is primarily associated with actions that Xerox took in the early
1980s to remain competitive with companies that were producing
less expensive and higher quality copiers. Xerox not only studied
its competitors’ products and processes, but the company also
looked at other industries’ processes and translated those best
practices into the Xerox standard procedures. Xerox defines
benchmarking as “the continuous process of measuring our
products, services, and practices against our toughest competitors
or those companies known as leaders.”577 This model is comprised
of ten steps in four phases:
Planning phase
Select a subject to benchmark
Identify the best practitioners in the field of study
Determine the data-collection method and collect the data
Analysis phase
Determine the current gap
Project future performance
Integration phase
Communicate the results of analysis
Establish functional goals
Action phase
Develop action plans
Implement plans and monitor results
Recalibrate benchmark578
In the field of emergency medicine, efforts are underway
to incorporate benchmarking.579 The non-profit Emergency
Department Benchmarking Alliance spearheads this effort by
maintaining a database of performance metrics, by hosting
conferences and meetings, and by providing community-building
services to their member organizations.580 According to the
Alliance’s data, benchmarking seems to be working. Wait times in
emergency departments from 2008 to 2009 fell for the first time in
four decades.581
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Camp, R. Business Process Benchmarking: Finding and Implementing Best Practices. ASQC Quality Press,
1995.
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American College of Emergency Physicians. Benchmarking in Emergency Medicine, March 1997. Accessed
November 29, 2011. http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=34362.
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Emergency Department Benchmarking Alliance. About Us. Accessed November 29, 2011.
http://edbenchmarking.org/index.php.
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Augustine, J. “ED Wait Times Improving for the First Time in 40 Years.” Improving Health Care, Press Ganey.
February 21, 2011.
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Violations
Two types of violations deserve mention: willful noncompliance and exceptional violations.
Often referred to as “bending the rules,” willful noncompliance tends to be habitual and is
enabled by a system of supervision and management that tolerates departures from standard
procedures. Just as some drivers may go 5 miles per hour over the speed limit, some examiners
may engage in shortcuts to come to a conclusion. Exceptional violations are willful and
particularly egregious, and they are neither tolerated by management nor routinely observed in
the forensic laboratory. An exceptional violation would be akin to driving 30 miles per hour over
the speed limit.
Examples of violations include deeming a latent print not suitable to avoid having to compare
it, disregarding aspects of the QA/QC process (for example, skipping the Verification phase),
intentionally misidentifying a latent print, making an identification or exclusion of a latent print
that the examiner knows is not suitable for comparison, reporting results without conducting a
comparison, and coercing a verifier into agreeing with a rendered conclusion.
9.2.2

Conditions that Affect Performance

Conditions of the examiner, of communication, and of the environment can affect an examiner’s
performance.
Physical and Mental State
An examiner’s mental state, physiological state, and physical or mental limitations all can
affect performance. Adverse mental states include temporary conditions such as exhaustion
and stress. The examiner and management should take appropriate action when the examiner is
not fit for duty. In most forensic units, examiners confront large backlogs. Some examiners are
held to quotas or unrealistic turn-around times. In this environment, examiners could become
more concerned with case output than the quality of the work. As a result, examiners may
hurry through cases, taking shortcuts in the analysis and documentation, and failing to reach
an appropriate conclusion. Plainly, many factors can affect the mental state of the examiner.
Examples are anger, apprehension about reaching conclusions, boredom and complacency,
distraction, expectancy, fatigue, overconfidence, peer pressure, and personal problems.
In addition, the examiner’s physiological state can affect the examination process. For example,
the typical latent print examiner is usually bending over a desk or workbench for long stretches
of time, looking through a magnifier, and making numerous comparisons. These working
conditions produce strain on the neck, back, and eyes. Glare from computer displays and the
sheer number of comparisons can result in headaches or eyestrain (see Chapter 7 for more
information about healthy workplace design).
Performance can also suffer due to lack of sleep. In many agencies, an examiner could be
called to a crime scene in the middle of the night and then be expected to work a normal latent
print caseload the next day without rest. Illness can have detrimental effects, and medications
can influence a person’s quality of sleep and daytime alertness. Other factors bearing on
physiological states include alcohol and drug use, nutrition, and injuries.
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Finally, physical or mental limitations affect the condition of the examiner. Deteriorating
eyesight is a physical limitation, while an inability to maintain competency is a mental limitation.
If the physical or mental limitation cannot be compensated for, the examiner may no longer
be qualified to perform latent print examinations. Other physical or mental limitations include
chronic psychological disorders, dyslexia, inadequate training or experience, incompatible
aptitude, and visual limitations such as poor acuity, poor contrast sensitivity, and color blindness.
Communication
An examiner must work with other examiners, management, investigators, attorneys, and
administrative personnel. While verbal communication is certainly important, communication
via case documentation is also imperative. Only with sufficient documentation and reporting
can other examiners and supervisors adequately provide technical and administrative review.
For instance, understanding the location, orientation, surface, and development technique of the
latent print can be critical for interpreting print distortion. Additionally, understanding how the
examiner searched the latent print (distal orientation and anatomical region) can provide critical
information if an error has occurred.
Communication can suffer from confusing or conflicting directions or demands, a failure to
convey or obtain adequate information, lack of report-writing skills, lack of teamwork, poor case
documentation, and departures from standard terminology.
Environment
Environmental factors can contribute to errors. Both the operational environment (e.g.,
workplace design or clutter) and the ambient environment (e.g., temperature, noise, and lighting)
can degrade performance. For example, the intensity, type, and direction of lighting can influence
what an examiner perceives as key data. Chapter 7 discusses such physical environmental
conditions as clutter, excessive heat or cold, lighting, ventilation, and noise, as well as technical
environmental factors such as equipment and software.
9.2.3

Supervisory Issues

If an error has occurred, the investigation of the cause(s) starts with the examiner’s actions,
proceeds through the conditions that may have contributed to the error, and continues on to
supervisory actions and possibly organizational oversights or failures.
Leadership
Effective management provides examiners with adequate training, professional guidance,
oversight, and operational leadership. Without this leadership, the chance of errors is greater.
Managers can become so overwhelmed with meetings and paperwork that they fail to provide
sufficient oversight. Yet, some supervisors take oversight to extremes, becoming too controlling
and more concerned with minute details than the accuracy of the work. Micromanaging
examiners can delay decision-making, restrict information flow, and diminish confidence and
efficiency.
Effective leadership helps avoid errors by ensuring appropriate training; setting a proper
example; tracking and assessing job qualifications or skills; monitoring work; providing
appropriate feedback, mentoring, and incentives; and maintaining realistic expectations.
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Operational Planning
Management is responsible for planning the operations of the forensic unit. Scheduling should
include breaks and should take caseloads and deadlines into account. The supervisor who assigns
a large complex case to a less experienced examiner may inadvertently set up the examiner for
failure. Conversely, burdening the top performers with excessive work can keep them from
performing optimally and can limit the opportunities for less experienced examiners to learn.
Many latent print units are so overwhelmed that supervisors must divide casework into rush
cases and routine ones. Examiners with many rush cases can feel overwhelmed, frustrated, and
confused. Supervisors and managers need ways to allocate casework to maintain productivity
without causing frustration. Allowing examiners to finish one batch of cases before assigning
another batch can be helpful. Also, management can sometimes request a certain amount of time
from the court for rush cases to ensure that examiners can work the case properly. Trials can even
be rescheduled, if necessary. Other examples of operational planning failures are not allowing
adequate rest breaks; setting conflicting objectives, goals, or standards; and giving unclear or
conflicting assignments.
Problem Correction
When problems are known, they should be corrected. Consistent failure to correct or discipline
inappropriate behavior may foster a dysfunctional work environment. This caution also applies
to issues associated with equipment and supplies. When necessary repairs are overlooked or
supplies do not meet specifications, errors can result.
Supervisory Violations
Supervisory violations encompass the disregard of existing rules and regulations. An obvious
example of poor supervisory behavior is putting undue influence on an examiner to reach
a desired result. A more subtle violation is permitting an unqualified examiner to perform
casework. Likewise, pushing an examiner to work unreasonably fast or encouraging “bending
the rules” and procedures in the interest of completing a case are poor supervisory actions.
9.2.4

Organizational Influences

Organizational influences are the fourth and final layer—the last slice of Swiss cheese—to
investigate when evaluating the factors that led to an error. Three areas of organizational failures
fall into this category: resource management, organizational climate, and operational processes.
Resource Management
Resource management refers to the management, allocation, and maintenance of organizational
resources, including human resource management (selection, training, staffing), budgets,
logistics, and equipment design. Management decisions about such resources should focus on
both quality and cost-effectiveness. Unfortunately, quality improvements and training are often
the first items to be cut when experiencing financial difficulty. Resource management issues
include maintaining hiring, evaluation, and promotion policies; matching qualifications to job
assignments; reducing costs and managing unfunded directives; providing logistical support; and
making suitable equipment available.
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Organizational Climate
Organizational climate influences
examiner performance. The structure
of the organization includes the chain
of command, delegation of authority
and responsibility, communication
channels, and formal accountability
for actions. Agency policies that are
ill defined, adversarial, conflicting,
or supplanted by unofficial rules
and values can cause confusion,
reduce quality, and lead to a negative
organizational climate. Inaccessibility
of upper management, inadequate
accountability for actions, poorly
defined or articulated organizational
values, inappropriate allocation of
resources, and unclear or conflicting
assignments of responsibility can
also lead to a negative organizational
climate.

Box 9.2: High-Reliability Organizations
High-reliability organizations (HROs) are those with tightly
coupled, complex systems that have many potential points of
failure, any of which could result in catastrophic damage.582
Traditionally, these organizations are thought to include
nuclear power plants, air traffic control centers, aircraft
carriers, and submarines,583 but many habits of HRO
managers can benefit forensic science. While operating in a
highly complex environment, notably few catastrophic
failures occur in a successful HRO. For example, hospitals
consist of many individuals at many hierarchical levels
contributing to life-or-death decisions. To improve this
process in all hospitals, the Agency for Healthcare and
Research Quality has established an HRO network to allow
personnel to learn from each other’s expertise.584
Effective HROs empower employees at all levels with
“a way of looking at your job and your environment in
a ‘mindful’ way, which basically means that you both
anticipate potential problems and that you are also prepared
for them should they occur.”585 In other words, staff
members should consider things that could go wrong and
strive to improve on the status quo.586 Staff members must
be trained to recognize and address anomalies in the system
and should be rewarded for doing so. The overall mission,
communicated clearly throughout the organization, must
be willing to balance short-term gains with long-term
reliability.587 Management cannot take steps to “cut corners”
without expecting a system failure.

Many analysts work in fear of
retribution from management,
coworkers, and the International
Association for Identification
(IAI) Certification Board should
they misidentify a print. The IAI
Certification Program Operations
Manual states that a technical error
may result in suspension or revocation of certification and that the IAI can publish the results of
any disciplinary action.588 Consequently, some examiners may be unable or unwilling to make
difficult identifications. Worse yet, examiners may feel compelled to conceal mistakes.
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Effective management is vital to delivering high-quality forensic services. Because human
error in interpreting forensic science evidence can have devastating effects, examiners should
be encouraged to come forward to help understand when and why errors occur. Management
must foster a culture that promotes openness and acceptance when errors are committed without
fostering a nonchalant attitude. The Working Group recommends:
Recommendation 9.1: Management should foster a culture in which it is understood
that some human error is inevitable and that openness about errors leads to
improvements in practice.
Operational Processes
Operational processes refer to formal processes (e.g., operational tempo, time pressures,
production quotas, incentive systems, and schedules), procedures (e.g., performance standards,
objectives, documentation, and instructions about procedures), and oversight within the agency
(e.g., organizational self-study, risk management, and establishment and implementation of
a QA/QC process). Poor upper-level management decisions concerning each of these factors
can also have a negative effect on the examiners’ performance. Operational process factors
include accreditation; appropriate standards, policies, or guidelines; documentation for standard
operational procedures; overextension of resources; procedures that are not integrated into the
training process; and, again, work and production schedules that produce risky decisions.
Recommendation 9.2: Management should employ a system to identify and track errors
and their causes.
Appendix A gives a sample taxonomy of human factors issues and errors, including those
discussed above. Appendix B includes an example of a Corrective Action Report, and Appendix
C shows how the human factors described in the chapter apply to that particular error.

9.3

Accreditation as a Means to Quality Improvement

Accreditation is a multi-faceted process that ensures that the forensic laboratories follow a
documented quality management system and adhere to standards of operation promulgated
through standard-developing organizations. An accrediting body’s routine onsite surveillance
visits, required annual self-audit reports, and an externally monitored proficiency testing
program assures periodic monitoring of the unit’s compliance with the accreditation program’s
requirements.
Through accreditation, a forensic service provider demonstrates compliance with nationally
and internationally recognized standards. Accreditation also ensures that the forensic unit has
procedures in place to take appropriate corrective actions when indications of a significant
problem appear. Unfortunately, there is a lack of uniformity in the application of existing
accreditation standards in the United States, and different accrediting organizations apply
different requirements (see Chapter 8).
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9.3.1

Personnel Requirements

Personnel requirements for accreditation
include minimum standards for education,
training, competency testing, and ongoing
proficiency testing. Before assuming
casework responsibility, each examiner
should complete an established training
program and should be tested for
competency, at least in the most relevant
work areas. Examiners should be routinely
reviewed through annual proficiency testing,
technical review of reports and examination
records, and annual courtroom testimony
monitoring (see Recommendation 6.4).
Ongoing professional development for each
examiner is an important element of the
accreditation process.
Under the International Organization for
Standardization’s international standard
ISO/IEC 17025, a forensic unit “must have
arrangements to ensure that its management
and personnel are free from any undue
internal and external commercial, financial,
and other pressures and influences that may
adversely affect the quality of their work.”590
9.3.2

Box 9.3: Accreditation in the European Union
In late November 2009, the European Union (EU)
approved a measure known as the Framework
Decision to standardize forensic laboratory
accreditation in member states. Because of the high
likelihood for cross-border crimes in the EU, judicial
systems in each country must have confidence in
laboratory results from other countries.
The standards require national accreditation bodies
in each member state to grant accreditation to
forensic laboratories that comply with ISO/IEC
17025, General requirements for the competence
of testing and calibration laboratories. The
accreditation standard specifically applies to
laboratories that produce DNA profiles or work with
latent print data. Each member state is responsible
for ensuring compliance, for granting accreditation
to their own laboratories, and for providing any
funding necessary to achieve accreditation. The EU
requires all latent print labs to comply with ISO/IEC
17025 by November 30, 2015.589

Management Procedures

Accreditation requires documented quality management procedures for the operation of the unit.
The management system must designate a quality manager responsible for ensuring that the unit
operates in conformity with the quality management system. Procedures must include steps to
ensure that evidence is protected from loss, cross-transfer, contamination, or deleterious change.
The procedures must ensure that evidence is properly marked and tracked throughout the period
the unit controls the evidence.
9.3.3

Technical Procedures

Technical procedures must be documented, validated, and accepted in the scientific community.
An accrediting agency conducts onsite assessments to ensure that the unit follows its documented
procedures, adheres to the required standards, and uses proper controls.
Council Framework Decision 2009/905/JHA of 30 November 2009 on Accreditation of Forensic Service
Providers Carrying out Laboratory Activities. “Acts Adopted Under the Title VI of the EU Treaty.” Official Journal
of the European Union, 52, (December 9, 2009): 14–16.
590
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9.3.4

Facility Safety and Security

The forensic unit should have a well-designed, efficient laboratory with adequate ventilation and
safety equipment. All forensic units should follow applicable Occupational Safety and Health
Administration standards, state and local health agency guidelines, and other safety regulations
and should offer a mandatory safety training program (see Chapter 7).
The facility must have security to limit access to evidence, whether stored or under examination,
and access to authorized individuals. The accreditation process evaluates the physical plant to
ensure these standards are met.
Recommendation 9.3: All forensic service providers should be accredited by a
recognized accrediting body.

9.4

Case Review, Conflict Resolution, and Corrective Action

Assuring the quality of forensic work, particularly in those disciplines in which the examiner is
the sole provider of the results, can be challenging. Examiners can be influenced by a range of
factors, including experience, fatigue, and stress. Not only are no two examiners exactly alike,
but also an individual examiner’s performance level can vary throughout the day. Thus, case
review is an integral component of quality management.591
Case review involves verification, technical review, and administrative review. During the
Verification phase of the Analysis, Evaluation, Comparison, and Verification process, a second
examiner re-examines the latent prints to confirm or refute the conclusion of the case examiner.
During technical review, another expert reviews the case file and report “to ensure the validity
of scientific results and conclusions.”592 During administrative review, an expert examines the
case file “for consistency with laboratory policy and for editorial correctness.”593 If discrepancies
arise, the laboratory must have policies and procedures in place to address them.594 Numerous
discrepancies can arise, but the remainder of this section focuses on disagreements during
Verification, methods to resolve conflicting results, and corrective action.
9.4.1

Verification

Agencies should have a clear policy indicating which results will undergo verification. The
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST)
quality assurance guidelines state that source attributions “shall be verified prior to reporting”
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but that “exclusion or inconclusive results may be verified.”595 Verifying all results would be
ideal (and some agencies do so). To conserve resources, however, agencies may verify all
identifications but only a portion of the exclusions and inconclusive results.
The verifier typically receives the latent prints, the exemplar prints, the conclusions of the
case examiner, and other information. In a blind verification, however, the verifier does not
know the outcome of the first examination (see Chapters 1, 3, and 5). For blind verification to
be meaningfully conducted, a sufficient proportion of all case conclusions must be reviewed.
SWGFAST has released a Standard for the Application of Blind Verification of Friction Ridge
Examinations596 to assist agencies instituting blind verification.597Additional research into the
costs and benefits of blind verification would be valuable.
9.4.2

Conflict Resolution

Once the agency establishes procedures for verifications, it also must adopt procedures for
handling and documenting conflicting decisions. Conflict can occur because examiners have
varying degrees of knowledge, skills, training, and experience. The agency must have a method
to determine the result that will be reported as correct. Some agencies have a technical leader
who makes the final decision. Others use a panel of examiners. Still others send conflicting
results to another forensic service provider, which helps to mitigate some internal concerns (e.g.,
systemic error, personality conflicts, and bias) but is not practical for all agencies. Regardless
of the procedure implemented by the agency, the existence of the disagreement should be
noted in the report, and the basis for the final consensus should be stated in the report or
other documentation. (For additional discussion of conflict resolution and how it differs from
consultation, see Chapter 5, section 5.3.5.)
9.4.3

Corrective Action

Once the conflict has been resolved, an “error” will have to be attributed to either the case
examiner or the verifier, and corrective action may be appropriate.598 For instance, failing to
identify a single latent print on an item when the subject has been identified as leaving other
prints on the item may not be critical. An occasional non-critical failure to identify does not
necessitate a formal corrective action; however, routine failures to identify should result in a
formal corrective action, as it may indicate a contributing issue such as training, medical issues,
or the work environment. Regardless of any formal corrective actions, management should track
errors to determine if there are chronic problems.

Ibid. (emphasis added).
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Standard for the Application
of Blind Verification of Friction Ridge Examinations. Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge
Analysis, Study and Technology, February 2011.
597
For discussion of a mixed system of blind and non-blind verification, see U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI’s Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the Office of the
Inspector General Report on the Fingerprint Misidentification in the Brandon Mayfield Case. U.S. Department of
Justice, 2011.
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SWGFAST, 2006, op. cit.
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The response of management to an error must be commensurate with the potential impact and
frequency of the error.599 When errors occur, resolution may involve a simple consultation
between the examiners or a formal corrective action. ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation standards
state that (1) a laboratory must have policies and procedures regarding the implementation of
corrective action, (2) the procedures must include an investigation to determine root causes,
and (3) the laboratory must take preventive measures to mitigate the problem.600 Appendix B
provides a sample Corrective Action Report, which describes the circumstances of an error, the
corrective action, and the preventive measures.
Appendix C lists the human factors issues from all levels (examiner, conditional, supervisory,
organizational) that contributed to the error in Appendix B. By compiling statistics on the various
human factors issues related to each error, evaluating the data from multiple errors, and looking
for common themes, management can become aware of critical failures in the system that
could be setting the examiners up for failure. This systems approach could improve examiner
performance not only within an agency but also throughout the profession.
Recommendation 9.4: Management should establish policies and procedures for case
review and conflict resolution, corrective action, and preventive measures.

9.5

Competency, Certification, and Proficiency Testing

Certification and testing for competency and proficiency are components of a strong quality
management system. Testing is one way to measure the examiner’s knowledge, skills, and
abilities. It can be used to demonstrate the examiner’s minimum competency, achievement of
proficiency, and continued proficiency. A competency test evaluates “a person’s knowledge and
ability prior to performing independent casework.”601 A proficiency test evaluates “the capability
and performance of analysts, technical support personnel, and the laboratory; in open tests, the
analysts and technical support personnel are aware that they are being tested; in blind tests, they
are unaware.”602
Many professions (e.g., language training, medicine, accountancy, and law) use testing and
certification to demonstrate and acknowledge that an individual has met established minimum
standards of skills and knowledge. In these professions, the testing process is typically called
competency testing, and the official acknowledgement is called certification. Various professions
handle certification and proficiency testing in different ways.

Ibid.
ISO/IEC 17025:2005(E), op. cit.
601
ASCLD/LAB, op. cit.
602
Ibid.
599
600
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The process of competency
testing, certification, and
proficiency testing in the latent
print discipline is largely ad
hoc by jurisdiction and agency.
It may be difficult to gain
consensus on what competency,
certification, and proficiency
mean, let alone how they will
be attained or documented. Yet,
accreditation standards require
competency testing prior to
performing casework and the
successful completion of a
proficiency test by each examiner
annually.
Recommendation 9.5: The
latent print community
should develop and
implement a comprehensive
testing program that
includes competency
testing, certification testing,
and proficiency testing.

Box 9.4: Certification and Testing for the Practice of
Medicine
Upon graduation from an accredited medical school, all medical
school graduates are required to pass a national licensing
examination before practicing medicine. The test is sponsored by
the Federation of State Medical Boards and the National Board
of Medical Examiners. The first part (on anatomy, physiology,
biochemistry, pharmacology, pathology, microbiology, and
behavioral sciences) typically is taken at the end of the second
year of medical school. The second part (on clinical knowledge),
includes demonstrations of clinical skills via simulated patient
encounters and typically is taken in the fourth year of medical
school. The final part is taken at the end of the student’s formal
medical school training and before internship and residency. This
2-day test measures the student’s knowledge of basic science and
medicine and assesses his or her ability to manage patient care via
case simulations that include prescribing medications.
After completing formal medical education at an accredited
medical university and passing the competency examinations,
U.S. medical students are required to complete a 1-year
internship. This internship is typically part of the student’s
postgraduate residency in a chosen specialty (e.g., orthopedics,
radiology, family practice). The internship is the minimum
training requirement for a license to practice medicine in the
U.S. and for taking most state medical board certification tests.
All state medical specialties require periodic proof of continued
professional competency. Continued professional competency
often includes continuing medical education, recertification
examinations, and some measure of clinical skills as approved by
the certification board.

A standardized national testing
program would be very useful
in achieving this goal. To
implement such a program,
however, major tasks would need
to be accomplished. Research
should evaluate current training programs to discern similarities, weaknesses, and effectiveness
(see Chapter 8). Training standards and standardized training material, including practical
exercises, should be written, and criteria for selecting qualified trainers should be developed. A
standardized test should be written with input from specialists in test design and validation. This
test (or others) could be part of the framework for comprehensive testing described below.
9.5.1

Competency Training

During the training program, the new examiner should work toward a minimum level of
knowledge and skill. To show that this level has been achieved, the examiner should pass a
standardized competency test. Because examiners typically perform additional agency-specific
functions (e.g., automatic fingerprint identification system entry, latent print development,
and latent print photography), the agency or a national body should develop competency tests
tailored to the examiner’s duties.
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After succeeding in the competency tests, an examiner can perform casework. A certified
examiner should review the new examiner’s casework at this stage. All conclusions should be
verified, and each case should undergo technical review. This verification and technical review
should continue until the agency determines that the examiner can work successfully under the
agency’s routine verification and technical review process. The examiner should not perform
verification or technical reviews before becoming certified.
9.5.2

Certification Testing

A standardized certification test demonstrates that the examiner has become proficient in
casework and meets or exceeds minimum competency to perform latent print examinations.
To retain certification, an examiner should complete continuing education requirements and
demonstrate proficiency in periodic proficiency tests.
9.5.3

Proficiency Testing

Periodic proficiency tests are a means to ensure that examiners maintain their skills. Agencies
should administer proficiency tests at least annually that reflect the type of casework performed
by the examiner. A standardized proficiency test for each examiner not only could demonstrate
the necessary ability to continue as an examiner, but it also could inform training needs across
the discipline. For instance, a high erroneous exclusion rate on latent palm prints that lack a clear
distal orientation and anatomical region could indicate that training programs need to place more
emphasis on palm prints or that examiners need periodic refresher training on palm prints.603

9.6

Summary

This chapter offers recommendations about the principles, policies, and practices of management
and describes strategies to prevent human errors in latent print examinations. Management
within any forensic operation must be committed to developing, maintaining, and improving
quality assurance and quality control. Latent print units should report accurate and timely results.
The examiners have the responsibility to provide results and testimony based upon scientific or
technical knowledge, training, and experience. Management must create the proper environment
for this to occur. This includes creating an impeccable QA/QC process; meeting standards of
certification, accreditation, and proficiency testing; and adopting a systems approach to reducing
errors.

603

Proficiency testing for other purposes, such as estimating error rates, is considered in Chapter 2.
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Appendix 9-A: Sample Taxonomy of Errors and Human Factors
The following tables contain a classification scheme that outlines potential sources of error.
Additional factors at every level could always occur and should be documented and tracked.
Examiner Actions
Decision-Based Mistakes
Conclusion exceeded ability of examiner
Failure to recognize exemplars as inadequate
Failure to search all exemplars
Failure to use available technology
Hurried or insufficiently thorough examination
Improper anatomical source of data
Improper orientation of images
Incomplete search
Insufficient data to support conclusion
Misprioritized level of effort
Poor target group selection
Print improperly deemed suitable
Print improperly deemed unsuitable
Perception-Based Mistakes
Not all data perceived
Data perceived and compared inadequately
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Skill-Based Mistakes
Failure to find target data
Failure to properly weight the significance of the
data
Failure to recognize distortion
Inability to reach a conclusion
Incomplete comparison
Misinterpreted data
Not all data understood
Poor search technique
Examiner Violations
Deeming a latent print not suitable intentionally
Disregarding QA/QC procedures (e.g., verification)
Disregarding discrepant information
Erroneously identifying a latent print (intentionally)
Identifying an unsuitable latent print (intentionally)
Including a subject inappropriately (intentionally)
Misrepresentation of information
Not comparing a latent print and reporting exclusion
or inconclusive results
Seeking/coercing another examiner to verify a
complex comparison
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Conditions that Affect Performance
Adverse Mental States of the Examiner
Anger
Apprehension to reach a conclusion
Bias
Boredom
Channelized attention
Complacency
Compromised integrity or ethics
Distraction
Expectancy
Frustration
Haste
Lack of confidence
Mental fatigue
Misplaced motivation
Overconfidence
Peer pressure
Preoccupation with personal problems
Task overload
Stress
Adverse Physiological States of the Examiner
Alcohol use (intoxicated or hung-over)
Eyestrain
Illicit drug use
Inadequate nutrition (poor dietary practices)
Lack of sleep
Medical illness
Physical fatigue (e.g., postural fatigue)
Physical injuries
Medication side effects

Physical or Mental Limitations of the Examiner
Chronic psychological disorder
Color vision deficiency
Dyslexia
Inadequate training
Incompatible intelligence/aptitude
Limited experience
Visual limitations (e.g., acuity or contrast sensitivity)
Communication
Confusing or conflicting directions or demands
Failure to convey adequate information
Failure to use all available sources of information
Inadequate communication among examiners
Inadequate communication with management
Inadequate report writing skills
Inadequate teamwork
Inadequate case documentation
Standard terminology not used
Physical Environment
Clutter
Excessive heat or cold
Inadequate lighting
Inadequate ventilation
Poor workplace design
Noise interference
Technical Environment
Defective equipment
Defective tools
Inadequate/outdated software or equipment
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Supervisory Issues
Leadership Failures
Change induced without training
Failure to provide professional guidance and
oversight
Failure to set proper example
Failure to track job qualifications or skills
Inadequate assessment of required skill
Inadequate leadership job knowledge
Inadequate monitoring of work
Inadequate or incorrect performance feedback
Inadequate performance measurement or evaluation
Insufficient initial or ongoing training provided
Inadequate or inappropriate incentives
Inadequate coaching or mentoring on skill
Inadequate measurement of training effectiveness
Personality conflicts
Unrealistic expectations

Failure to Correct Known Problems
Failure to correct inappropriate behavior
Failure to correct reported problem
Failure to correct workplace hazards
Failure to initiate corrective action
Failure to update standard operating procedures
Rewarding or tolerating improper performance
Supervisory Violations
Enabling excessive risk-taking
Failure to enforce rules and regulations
Supervisor encouragement of rule bending
Fraudulent documentation
Management-induced haste
Unrealistic production goals
Undue influence toward a desired outcome
Violation of standard operating procedures by
supervisor

Operational Planning Failures
Excessive workload
Failure to provide adequate rest breaks
Improper or insufficient delegation of work
Inadequate communication of policy, procedure,
practices, or guidelines
Inadequate documentation
Inadequate matching of individual qualifications and
job or task requirements
Setting objectives, goals, or standards that conflict
Unclear or conflicting assignment of responsibility
Unrealistic deadlines or quotas
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Organizational Influences
Resource Management Failures
Failure to correct known design flaws
Inadequate evaluation and promotion policies
Inadequate hiring, firing, and promotion processes
Inadequate matching of qualifications for the job
Ineffective cost-cutting
Lack of logistical support
Purchasing unsuitable equipment/parts
Inadequate selection of personnel
Inadequate staffing
Use of inadequate contractor or vendor
Unfunded directives

Operational Process Failures
Failure to maintain accreditation
Lack of appropriate standards, policies, or guidelines
Inadequate documentation for standard operating
procedures
Organizationally induced time pressure
Overextending resources
Procedures not integrated into training process
Quality process not adequately implemented or
maintained
Unrealistic quotas established by the organization
Work or production schedules that produce risky
decisions

Organizational Climate Failures
Inadequate accessibility or visibility of upper
management
Inadequate allocation of resources
Inadequate formal accountability for actions
Dysfunctional organizational culture
Organizational values not clearly defined and
articulated
Unclear or conflicting assignments of responsibility
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Appendix 9-B: Corrective Action Report Sample
FORENSIC LAB CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT
Place “N/A” in blanks that are not applicable.
APPLICABLE #(S) (e.g., Event #, CTS #)
RELEVANT INSTRUMENT:
Case: 12356-78
Instrument type: N/A
Manufacturer: N/A
Model #: N/A

Serial #: N/A
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT/EFFECT OF DISCREPANCY
Forensic scientist (FS) Jane Doe was assigned homicide case #123456-78. FS Doe worked the case
during November and early December 2009. FS Doe completed the initial formal report in December
2009. She developed latent prints on 4 items of evidence and recovered 16 latent prints. She deemed
two of these suitable for comparison.
FS Doe also examined 3 latent print packets submitted by Crime Scene Examiners (CSA), collectively
containing 56 lifts/photos. On these lifts/photos, 75 suitable latent prints were present.
FS Doe compared the 77 suitable latent prints to those of 5 suspects, 1 victim, and 1 other subject
identified via the automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS). This amounts to 539 conclusions.
One suspect was identified to one of the latent prints recovered from the evidence. Another suspect
was identified to one latent print submitted by CSA. The AFIS subject was identified to 28 latent prints
submitted by the CSA.
Manager Susan Smith verified these results on February 4, 2010. Manager Smith noted that two of the
identifications recorded by FS Doe were to the incorrect finger of the correct subject (AFIS subject). FS
Doe originally identified the two latent prints to the right thumb of the subject; however, one was made
by the right middle finger, and the other was made by the right ring finger of the same subject.
Manager Smith noted the correct conclusion in the case notes and asked FS Doe to review her conclusions. FS Doe immediately noticed the errors. Manager Smith verbally notified the quality assurance
(QA) manager and the laboratory director on February 8, 2010. The case was returned to FS Doe, and
she created charted enlargements for her case file and annotated the notes appropriately. Manager Smith
completed a technical review of the case on February 25, 2010, and issued the report.
There was no effect of the discrepancy, as the errors were caught during the Verification phase.
Date: 3/4/11

193

Reported By: Manager Smith

Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis

ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION
The right thumb, middle, and ring fingers of the subject had similar ridge configurations in the core.
The similar pattern, ridge count, and ridge configuration in these fingers likely contributed to the errors.
In addition, FS Doe was under significant stress during this time period because of the terminal illness
of a parent.
FS Doe also indicated to Manager Smith that she was trying to increase her case productivity to help
alleviate the backlog. The pressure FS Doe was placing upon herself to complete the case may also
have contributed to the error.
FS Doe was increasing the use of fingerprint loupes into the analysis of her casework during this time
period to prepare for the International Association of Identification (IAI) Latent Print Certification Test.
This was a significant departure from her normal routine, which focuses on the use of digital imaging
during her comparisons. (The IAI certification test does not permit use of digital imaging technology.)
FS Doe normally charts her identifications via Photoshop, but she did not do so in this case because she
used the loupes.
The cumulative effect of the stress of life events, similarity of the prints, time pressure, and technology
adaptations ultimately resulted in these errors.
Determined By: Manager Smith
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN
Corrective Action
FS Doe was placed on supervised casework for a period of 30 days. Nine cases were fully reviewed
and re-examined during this time. No errors were noted. Upon completion of the 30 days of supervised
casework, FS Doe was assigned a Collaborative Testing Services test as in-house proficiency test on
March 17, 2011. FS Doe successfully completed this test on April 1, 2011.
From November 1, 2010, to February 3, 2011, FS Doe completed ten cases. Seven of these cases were
reviewed. No errors were noted on the identifications in these cases. The three cases that were not
reviewed during this time were latent print development cases, and no comparable latent prints were
recovered.
Preventive Measures
FS Doe and Manager Smith analyzed and marked 30 difficult latent prints to evaluate FS Doe’s ability
to interpret and detect minutiae. Once marked, FS Doe and Manager Smith compared the markings and
discussed the results for each image. The goal of this exercise was to ensure that FS Doe was correctly
assessing friction ridge detail. FS Doe successfully completed this exercise: Manager Smith did not
note any problems with FS Doe’s interpretation of the friction ridge detail.
The Forensic Laboratory monitors the caseload and work product more carefully during high-stress
times. Over time, examiners learn when they are not mentally able to perform the task and postpone the
examination to a better time. Possibly, cases should be re-assigned in this situation.
If FS Doe chooses to use the fingerprint loupe in casework, the comparison will be repeated utilizing
digital imaging to determine if the re-examination yields any inconsistencies.
Date: 05/3/2011
Approved By: QA Manager
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ROUTE TO IN LAB: (NAME & P #)
FS Jane Doe

SIGNATURE

DATE

Manager Smith
QA Manager
Laboratory Director
ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS, IF REQUIRED:
PERSON NOTIFIED: (NAME & TITLE / P #)

ASCLD/LAB Notified:

□ Yes

DATE NOTIFIED

X Not Required

NOTES:
Jane Doe has not made any erroneous identifications since this incident - QA Manager 08/26/20101

THIS SECTION WILL BE COMLPETED BY THE QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER
Was the problem corrected?

× Yes □ No

(if no, complete section below)

FOLLOW-UP, IF REQUIRED:
N/A - QA Manager
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Appendix 9-C: Applying Human Factors to an Error
Human factors issues have an impact on examiner performance. The error described in the
Corrective Action Report (CAR) in Appendix B was the culmination of a breakdown in the
system, not just the fault of the examiner. The examiner involved is a dedicated professional
and an excellent casework examiner. In reviewing the CAR, one can look at the various holes in
the Swiss cheese model at each level: Examiner Actions, Conditions that Affect Performance,
Supervisory Issues, and Organizational Influences.
Examiner Action: Decision-Based Mistakes

Supervisory Issues: Leadership Failures

Failure to use available technology

Inadequate assessment of required skill

Hurried or insufficiently thorough examination

Inadequate monitoring of work

Misprioritized level of effort

Inadequate coaching or mentoring on skill

Examiner Action: Skill-Based Mistake
Misinterpreted data
Examiner Action: Perception-Based Mistake
Not all data perceived

Organizational: Resource Management Failures
Inadequate staffing
Organizational: Operational Process Failures
Organizationally induced time pressure
Overextending resources

Conditions: Adverse Mental States
Preoccupation with personal problems
Stress
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Chapter 10: Summary of Recommendations
The recommendations and suggestions of the Working Group address issues ranging from the
acquisition of impressions of friction ridge skin to courtroom testimony, from laboratory design
and equipment to research into emerging methods for associating latent prints with exemplars.
This group is not the first to address most of these matters; the recommendations are informed
by and build upon the work of many practitioners and scholars of forensic science and evidence
as well as the experience of other industries and enterprises that must deliver safe products or
services. This concluding chapter collects and organizes the recommendations put forth on the
following topics:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Performing Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V)
Reporting and testifying
Managing the process
Improving training and education
Providing facilities and equipment
Supporting research efforts.

10.1 Performing Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V)
Latent print examinations can produce very powerful evidence regarding the possible association
between a suspect and the source of a print. The long-established practice in latent print
examinations is to interpret the evidence in terms of the categorical conclusion that two prints
do or do not share a common source (or to report that the information presented does not permit
such a categorical conclusion). Traditionally, a fingerprint identification was considered an
“individualization,” meaning that the latent print was considered identified to one finger of a
specific individual to exclude every other potential source in the universe. However, this claim
is needlessly strong, not yet adequately supported by fundamental research, and impossible to
validate solely on the basis of experience. Nor does fingerprint evidence have objective standards
or a well-validated statistical model that can provide an objective measure of its strength in a
given instance. Therefore, examiners should not claim to be able to exclude every other finger in
the world as a potential source. Rather, an identification decision suggests a substantial enough
similarity that, based on the examiner’s training and experience, the examiner believes that
the two impressions originated from a common source. Whether any other finger in the entire
world might also be able to leave an impression with a comparable amount of similarity is not
fully known, and the examiner’s testimony should not suggest otherwise. Regardless of the
specific words used to describe an identification, examiners should refrain from claiming that an
identification means that they have excluded all other individuals in the world.
Because empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not support a source attribution to
the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent print examiners should not report or
testify, directly or by implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion of all others in the
world. (Recommendation 3.7)
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The alternatives to the theory of universal individualization include probabilistic forms of source
attribution (see Chapter 1), qualitative or quantitative likelihood ratios (determined subjectively
or, in the future, with probabilistic models, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6), or a broader range
of conclusions than the three choices of identification, exclusion, or inconclusive. Without taking
a position on which of these approaches is best, the Working Group recommends:
The friction ridge examiner community and other experts should determine under what
circumstances a qualified rather than an absolute conclusion is warranted. (Recommendation
3.8)
However the conclusion of a latent print examination might be framed, the examination process
requires the careful interpretation and comparison of friction ridge impressions. From the
first examination of the features contained in a latent print to a final conclusion regarding an
identification or exclusion, an examiner engages in many acts of interpretation. Current methods
for making these interpretations are based on professional knowledge and experience rather than
on formal decision thresholds or statistical models. The process known as ACE-V organizes the
interpretations and decisions of an examiner into a useful and logical sequence, but descriptions
of this process do not detail the substantive content of the various steps. Examining latent prints
and exemplars necessitates judgment and expertise, which inevitably makes the interpretive
process partly subjective. With this subjectivity of interpretation comes the possibility of reduced
performance due to a wide range of human factors issues. To increase the transparency of the
process and to insulate the examiner from extraneous influences, the Working Group makes the
following recommendations:
A report and contemporaneous supporting notes or materials should document the
examination to make the interpretive process as transparent as possible. Although the degree
of detail may vary depending on the perceived complexity of the comparison, documentation
should, at a minimum, be sufficient to permit another examiner to assess the accuracy and
validity of the initial examiner’s assessment of the evidence. (Recommendation 3.1)
Modifications to the results of any stage of latent print analysis (e.g., feature selection, utility
assessment, discrepancy interpretation) after seeing a known exemplar should be viewed
with caution. Such modifications should be specifically documented as having occurred after
comparison has begun. (Recommendation 3.2)
Procedures should be implemented to protect examiners from exposure to extraneous
(domain-irrelevant) information in a case. (Recommendation 3.3)
Several steps in the latent print analysis process require a determination of latent print
utility or sufficiency. The examiner must determine whether the print has enough clarity and
quantity of information for some specified purpose. This happens both early in the process
(e.g., determinations of whether the latent is suitable for analysis or suitable for an automated
fingerprint identification system search) and later in the process (e.g., determinations of sufficient
information to compare the latent and exemplar). Forensic service providers can enhance the
transparency of their analyses and conclusions by promulgating clear guidelines that
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assist examiners in making determinations of utility.604 Therefore, the Working Group
recommends:
Each agency or forensic service provider should define “suitable” or “sufficient” in its
standard operations procedures. These guidelines should be as explicit as possible about what
is expected for sufficiency determinations at different stages of the latent print examination
process. (Recommendation 3.4)
Information that could be incorporated in an agency’s guidelines includes, for example, number
of minutiae and visibility of ridge flow, pores, ridge edges, and details of incipient ridges,
creases, and scars.605 For a more detailed discussion of suitability, see Chapter 3, section 3.4.
Modern investigations often compare latent prints to exemplars from automated fingerprint
identification system (AFIS) searches. When looking in a large database for those prints that bear
the greatest similarity to the latent print in question, these programs could select a print from a
non-source that is far more similar to the latent print than examiners are accustomed to seeing
from non-matching sources. An examiner whose idea of the necessary amount of information
for a match comes from a non-database world may not be taking into account the possibility
of incidental similarity that a large database carries with it. Special care may be warranted in
interpreting the evidence in such cases. Thus, the Working Group recommends:
When comparing latent prints to exemplars generated through AFIS searches, examiners
must recognize the possibility and dangers of incidental similarity. Adjustments such as
a higher decision threshold, stricter tolerances for differences in appearance, and explicit
feature weighting need to be considered. Modified quality assurance practices for this
scenario also should be considered. (Recommendation 3.6)

10.2 Reporting and Testifying
The forensic part of forensic science distinguishes it from other scientific disciplines. Outside
the forensic arena, scientists must report their results, but they rarely do so to inform criminal
investigators, prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts. The needs of these lay consumers of
forensic science evidence lead to two recommendations. First:
The report of the examination should ensure that the findings and their limitations are
intelligible to non-experts. (Recommendation 5.1)
Second, to maximize the likelihood that the evidence will be used properly, fully, and fairly at
trial, the report of the results of an examination should:
This refers to guidelines for deciding whether a print warrants further assessment and not to guidelines for source
attribution. Thus, a rule that specifies a minimum number of minutiae for sufficiency might be reasonable because it
creates a process that is consistent throughout the forensic service provider and transparent to others. Given current
information, however, a similar rule would not be appropriate for ultimate decision making.
605
The guidelines for determining whether a latent print is suitable for comparison are necessarily different than the
guidelines for comparing a pair of prints. The Working Group takes no position on whether agencies should couch
guidelines as recommendations or as requirements.
604
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a. Identify the latent print examiner(s);
b. Describe the items submitted to the examiner(s);
c. List the procedures used by the examiner to develop, visualize, or enhance the friction
ridge impressions;
d. List all comparisons conducted;
e. State all conclusions with the method used to reach them;
f. Note any important limitations to the conclusions;
g. Indicate whether a verification was made and whether there was any conflict of
opinion among examiners prior to the reported conclusions;
h. Note (or refer to external documentation of) any information about the case that the
examiner(s) received;
i. Note the existence of additional documentation; and
j. Define important technical terms, either explicitly or by reference to an authoritative,
readily available source. (Recommendation 5.2)
Latent print examiners do more than analyze impressions and prepare written records of
their work. They testify as expert witnesses who have more latitude than ordinary fact
witnesses to provide opinions and guidance to jurors. As expert witnesses and as forensic
science professionals, they have an obligation to their profession and to the court to maintain
“objectivity, staying within the bounds or limits of what the science can provide, maintaining
confidentiality, complying [with] legal demands such as disclosure, and being truthful.”606 To help
maintain this objectivity and “to promote the understanding of examinations and findings,”607 the
Working Group recommends:
Forensic service providers should adopt codes of ethics that require testifying in a
nonpartisan manner; answering questions from both the prosecution and the defense directly,
accurately, and fully; and providing appropriate scientific information before, during, and
after trial. (Recommendation 6.2)
The importance of “staying within the bounds or limits of what the science can provide” and
providing appropriate scientific information means that, as previously noted in section 10.1,
“latent print examiners should not report or testify, directly or by implication, to a source
attribution to the exclusion of all others in the world” (see Recommendation 3.7).
These goals are most likely to be realized when the expert confers with the lawyer prior to
direct examination. At a pretrial meeting, the expert can make clear the nature and limits of the
testimony that the evidentiary material warrants and can work with the lawyer to present this
information fully, fairly, and clearly.
The trial preparation process should address the presentation of technical information in
lay terms, the organization of the direct examination, possible cross-examination, and the
possible use of visual aids. (Recommendation 6.1)
Budowle, B., M. Bottrell, S. Bunch, et al. “A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic
Sciences and Direction for Continuing Advancement.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 54 (July 2009): 803.
607
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. A Model Policy for Friction Ridge
Examiner Professional Conduct. Version 1.0. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and
Technology, December 2008.
606
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Because absolute certainty is unattainable in science, the witness must be prepared to
acknowledge and discuss the possibility that an opinion is not correct. Therefore:
A testifying expert should be familiar with the literature related to error rates. A testifying
expert should be prepared to describe the steps taken in the examination process to reduce
the risk of observational and judgmental error. The expert should not state that errors are
inherently impossible or that a method inherently has a zero error rate. (Recommendation
6.3)
Finally, forensic service providers should maintain quality assurance mechanisms for reporting
and testifying.
An agency that employs latent print examiners should establish requirements and guidelines
for reporting, documentation, and testimony. The agency should review a sample of every
examiner’s case reports, documentation, and testimony and affidavits at least annually to
verify compliance with these requirements and guidelines. (Recommendation 6.4)

10.3 Managing the Process
Latent print examinations do not occur in isolation. Supervision of the staff members and
management of the facilities are essential to risk reduction and quality assurance and control.
Effective management requires good information about the incidence and sources of errors.
Making this information available requires a culture in which both management and staff
understand that openness about errors is not necessarily a path to punitive sanctions but rather is
part of an effective system to detect deviations from desired practices and incorrect judgments in
latent print casework. To achieve such a system, the Working Group recommends:
Management should foster a culture in which it is understood that some human
error is inevitable and that openness about errors leads to improvements in practice.
(Recommendation 9.1)
Management should employ a system to identify and track errors and their causes.
(Recommendation 9.2)
Management should establish policies and procedures for case review and conflict resolution,
corrective action, and preventive measures. (Recommendation 9.4)
Furthermore, adherence to appropriate standards is vital to achieving high levels of performance.
As a result:
All forensic service providers should be accredited by a recognized accrediting body.
(Recommendation 9.3)
The latent print community should develop and implement a comprehensive testing
program that includes competency testing, certification testing, and proficiency testing.
(Recommendation 9.5)
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Forensic service providers should require personnel to become certified through an
accredited program. Certifying bodies should review current certification tests with the aid of
professionals in test design and psychometrics. (Recommendation 8.7 in part)
Finally, to ensure that latent print examiners maintain their physical capacity to perform at high
levels of accuracy:
Forensic service providers should institute medical surveillance for examiners with respect
to activities specific to friction ridge examination. Corrective measures should be taken
when appropriate and recorded. The program should include a baseline visual examination
followed by annual vision testing to detect vision deficiencies that may affect interpretation
of the evidence. (Recommendation 7.2 in part)

10.4 Improving Training and Education
The need to train and educate examiners on existing procedures and equipment and on emerging
technologies is a recurring theme in this report. The Working Group’s recommendations involve
university education, on-the-job training and mentoring, and continuing education. Specifically,
the Working Group recommends:
Forensic service providers should require personnel to participate in continuing education.
(Recommendation 8.7 in part)
The latent print examiner community should expand the training of examiners in elementary
probability theory to enable examiners to properly utilize the output of probabilistic models.
(Recommendation 4.3)
The federal government should consider funding research to determine what educational
and cognitive abilities should be prerequisites for training a latent print examiner. Forensic
service providers should have systematic training programs that include these abilities as well
as education in the scientific method, reading and understanding relevant scientific literature,
communication skills, and methods for logically developing conclusions. (Recommendation
8.1)
Agencies should develop formal mentoring programs that define the responsibilities of the
mentor, trainee, and supervisor. (Recommendation 8.3)
Certifying bodies should ensure that examiners have been trained to competency. Laboratory
accrediting bodies should evaluate the effectiveness of an agency’s training program.
(Recommendation 8.8)
Because statistical information plays a fundamental role in weighting latent print feature
evidence, training should include the best available empirical information and should educate
examiners about probabilistic reasoning in using that information. (Recommendation 3.5)
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The federal government should establish an expert group to develop a latent print educational
textbook, practical exercises, and assessment tests (print and online) in consultation
with professional organizations, senior latent print examiners, researchers with content
knowledge, experienced trainers, and professionals experienced in curriculum development.
(Recommendation 8.4)
The federal government should support a clearinghouse of materials from existing training
programs as well as publications on latent print identification. (Recommendation 8.6)
Training materials should include topics beyond the technical aspects of friction ridge
analysis, such as:
a. Documentation of work and case notes and written and oral communication;
b. Professional ethics;
c. Human factors issues such as fatigue, bias, cognitive influences, perceptual
influences, and error;
d. Research methods; and
e. Legal and ethical aspects of expert testimony. (Recommendation 8.5)
The federal government should develop a forensic latent print examiner scholarship
program to:
a. Fund the post-hire training program and, upon successful completion, provide tuition
reimbursement, loan forgiveness, or other financial assistance to degreed latent
print examiner trainees working in state, local, or private (not-for-profit) forensic
laboratories; and
b. Reimburse the employer for a percentage of the salaries during the training period.
(Recommendation 8.2)

10.5 Providing Facilities and Equipment
Latent print examinations take place in a physical environment with hardware and software that
can facilitate the work of the examiners. To achieve the best results in examinations, the Working
Group recommends:
A structured approach that involves users throughout the entire design and implementation
process should be followed when designing technology systems and the physical work
environment. In addition, forensic service providers should perform usability testing to
optimize user performance and user satisfaction before deployment. (Recommendation 7.1)

10.6 Supporting Research Efforts
An increasing number of research projects are underway, but additional research should be
undertaken in many areas. For example, the Working Group encountered many questions about
the existing interpretive process, possible enhancements to it, and other significant matters that
presently lack definitive answers. There is a critical need for a focused program of research into
the interpretive process that is at the heart of ACE-V. For example, only a handful of studies
have assessed variation in the feature selection process. Generally, the findings have shown wide
variation among examiners during the task of feature selection. Developing methods to reduce
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the variation of the print features selected for comparisons and the development of tools and
technologies to assist in the identification of the most reliable features would both be useful.
While these tools are likely to be especially important for complex comparisons, they may have
broader benefits. Standardized methods for feature selection should result in less variation in the
features that are selected and compared, which in turn should lead to more consistency in the
decisions reported. However, even if decisions were more consistent, they would not necessarily
be more accurate. Even the best interpreters of prints should be willing to compare their own
methods to a standard protocol to decide which practice is best.
Furthermore, the link between variations in feature selection and the examiner’s ultimate
decision is not well understood. Emerging research suggests that there is a relationship, but the
effect may be competing with other major interpretative steps, such as interpreting discrepancy,
feature weighting, and thresholds for reaching identification decisions. A better understanding
of the link between feature selection and the ultimate decision would permit best practices to be
formulated. This knowledge would also allow technology systems to select the most reliable and
useful features on which to base decisions later in the ACE-V process.
The Working Group found no research that explicitly addresses utility or sufficiency in the
context of latent print analysis. This is unsurprising, for a critical piece for any such research—
the definition and validation of a metric for assessing utility—is missing. Research has been
carried out related to the examiner decision process that implicitly involves judgments of utility
and sufficiency, but these studies tend to focus only on the accuracy or repeatability of the
ultimate decision. For example, the Noblis-FBI study described in Chapter 2 treats the ACE-V
process as a “black box.” The experimenters provide the input and measure the output in various
ways. This kind of research provides valuable information on how examiners perform relative
to “ground truth” (accuracy) and how their results compare to one another (reliability). Opening
the box to study the process of judgment in every phase of ACE-V would provide the empirical
foundation from which to develop best practices for each part of the process. As a result, the
Working Group recommends:
The federal government should support a research program that aims to:
a. Develop measures and metrics relevant to the analysis of latent prints;
b. Use such metrics to assess the reproducibility, reliability, and validity of various
interpretive stages of latent print analysis; and
c. Identify key factors related to variations in performance of latent print examiners
during the interpretation process. (Recommendation 3.9)
Practitioners recognize that assigning weights to latent print features and their configurations
is a fundamental decision-making or interpretive step, either as an output of the Analysis phase
or as part of the Evaluation phase. Pioneers such as Locard indicated that fingerprint features
should be assessed as a function of their relative rarity (allowing also for a proper consideration
of their clarity).608 Currently, however, the weighting of individual features is mainly based upon
subjective, experience-based judgments of the probability associated with their occurrence. In
fact, in one study, latent print examiners did not provide consistent rankings of how frequently
Locard, E. “La Preuve Judiciaire par les Empreintes Digitales.” Archives d’Anthropologie Criminelle, de
Médecine Légale et de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, 29 (1914): 321 – 48.
608
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fingerprint features occur.609 No clear consensus exists among practitioners as to the
reproducibility and perceived contribution of Level 3 Detail features appearing in both latent
and the exemplar print.610 Carefully collected data should be used to provide more accurate
assessments that can inform the weighting of features in the interpretive process.
This statistical data also could be incorporated into formal probabilistic models of various
kinds (see Chapter 4). In addition to providing both a firmer foundation for and opportunities
to improve the judgments of examiners, such modeling can supply objective probabilities that
would be useful to judges or juries (Chapter 6). Before that can happen, however, large datasets
will be needed to validate the emerging models more fully. The Working Group therefore
recommends:
To facilitate the validation of probabilistic models and other statistical research, the federal
government should create large, anonymous databases of exemplars and latent prints.
(Recommendation 4.2)
Visual acuity is vital to the examination process, and section 10.3 included a recommendation
for medical monitoring. To permit the most effective monitoring, the Working Group also
recommends:
The federal government should support research to determine the most appropriate tests of
visual function for friction ridge examiners. (Recommendation 7.2 in part)
As discussed in Chapter 4 and section 10.4, AFIS technology has proven to be of great value
in efficiently locating candidate exemplars for examiners to compare to a questioned print. The
design of these systems could be improved in several respects.
The federal government should support research programs to improve automated fingerprint
identification systems. Such programs could address the following issues:
a. Expanding the algorithms used to match prints to account for the fact that the
diagnostic value of minutiae depends on the region in which they are located;
b. Making fingerprint and palm print databases interoperable among local, state, and
federal automated identification systems; and
c. Increasing compatibility between automated identification systems and other latent
print software tools, including digital enhancement programs, probability calculation
programs, and automated quality assessment programs. (Recommendation 4.1)
The reference above to automated quality assessment programs relates to Recommendation
3.9 for research into the interpretative process. In the experience of the Working Group, the
initial quality assessment of the latent print is often the weak link in the analytical process,
as examiners are susceptible to making one of two types of errors. In the first type of error,
the examiner prematurely discards a print that should be deemed suitable for further analysis
and comparison, possibly resulting in a missed identification. In the second type of error, the
Osterburg, J. “An Inquiry into the Nature of Proof. The Identity of Fingerprints.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 9,
no. 4 (1964): 413 – 27.
610
Anthonioz, A., N. Egli, C. Champod, et al. “Level 3 Details and Their Role in Fingerprint Identification: A Survey
Among Practitioners.” Journal of Forensic Identification, 58, no. 5 (2008): 562 – 89.
609
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examiner continues to evaluate a latent print that ought to be deemed unsuitable for further
processing. This outcome results in wasted time and might even contribute to an erroneous
identification. Although efforts to develop automated quality assessment programs have had
limited success, a concerted effort to automate the quality assessment step, at least partially, is
worthwhile. In addition to Recommendation 3.9(a), the Working Group proposes:
The federal government should continue funding research into automation of the initial
quality assessment step in latent print analysis. (Recommendation 4.4)
Latent print analysis provides perhaps the single most common type of forensic science evidence.
It is critical to the successful operation of the criminal justice system. The recommendations
listed above do not exhaust this report’s suggestions for improving the understanding and
management of human factors issues in this vital work. Related suggestions, explanations, and
ideas are found in each chapter. Translating these ideas into practice will make the analysis and
presentation of a crucial source of information even more effective and reliable.
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Appendix 10-A: List of Recommendations
Recommendation 3.1: A report and contemporaneous supporting notes or materials should
document the examination to make the interpretive process as transparent as possible. Although
the degree of detail may vary depending on the perceived complexity of the comparison,
documentation should, at a minimum, be sufficient to permit another examiner to assess the
accuracy and validity of the initial examiner’s assessment of the evidence.
Recommendation 3.2: Modifications to the results of any stage of latent print analysis (e.g.,
feature selection, utility assessment, discrepancy interpretation) after seeing a known exemplar
should be viewed with caution. Such modifications should be specifically documented as having
occurred after comparison had begun.
Recommendation 3.3: Procedures should be implemented to protect examiners from exposure to
extraneous (domain-irrelevant) information in a case.
Recommendation 3.4: Each agency or forensic service provider should define “suitable” or
“sufficient” in its standard operations procedures. These guidelines should be as explicit as
possible about what is expected for sufficiency determinations at different stages of the latent
print examination process.
Recommendation 3.5: Because statistical information plays a fundamental role in weighting
latent print feature evidence, training should include the best available empirical information and
should educate examiners about probabilistic reasoning in using that information.
Recommendation 3.6: When comparing latent prints to exemplars generated through AFIS
searches, examiners must recognize the possibility and dangers of incidental similarity.
Adjustments such as a higher decision threshold, stricter tolerances for differences in appearance,
and explicit feature weighting need to be considered. Modifying quality assurance practices for
this scenario also should be considered.
Recommendation 3.7: Because empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not support a
source attribution to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent print examiners
should not report or testify, directly or by implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion of
all others in the world.
Recommendation 3.8: The friction ridge examiner community and other experts should
determine under what circumstances a qualified rather than an absolute conclusion is warranted.
Recommendation 3.9: The federal government should support a research program that aims to:
a. Develop measures and metrics relevant to the analysis of latent prints;
b. Use such metrics to assess the reproducibility, reliability, and validity of various
interpretive stages of latent print analysis; and
c. Identify key factors related to variations in performance of latent print examiners during
the interpretation process.
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Recommendation 4.1: The federal government should support research programs to improve
automated fingerprint identification systems. Such programs could address the following issues:
a. Expanding the algorithms used to match prints to account for the fact that the diagnostic
value of minutiae depends on the region in which they are located;
b. Making fingerprint and palm print databases interoperable among local, state, and federal
automated identification systems; and
c. Increasing compatibility between automated identification systems and other latent
print software tools, including digital enhancement programs, probability calculation
programs, and automated quality assessment programs.
Recommendation 4.2: To facilitate the validation of probabilistic models and other statistical
research, the federal government should create large, anonymous databases of exemplars and
latent prints.
Recommendation 4.3: The latent print examiner community should expand the training of
examiners in elementary probability theory to enable examiners to properly utilize the output of
probabilistic models.
Recommendation 4.4: The federal government should continue funding research into automation
of the initial quality assessment step in latent print analysis.
Recommendation 5.1: The report of the examination should ensure that the findings and their
limitations are intelligible to non-experts.
Recommendation 5.2: A report should:
a. Identify the latent print examiner(s);
b. Describe the items submitted to the examiner(s);
c. List the procedures used by the examiner to develop, visualize, or enhance the friction
ridge impressions;
d. List all comparisons conducted;
e. State all conclusions with the method used to reach them;
f. Note any important limitations to the conclusions;
g. Indicate whether a verification was made and whether there was any conflict of opinion
among examiners prior to the reported conclusions;
h. Note (or refer to external documentation of) any information about the case that the
examiner(s) received;
i. Note the existence of additional documentation; and
j. Define important technical terms, either explicitly or by reference to an authoritative,
readily available source.
Recommendation 6.1: The trial preparation process should address the presentation of technical
information in lay terms, the organization of the direct examination, possible cross-examination,
and the possible use of visual aids.
Recommendation 6.2: Forensic service providers should adopt codes of ethics that require
testifying in a nonpartisan manner; answering questions from both the prosecution and the
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defense directly, accurately, and fully; and providing appropriate scientific information before,
during, and after trial.
Recommendation 6.3: A testifying expert should be familiar with the literature related to error
rates. A testifying expert should be prepared to describe the steps taken in the examination
process to reduce the risk of observational and judgmental error. The expert should not state that
errors are inherently impossible or that a method inherently has a zero error rate.
Recommendation 6.4: An agency that employs latent print examiners should establish
requirements and guidelines for reporting, documentation, and testimony. The agency should
review a sample of every examiner’s case reports, documentation, and testimony and affidavits at
least annually to verify compliance with these requirements and guidelines.
Recommendation 7.1: A structured approach that involves users throughout the entire design and
implementation process should be followed when designing technology systems and the physical
work environment. In addition, forensic service providers should perform usability testing to
optimize user performance and user satisfaction before deployment.
Recommendation 7.2: Forensic service providers should institute medical surveillance for
examiners with respect to activities specific to friction ridge examination. Corrective measures
should be taken when appropriate and recorded. The program should include a baseline visual
examination followed by annual vision testing to detect vision deficiencies that may affect
interpretation of the evidence. The federal government should support research to determine the
most appropriate tests of visual function for friction ridge examiners.
Recommendation 8.1: The federal government should consider funding research to determine
what educational and cognitive abilities should be prerequisites for training a latent print
examiner. Forensic service providers should have systematic training programs that include
these abilities as well as education in the scientific method, reading and understanding relevant
scientific literature, communication skills, and methods for logically developing conclusions.
Recommendation 8.2: The federal government should develop a forensic latent print examiner
scholarship program to:
a. Fund the post-hire training program and, upon successful completion, provide tuition
reimbursement, loan forgiveness, or other financial assistance to degreed latent print
examiner trainees working in state, local, or private (not-for-profit) forensic laboratories;
and
b. Reimburse the employer for a percentage of the salaries during the training period.
Recommendation 8.3: Agencies should establish formal mentoring programs that define the
responsibilities of the mentor, trainee, and supervisor.
Recommendation 8.4: The federal government should establish an expert group to develop a
latent print educational textbook, practical exercises, and assessment tests (print and online)
in consultation with professional organizations, senior latent print examiners, researchers
with content knowledge, experienced trainers, and professionals experienced in curriculum
development.
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Recommendation 8.5: Training materials should include topics beyond the technical aspects of
friction ridge analysis, such as:
a. Documentation of work and case notes and written and oral communication;
b. Professional ethics;
c. Human factors issues such as fatigue, bias, cognitive influences, perceptual influences,
and error;
d. Research methods; and
e. Legal and ethical aspects of expert testimony.
Recommendation 8.6: The federal government should support a clearinghouse of materials from
existing training programs as well as publications on latent print identification.
Recommendation 8.7: Forensic service providers should require personnel to participate
in continuing education and to become certified through an accredited program. Certifying
bodies should review current certification tests with the aid of professionals in test design and
psychometrics.
Recommendation 8.8: Certifying bodies should ensure that examiners have been trained to
competency. Laboratory accrediting bodies should evaluate the effectiveness of an agency’s
training program.
Recommendation 9.1: Management should foster a culture in which it is understood that some
human error is inevitable and that openness about errors leads to improvements in practice.
Recommendation 9.2: Management should employ a system to identify and track errors and their
causes.
Recommendation 9.3: All forensic service providers should be accredited by a recognized
accrediting body.
Recommendation 9.4: Management should establish policies and procedures for case review and
conflict resolution, corrective action, and preventive measures.
Recommendation 9.5: The latent print community should develop and implement a
comprehensive testing program that includes competency testing, certification testing, and
proficiency testing.
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